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 ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the interconnection between old and new actors as well as programs for 
conflict management in the workplace:  unions and Integrated Conflict Management Systems 
(ICMSs).  ICMSs are designed to provide an interconnected web of conflict resolution options 
and services to employees with ultimate aim of creating organizations that can productively 
manage conflict.  Given that ICMSs have primarily been used by and researched in non-union 
organizations, this study investigates the interaction of ICMSs with traditional conflict resolution 
approaches and procedures found in unionized workplaces.  Using a comparative case research 
design, the study investigates the reasons why three local unions in a large U.S. government 
agency take different positions on the desirability of a conflict management system.  It finds the 
level of alignment between local union goals and strategies and local management goals and 
strategies is the key factor explaining the divergent union approaches.  The thesis proposes a 
model of union engagement with conflict management systems and discusses the implications of 
such a model for conflict management system theory. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE CENTRAL ROLE OF STAKEHOLDER GOALS AND STRATEGIES 
 
 Our conversation was in its final stretch.  As I commonly do in interviews coming to a 
close, I asked the interviewee, “Do you have any final comments or additional thoughts you 
would like to share?”  After a brief pause, the union member, who was an employee of the U.S. 
Department of the Interior, replied, “Fuck management.” 
 I was immediately taken aback at my interviewee’s blunt transition as she1 had spoken 
with me at length just two minutes previously about her commitment to public service: 
  I want to show people that the federal government is working for them.  If I can  
  slice through or interpret the red tape and help an American citizen--- after every  
  encounter I make with a citizen, I want them to walk away: ‘Wow, now I know  
  why I am paying my taxes.’  That is why I go to work every day.  (A-U-8) 
 
Even though her commitment to the public service mission of the government organization was 
strong, such an anti-management view would be labeled by many on the outside as a “problem 
employee” or an “organizational troublemaker.”  But as this thesis will show, this employee’s 
disconnect between her view of management and the federal government as a whole gets to the 
heart of core issues in workplace conflict; programs, systems, and strategies attempting to 
actively and productively manage conflict; and the theoretical perspectives underlying them all. 
 In this thesis, I examine the interconnection between old and new actors and forms of 
conflict management in the workplace:  unions and Integrated Conflict Management Systems 
(ICMSs).  Although the role of unions in workplace conflict management has been well 
documented in the industrial relations literature, ICMSs are newer entrants on the scene.  They 
are a bundle of practices and workplaces resources that provide additional conflict management 
                                                
1 To protect the anonymity of study participants, I use the pronouns “she” and “her” exclusively in the thesis when 
discussing anonymized comments from managers and union members. 
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options that are not traditionally available in union and non-union workplaces.  Since little is 
currently known about ICMS operation in unionized settings, since such systems are both new to 
and also limited in number in unionized organizations, I intend to provide an empirical look at 
the relationship between unions and ICMSs. 
 Specifically, my thesis answers the question:  Why do local unions use different tactics 
toward participation in an ICMS?  My research setting is the United States Department of the 
Interior (DOI), a cabinet-level executive branch agency that has in recent years implemented an 
integrated conflict management system called CORE PLUS.  With 150 different bargaining units 
representing 21,000 employees, DOI provides a good setting in which to investigate such a 
question due to the fact that union locals have taken drastically different approaches to CORE 
PLUS, with some actively using the system and others prohibiting the employees they represent 
from using it. 
 At first glance one may surmise that in relationships that are traditionally viewed in 
industrial relations as operating under a ‘high’ industrial relations climate with collaboration, 
partnership, and informal methods of dispute resolution the norm, ICMS adoption and use would 
be expected.  In workplaces with ‘low’ industrial relations climates, it could reasonably be 
expected that unions would refuse to allow an ICMS into the workplace due to the tendency for 
management and union representatives to resort to formal and adversarial conflict management 
tactics in such settings. 
 Although I find that industrial relations climate is an important component of an 
explanation of the relationship between unions and conflict management systems, it ultimately is 
only part of the story.  A fuller account of such a relationship, I argue, must take into account the 
difference between unitarist and pluralist conceptions of workplace conflict and how those 
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theoretical orientations manifest themselves in the design, implementation, and operation of a 
workplace ICMS.  I also argue for a multiple stakeholder view of workplace conflict rather than 
a single organizational view (Lipsky et al. 2003; Avgar 2008).  I found that the overlap (and 
alternatively: disconnect) of ‘union’ and ‘management’ goals and strategies were key 
explanatory factors for the initial adoption and eventual engagement of the union in a workplace 
ICMS. 
 While analyzing my interview and observation data from the three bargaining units 
included in the study, it became evident that the three locals I had selected to study all had taken 
forms of theoretical extremes when it came to deciding on the conflict management tactics they 
were using generally to manage conflict in their bargaining units, and specifically in regards to 
their choices about initially participating in the CORE PLUS ICMS and their ongoing 
engagement with it.  As will be noted in Chapter 2, the limited previous research in the area of 
conflict management systems in organized workplaces has focused almost solely on the design 
and initial implementation stages of conflict management systems in unionized settings.  
Alternatively, this study investigates local union responses to an ICMS after the design phase (in 
which the unions did not play a role) is complete and the system is fully operational.  This setting 
provides a unique opportunity to investigate the union-ICMS relationship theoretically and 
clearly finds that there is not a monolithic ‘union’ response to ICMSs in the workplace. 
 Goals and objectives exist in all organizations.  Whether they are and can be identified, 
communicated, and/or contested by internal and external stakeholders is what varies a great deal 
among organizations.  Organizational goals and objectives can be large or small and they can and 
often do change.  One can imagine a large automobile manufacturer having the goal of being the 
leading producer of SUVs in the world.  One can also imagine a sole proprietor of a small bed-
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and-breakfast having the goal of attaining sufficient revenue in her business to be able to quit her 
part-time job.  In the public sector, government agencies often have their goals and objectives 
dictated to them by higher authorities, such as the President and Congress.  In large, diverse 
organizations, goals and objectives may vary at differing levels of the organizations as well as 
for differing internal stakeholders. 
 In this thesis, I focus specifically on the goals and objectives of local unions and 
managers in the bargaining units I study, finding they significantly impact conflict management 
strategies and tactics, such as, and importantly, participation in the CORE PLUS ICMS.  When 
discussing goals and strategy in a negotiation context, Lewicki et al. identify a linear path with 
goals leading to strategy and strategy leading to choice of tactics.  Strategy is defined as the 
“pattern or plan that integrates an organization’s major targets, policies, and action sequences 
into a cohesive whole” (Lewicki et al., 2010, 110).  Lipsky and Avgar provide an additional 
definition:  “skill in managing or planning, especially by using stratagem” (2008, 157).  Tactics 
are seen by Lewicki et al. as “subordinate to strategy; they are structured, directed, and driven by 
strategic considerations.”  Adding further clarification, they argue tactics are, “short-term, 
adaptive moves designed to enact or pursue broad (or higher-level) strategies, which in turn 
provide stability, continuity, and direction for tactical behaviors” (2010, 110-111). 
 While I find the distinction among goals, strategy, and tactics extremely helpful in 
distinguishing the subprocesses of organizational goal setting and execution, I argue against 
thinking of them in a strictly linear relationship.  I also find that tactics used to manage conflict, 
which importantly includes ‘not managing’ conflict, the three bargaining units in this study are 
not only influenced by strategic choices but also the IR climates in the bargaining units. 
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 I argue that goals, strategies and tactics can vary across levels of organizations.  While 
upper management can attempt to align goals of the whole organization, such a project is 
extremely challenging in such a large, decentralized, and diverse organization as DOI.  While 
one can think of variation vertically within an organization, one can also think of horizontal 
differences in goals, strategies, and tactics of different offices or regions within an organization.  
Additionally, organizations often exhibit non-strategic behavior that is misaligned and does not 
follow from goals and objectives (Lewicki et al. 2010, 556-557). 
 Up to this point subgroups within organizations have been considered vertically and 
horizontally, but not in-depth.  Subgroups within the workplace also can be seen to have 
differing goals and objectives, strategies, and tactics.  Importantly for this study, the pluralist 
industrial relations tradition posits that there are underlying, and inevitable, conflicts of interest 
on many fronts of workers and management in organizations (Gall and Hebdon 2008, 592).  
Following this logic one can see how goals, strategies, and tactics of local unions would vary 
from those of local management teams.  It is to an analysis of the goals and objectives (and 
related strategies and tactics) of local unions in each of the three bargaining units in this study 
and their corresponding management teams, to which I will turn in Chapter 5. 
 As I will discuss in Chapter 3, I use an interpretive approach in which visits to and 
interviews with union leaders and members as well as managers to identify, goals and objectives 
and strategies of the groups.  I accomplish this directly, by asking key informants about their 
strategic goals, and indirectly through observation and inference from our discussion of other 
topics.  I pay particular attention to the language of union members and managers in the 
bargaining units I study.  How do they conceptualize their relationship?  How broadly shared are 
their goals, strategies, and tactics?  I find the degree to which goals and objectives and associated 
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strategies of local unions overlap with those of local management directly impact the conflict 
management tactical choices the unions make. 
 Before moving in to a substantive discussion of my fieldwork and findings, Chapter 2 
provides a review of the relevant literature for this research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This thesis sits at the intersection of several different industrial relations, public 
administration, and legal literatures:  a) workplace conflict in the public sector, b) conflict 
resolution in federal sector labor relations, c) unions and workplace conflict, and d) conflict 
management systems and unionized organizations.  While each of these four areas are large 
considered individually, I focus in this literature review on the key works in these areas as well 
as newer relevant research.  I find that research in each of the four spheres is largely independent 
of the others.  Therefore, this thesis’s focus on public sector union approaches to conflict 
management systems provides an opportunity to integrate ideas from across the four distinct 
research streams.  As will be seen, the intersection of traditional federal labor relations law and 
practice with newer forms of conflict management, such as an ICMS, brings challenges as well 
as opportunities to established labor relations practices. 
 
Workplace Conflict in the Public Sector 
 Most industrial relations and workplace conflict experts agree:  conflict is inevitable in all 
union and non-union workplaces, and thus ‘conflict’ found in micro and macro levels forms the 
central organizing nub of industrial relations scholarship.  Although scholars agree that at the 
interpersonal micro level, conflict exists in public sector workplaces in a manner similar to 
workplaces in the private sector, debate in the field has existed for many years on the 
fundamental bases of conflict in the public sector at the macro level. 
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 Before assessing the theoretical debates surrounding public sector labor relations and 
workplace conflict, I first would like to briefly review the three theoretical bases of workplace 
conflict, formed from theorizing around private sector workplaces, that are central to theory in 
the field of labor and employment relations.  Gall and Hebdon (2008) identify three main 
perspectives in the field, which address the source of workplace conflict and inevitability of 
workplace conflict. 
 The first perspective is the unitarist perspective, which “denies the existence of an 
inherent conflict of interest between management and labor.  Thus, as long as sound management 
practices and policies are followed, conflict is neither necessary nor inevitable.”  Gall and 
Hebdon discuss how this perspective on workplace conflict has dominated the study of human 
resources management for the past twenty years (2008, 591). 
 The second perspective the authors discuss is the radical/materialist perspective.  This 
orientation to conflict posits that conflict will inherently be present in capitalism.  It will be 
present, a) between workers and management fighting over the distribution of the firm’s 
resources, and b) through a struggle over employers trying to maximize the value they derive out 
of purchased labor power.  Thus, this perspective leads to a focus on the collective nature of 
conflict, and wider class struggles and has been the primary orienting lens for critical scholarship 
on conflict and employment relations (2008, 591). 
 Third, the pluralist perspective, posits that conflict is inevitable and can be healthy “so 
long as it does not become endemic, widespread or embedded.”  Therefore, the “means of 
institutionalizing, and thus ameliorating, conflict into acceptable forms and levels are deemed a 
prerequisite for responsible management” (2008, 592).  This perspective on conflict has been the 
principal perspective on conflict in the field of labor and employment relations in the United 
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States.  It can be seen to rest in some sense in between the unitarist and radical perspectives, 
resting with an understanding that some conflict is inevitable, but focusing on ways to resolve 
some conflict deemed unproductive.  Rather than silencing conflict and attempting to eliminate 
all conflict from the workplace, conflict through the pluralist lens can be seen as an opportunity 
to learn about and to improve workplaces for managers, unions, and employees alike. 
 In the public sector, the employment relationship, while still mainly employer/employee-
based as in the private sector, can be seen not to fit neatly into certain workplace conflict 
perspectives.  The radical/materialist perspective that conflict is inherent in capitalism is 
muddied by the fact that public employees do not work for profit-seeking private organizations.  
In the grand scheme of things, serving the public is the primary interest of public sector 
organizations.  The value of public sector organizations is derived from their service to the public 
rather than the profits they generate (Scheuerman 1989: 435).  At the same time, even though at 
a macro level employee and employer (in the case of the public sector:  the government) interests 
are not inherently in conflict over the ownership of the firm and distribution its profits, employee 
and employer interests may still differ over central items in the employment relationship, such as 
salary, benefits, and working conditions, as well as regarding the mission and vision of the public 
agency.  Therefore, at a macro structural level, the pluralist perspective on conflict, I argue, best 
captures the realities of public sector conflict and is the perspective on conflict used to evaluate 
unions and Integrated Conflict Management Systems in this thesis. 
  
Conflict Resolution in Federal Sector Labor Relations 
 Debate over the theoretical underpinnings and appropriateness of collective bargaining 
for public sector employees has raged in intellectual circles for about a century.  In recent years 
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the debate has spilled out of books and journal articles and into the streets of Madison, 
Wisconsin, and in other states where legislatures and governors are attempting change state and 
local government collective bargaining laws.  While the federal government has been largely 
spared the rancorous debate in some states, debate still occurs about the appropriateness of its 
primary, albeit limited, collective bargaining and union representation statute, the Federal 
Service Labor-Management Relations Statute of 1978 (FSLMRS), which was incorporated into 
the Civil Service Reform Act of the same year (5 U.S.C. Chapter 71). 
 Historically debate centered around the suitability of the institution of collective 
bargaining in the federal government, due to the fact that it is not a normal private sector 
employer, but a “sovereign” one.  Two arguments, outlined by Wilson Hart in his history of early 
federal sector industrial relations, predominated.  The first argued “the ‘sovereign’ nature of the 
government prevents it from assuming the position of an employer in the normal collective-
bargaining relationship” (1961: 11).  The second stated the constitutionally mandated separation 
of powers did not permit a management-union collective bargaining relationship to occur: 
  Decisions concerning government employees’ wages, hours, and conditions of  
  employment—the issues that form the substance of collective bargaining—lie  
  principally in the realm of the legislature.  Hence the ‘employer’ (i.e. the   
  executive) is powerless to bargain on those issues that most deeply concern the  
  employee. (1961: 11-12) 
 
Since wages, leave, holidays, retirement benefits, and health insurance for federal employees 
were all determined through federal law written by Congress and implemented by the President, 
the prevailing view argued that collective bargaining with the executive branch was therefore not 
appropriate. 
 Congress addressed the issues outlined by Hart by limiting the scope of collective 
bargaining in the FSLMRS.  Since agencies’ budgets were set by Congress, the statute does not 
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allow bargaining over wages and benefits and instead limits mandatory subjects of bargaining 
primarily to conditions of employment.  The law also created an independent agency, the Federal 
Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), modeled after the National Labor Relations Board, to 
determine appropriate bargaining units and oversee elections for exclusive representation of a 
unit by a petitioning union.  Not surprisingly, due to the limited scope of bargaining in the sector, 
conflict management takes on a more important role in the federal sector than it often does in the 
private sector.  The FSLMRS requires all federal bargaining units to be ‘open shop’ meaning 
collective bargaining agreement language requiring employees to join a union or pay a 
representational fee to a union is unlawful.  Thus, conflict resolution is a key way, along with 
legislative lobbying, for federal sector unions to provide value to their members. 
 As one experienced federal union representative commented in a study conducted prior to 
the enactment of the FSLMRS, when collective bargaining in the federal sector was governed by 
executive order, “as far as unions are concerned, grievances are the name of the game in the 
federal sector” (Sulzner 1980, 149).  Improving dispute resolution procedures was a notable 
feature of the legislation with its own stated goals to “broaden and strengthen 
grievance/arbitration procedures for Federal employees” and to “increase credibility and 
acceptance of the third-party mechanism” (OPM 1980, i).  The Act did so first through a major 
change to the scope of grieveable disputes.  Unlike in the previous governing Executive Orders, 
the Act states that appealable personnel actions covered under statutory appeals processes were 
now assumed to be included in negotiated grievance procedures, unless parties specifically 
excluded such actions in their CBAs (OPM 1980, i-ii).  This allowed grievances to be filed over 
actions (primarily discharges and suspensions of 14 days or more) that had been statutorily 
appealable and excluded from pre-CSRA grievance procedures:  adverse actions (5 U.S.C. 
 12 
7512), actions based on unacceptable performance (5 U.S.C. 4303) and EEO complaints (5 
U.S.C. 7702).  For the first time, federal employees had a choice of a grievance or statutory 
appeals process for these major disciplinary actions.  If employees chose the negotiated 
grievance procedure, the Act required final decisions be subject to review by the appropriate 
body, i.e. the Merit Systems Protection Board for civil service law and regulation and the EEOC 
for discrimination, at the request of the employee (OPM 1980, ii). 
 Also for the first time, the Act required a grievance procedure be included in each CBA 
with binding arbitration as the final step (OPM 1980, ii).  This requirement stands in stark 
contrast to the National Labor Relations Act (as amended), which does not prescribe any specific 
requirement for a formal grievance procedure, leaving it completely to the parties to decide if 
they want one to supplement their statutory rights to strike/lockout and to go to federal district 
court to enforce terms found in their contracts. 
 The CSRA defines “grievance” extremely broadly: 
   Any complaint: 
   (A) by any employee concerning any matter relating to the employment of the    
   employee;  
   (B) by any labor organization concerning any matter relating to the employment of   
   any employee; or  
   (C) by any employee, labor organization, or agency concerning—  
    (i) the effect or interpretation, or a claim of breach, of a collective bargaining  
    agreement; or  
    (ii) any claimed violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of any law, rule,   
    or regulation affecting conditions of employment. (5 U.S.C. 7103(a)(9)) 
 
Although the definition of grievance is expansive, the Act outlines five types of disputes that 
cannot be grieved: 
  1.  Any claimed violation relating to prohibited political activities (Hatch Act violations) 
  2.  Retirement, life insurance, or health insurance 
  3.  A suspension or removal under section 7532 (National Security) of Title 5 
  4.  Any examination, certification, or appointment 
  5.  The classification of any position which does not result in the reduction in grade or pay of  
  an employee (5 U.S.C. 7121(c)) 
 
Even with the above five restrictions, the statutory framework for federal sector grievances can 
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be seen to be vast in scope, especially when compared to private sector grievance procedures that 
are used almost solely to resolve disputes surrounding contract interpretation and just cause for 
discipline.  Since the CSRA allows employees and unions to file grievances for complaints not 
directly tied to a claimed violation of the CBA or law (unless such an option is restricted by the 
parties’ own CBA), the procedure can be seen as a venue for traditional rights disputes as well as 
interest disputes that do not appeal to external criteria.  This, I argue, is a unique feature of the 
federal grievance procedure and should have important implications for federal sector dispute 
system design, including importantly ICMSs. 
 Due to a variety of factors, including the increasing cost of federal workplace redress and 
grievance procedures, Congress instructed agencies beginning in the early 1990s to consider and 
implement alternative forms of dispute resolution.  Legislation formally introducing alternative 
dispute resolution to federal agency administrative processes came first with the Administrative 
Dispute Resolution Act of 1990 and next with the ADR Act of 1996, which made features of the 
1990 Act permanent (U.S. Interagency Working Group 2007, 1).  The first and most 
comprehensive academic analysis of the legislation is a 1996 study by Lisa Bingham and Charles 
Wise.  In it, they examine both the language and variety of implementation strategies agencies 
had taken after the 1990 Act’s passage.  Generally, the Act allows for a “broad range of ADR 
techniques in federal administrative process where the parties agree to their use” (1996, 384).  
Such a technique as defined by the Act is: 
  Any procedure that is used in lieu of an adjudication as defined in [the APA], to  
  resolves issues in controversy, including but not limited to, settlement negotiations,  
  conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact finding, minitrials, and arbitration, or any  
  combination thereof. (1996, 385) 
 
Bingham and Wise discuss the fact that agencies may choose to use ADR in any administrative 
proceeding, but the Act notes that ADR is not appropriate in all instances (1996, 385-386).  For 
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example, an agency may want a ruling from an arbitrator in an employment matter that would 
clarify ambiguous CBA language.  Or, if the agency had been thinking about using ADR in its 
own administrative process, as in the example of the NLRB using ADR to help resolve unfair 
labor practice complaints, it may sometimes want to issue a ruling to serve as precedent.  In these 
situations, ADR would not necessarily help the agency reach its goal. 
 Due to the varying need for ADR across a diverse federal government, the 1990 ADR Act 
had minimal requirements:  
  1.  Agencies must consider using ADR. 
  2.  An agency-developed policy on the use of ADR 
  3.  A senior official must be designated “Dispute Resolution Specialist” responsible  
  for agency policy and its implementation. (386) 
 
To discover the extent of ADR institutionalization and the variation in institutionalization across 
federal agencies, Bingham and Wise interviewed the Dispute Resolution Specialists of 12 out of 
13 cabinet agencies as well as 27 non-cabinet agencies (1996, 392).  Interestingly 67% of cabinet 
agencies surveyed used ADR for personnel matters (excluding EEO), while 33% of non-cabinet 
agencies did (1996, 400).  When it comes to using ADR in EEO proceedings the rate is higher 
for both groups, with 100% of cabinet agencies surveyed and 44% of non-cabinet agencies 
reporting its use in their agencies. 
 Through their interviews with agency Dispute Resolution Specialists, Bingham and Wise 
found four major obstacles to a full implementation of ADR not just in personnel and EEO 
matters, but also in all other agency matters in which it could be used.  The first is agency inertia.  
Initiating change in any organization can be challenging, especially in organizations that are 
highly regulated such as federal agencies.  The second is resistance from agency attorneys.  This 
influential group of agency employees often feared the loss of their leadership role with the 
advent of ADR and also feared that having the agency participate in ADR processes would limit 
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their options if a matter ever advanced to litigation.  The third barrier Bingham and Wise found 
is lack of basic knowledge on various ADR options.  Some Dispute Resolution Specialists 
reported colleagues not understanding that ADR (outside of the realm of arbitration and fact-
finding) helps parties reach mutual agreement, if possible.  Some agency officials, it was 
reported, believed that all ADR was like arbitration and thought using it meant turning over 
power to decide disputes to outside neutrals.  The last barrier identified by the authors is that of 
resources.  Many agency Dispute Resolution Specialists reported they held their job only part 
time and it was added to their already full loads.  Without adequate budgets, the specialists were 
often hamstrung in their efforts to offer training and further interest in ADR in their agencies 
(1996, 403-405). 
 Where do unions fit into this early federal ADR institutionalization story?  Labor 
organizations as well as the employees they represent are left out of Bingham and Wise’s 
analysis, which is centered solely on agency management’s perspectives.  Almost all federal 
agencies have at least some employees covered under collective bargaining agreements.  Do 
unions representing federal employees view ADR in the form of integrated conflict management 
systems as a complement or substitute for the traditional role they provide in the negotiated 
grievance procedure as well as the representational services they provide to union members in 
EEOC and Merit Systems Protection Board statutory appeals proceedings?  Is there variation in 
views across union internationals and locals?   This thesis begins to address these questions, 
which have not yet been researched in the federal sector and the U.S. public sector more 
generally. 
 
 
 16 
Unions and Workplace Conflict 
 I now turn to a review of the literature on private sector unions and workplace conflict.  
While much of the workplace conflict management literature is currently focused on newer 
programs namely, conflict management systems, it is important to remember that unions were 
the first workplace organizations formed to manage workplace conflict outside of informal 
individual and group-level negotiations and interactions between employees and managers.  
Rather than being initiated by management, as is usually the case with conflict management 
systems, unions in the U.S. were primarily instigated at the behest of employees who conducted 
an organizing campaign and achieved support of a majority of employees in the bargaining unit, 
often without concurrent management approval. 
 Unions, therefore, can be seen to be constantly and unceasingly managing conflict in the 
workplace.  Historically, labor and employment relations scholarship has looked primarily in 
private sector organizations at the varieties of strategies and tactics of unions and managers to 
manage conflict in the workplace.  John Dunlop’s classic text, Industrial Relations Systems 
(1958), developed a systems theoretical view of industrial relations in which the three primary 
actors of industrial relations were:  workers and their representatives, management, and 
government agencies regulating the employment relationship, like the National Labor Relations 
Board.  “The interaction of these actors generated two types of rules, procedural rules that 
governed [actors’] interaction, including procedures for collective bargaining and dispute 
resolution, and substantive rules that specified the terms of the employment relationship” (Heery 
2008, 70).  In this traditional view of the industrial relations system, dispute resolution between 
union and management was channeled primarily through the grievance procedure negotiated by 
the parties and found in their collective bargaining agreement, through the National Labor 
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Relations Board unfair labor practice procedure, or the courts.  Although exact details of the 
dispute resolution procedure could vary, Dunlop’s “web of rules” held unions, managers, and 
government together in a larger industrial relations system. 
 Following Dunlop and taking a systems approach to industrial relations, James Kuhn in his 
1961 classic, Bargaining in Grievance Settlement:  The Power of Industrial Work Groups, asks 
the question:  Is the negotiated grievance procedure an “adequate and acceptable means of 
settling all disputes arising in the shop?... Does it in fact fulfill the promise we have assumed it 
holds forth?” (1961, 3).  Kuhn notes that the benefits of the grievance procedure over work 
stoppages for rights disputes (disputes regarding the application of terms and conditions of the 
collective bargaining agreement) are frequently lauded in the labor and employment relations 
literature, but not much was known at the time about grievance procedure effectiveness. 
 To attempt to answer his research question, Kuhn studied grievances and grievance 
handling in 20 plants of 9 industries (1961, 3-4).  He found that variation in the process 
grievances are handled mattered and that in certain shops grievance procedures worked more 
effectively than others.  Like Dunlop, Kuhn believed in the “maturity of collective bargaining” 
and that wildcat strikes would ultimately be fully replaced by use of the grievance procedure 
(1961, 50).  The major contribution of Kuhn’s study was his identification of the tactic of 
“fractional bargaining,” or bargaining between work groups and management rather than 
between the union and management (1961, 79).  Since multiple work groups usually are 
combined into one bargaining unit, the potentially divided loyalties of the work groups were seen 
as a threat to the union’s overall legitimacy and power in the workplace.  Another key 
contribution Kuhn made is his recognition of the grievance process as “continuous shop 
bargaining” rather than seeing it outside of the context of collective bargaining (1961, 77).  
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Taking this perspective means that a researcher analyzing conflict management tactics that 
unions use should not consider such tactics outside the union’s bargaining function; instead, they 
fall squarely within it. 
 Moving to the 1980s and 1990s, I now turn to more current theorists of unionized 
workplace conflict resolution.  As in the case of Kuhn, the research focused on the grievance 
procedure found in the collective bargaining agreement of the parties.  In a 1996 article, 
Bemmels and Foley argued that the literature on the usage and operation of the grievance 
procedure in unionized organizations had to date been limited by lack of available data and a 
focus before the mid-1980s on arbitration rather than the grievance procedure steps leading up to 
it (1996, 360).  They argued that there is currently no one “complete theory” of the grievance 
procedure and, instead, grievance procedure researchers were in a period of theory development 
(1996, 361).  The authors continued on to state their belief that grievance rates should be highly 
correlated with “subjective evaluations of the level of conflict in a bargaining relationship.”  
Therefore, they argued, “Perceptual measures of the nature of the bargaining relationship are not 
appropriate explanatory variables for studies of grievance rates.”  Instead, they think it is “much 
more interesting to determine the impact of environmental factors, management, and union 
policies or the attitudes and behaviors of the actors in the grievance procedure on grievance 
rates” (1996, 369).  While I agree that management and union “policies” are key explanatory 
variables for the determination of grievance rates, I argue in this thesis that “perceptual measures 
of the nature of the bargaining relationship” contribute to and at the same time are influenced by, 
the “policies” I refer to here as “strategies” of local unions and managers.  Both, I find, are 
interrelated and important in the conflict management tactics chosen, which are not just limited 
to filing grievances. 
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 Clark et al. argued in a 1990 study that the grievance procedure has a benefit to unions as 
organizations independent of the benefits it brings to individual bargaining unit employees: 
  Ultimately, the presence of a grievance procedure holds unique benefits for  
  unions and union leaders.  Representing members in the grievance procedure is  
  one of the most visible services unions provide.  This mechanism, more so than  
  contract negotiations, legislative activity, or virtually any other union service,  
  operates at the workplace level.  It provides members with an opportunity to see  
  the union ‘in action’ in a way that few union services are seen. (1990, 149) 
 
Conducting a survey of members (excluding stewards and officers) of the National Association 
of Letter Carriers, a federal employee union representing Postal Service workers, the researchers 
found that attitudes towards grievance procedures were significantly and positively related to the 
loyalty dimension of general union commitment.  Additionally the authors found perceptions of 
procedural fairness of the grievance procedure were more important than distributive effect 
concerns (1990, 153). 
 Another key researcher of the grievance procedure is David Lewin, who along with 
Richard Peterson conducted a study of four industries to learn more about the operation of 
grievance procedures in union settings, noting the last major study of the grievance procedure 
was Kuhn’s (1988, 1).  Lewin and Peterson use a limited definition of grievance for the study; 
one that “refer[s] to any alleged violation of the labor agreement between the parties where the 
grievance takes a written form and where it pertains to contract language” (1988, 2).  The 
authors’ two research questions are a) “How effective are unionized grievance procedures in the 
United States?” and b) “What are the consequences of using the procedure?” (1988, 6).  They 
find expedited grievance procedures “appear to be associated with higher levels of grievance 
procedure effectiveness” as well as the finding that employers punish grievance filers 
“irrespective of whether or not these same employers seek to rid themselves of unions” (1988, 
209-210).  This finding indicates that employers see the grievance procedure and grievants as 
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problems rather than constructively using voice to bring issues and concerns to the attention of 
management. 
 In a later review, Lewin argues there is no “consensus among researchers or practitioners 
about what exactly constitutes” grievance procedure effectiveness.  One can imagine that it 
would be hard to argue that a procedure was functioning ‘perfectly’ if it was being overused or 
going unused (2008, 456).  Lewin argues that the availability of the grievance procedure along 
with high-involvement human resources management practices has been shown to be associated 
with positive organizational performance measures.  Whereas “the actual use of a grievance or 
grievance-like procedure has been shown to be negatively associated with these and other 
measures of organizational performance” (460).  This negative stigma attached to raising 
grievances may mean many employees are “suffering in silence,” Lewin argues (462).  
Documenting this hypothesis is a challenge for researchers of the grievance procedure, who have 
focused on the incidence and content of written grievances.  Studies focusing on written 
grievances obviously leave out any employee who has not filed a grievance.  Therefore, my 
study, which involves interviews with union members and managers regarding perceptions of 
conflict and its resolution in their bargaining unit, includes the attitudes opinions of non-filers.  
For example, I find one bargaining unit in my study with various issues and conflict present.  A 
written grievance has never been filed in this unit. 
 While Dunlop and the grievance procedure scholars who explicitly or implicitly use his 
framework focus on the structure and relations among the institutions regulating the workplace, 
another industrial relations theorist, Jack Barbash, developed a theory of industrial relations that 
places a pluralist understanding of conflict at its core.  Barbash argues against the unitarist 
perspective on conflict when he states that workers’ interests do not align with management’s.  
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“The worker is more interested in other aspects of his job than he is in fulfilling the rationality 
goals of his order-giver,” he avers (1964, 69).  Using this pluralist understanding of conflict, 
Barbash finds many differences between employees and management are due to “genuine 
differences in interest and power” and will not be “removed by policies of ‘love will conquer 
all’” which can be seen as a dig against a more unitarist view of workplace conflict (1964, 77).  
Barbash also argues the central problem of industrial relations revolves around a pluralist notion 
of conflict.  “The problem of industrial relations, then, arises out of the tension between the 
employer’s application of rational pressures and the worker’s resistance to these pressures 
through his protective devices” (1964, 72). 
 Barbash notes what he believes to be the inherent conflict of interest in the employment 
relationship that can be applied to the private and public sectors: 
  The relationship between managers and workers, it is argued here, flows along a  
  continuum whose phases oscillate between diversity, conflict, and resolution of  
  conflict--that is, between opposition and common interest.  This is a law of motion of 
  work-place relationships, irrespective of the label which the enterprise bears:   
  capitalist, socialist, communist, or fascist.  This law also operates irrespective of the  
  shape and form which the defensive work-site reaction takes:  trade union, company  
  union, or informal groupings.  What does vary is the amplitude of the swing from one 
  phase of the continuum to the other.  (1964, 73) 
 
This spectrum between “opposition and common interest” as well as the “amplitude of the swing 
from one phase of the continuum to the other” is a helpful tool to understand the strategic 
choices unions make among their conflict management and bargaining tactics: 
  The test to which the union performance is put by both union leader and worker is its  
  capacity to stabilize achievement of gains to be sure, as a result of conflict, but  
  conflict which will rapidly be followed by resolution. Extreme militancy, or   
  militancy for its own sake, makes it impossible for the union to achieve the short-run  
  gains by which it maintains itself as an institution, while extreme ‘co-operativeness’  
  with the management impairs its solidarity as a group in its own right. (1964, 73) 
 
Tactics unions use on the continuum of which Barbash writes, along with tactics used by 
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management bring us to a discussion of the concept of “industrial relations climate,” a measure 
of the relationship between management and unions developed in the 1980s and 1990s.  It is to 
this measure that I now turn. 
 Industrial relations climate is defined traditionally as the “perceptions of organizational 
members about the norms, conduct, and atmosphere of union-management relations in the 
workplace” (Dastmalchian 2008, 548).  Originally developed through studies conducted in the 
1970s and 1980s, the measure attempted to capture workers’ and managers’ views about their 
workplace union-management relationship in a more systematic way than had been done 
previously.  While industrial relations scholars and practitioners had referred to issues of 
cooperative versus adversarial labor relations as well as trusting versus non-trusting 
relationships, the IR climate concept was a way for researchers to combine multiple dimensions 
into one measure.  In 1991, Dastmalchian, Blyton, and Adamson conducted a study of 51 
Canadian organizations in the public and private sectors and, using survey and field interview 
methods, developed through factor analysis a “final measure of IR climate that consisted of 20-
items measuring 5 dimensions of:  fairness, union-management consultation, mutual regard, 
membership support for unions, and union legitimacy” (Dastmalchian 2008, 555). 
 Other researchers have measured IR climate through other scales or through a modified 
Dastmalchian-et al. measure.  For example, Hammer et al. created a six-item uni-dimensional IR 
climate measure, which consisted of questions surrounding levels of trust, respect, cooperation, 
and labor-management relationship quality (1991, 678).  For this thesis, I have chosen to use 
Hammer et al.’s scales to explore the above four criteria of IR climate in the three bargaining 
units included in my study. 
 Discussions of IR climate in some instances can wade into normative territory.  When 
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reviewing literature on the measure, Dastmalchian uses the phrase “positive labor-management 
climate” to indicate a generally cooperative and trusting relationship between unions and local 
management.  Dastmalchian also argues “most of the literature tends to favor positive IR 
climates,” finding benefits for units and management with more cooperative approaches (2008, 
561).  In this thesis, I shy away from assigning a normative value to IR climates as I find the 
parties strategically manage their IR climate through conflict management and other tactics.  
Depending on a party’s goals and strategies what Dastmalchian deems a “positive” IR climate 
may actually be ‘negative’ in the eyes of a party.  For example, using a modified version of the 
Dastmalchian et al. IR climate measure that only focused on the conflictual vs. cooperative labor 
relations scale, Bacon and Blyton found in a study of the UK steel industry that unions in mills 
with a more cooperative IR climate did not fare as well as units with a conflictual IR climate 
when organizational changes were introduced (2006, 226). 
 Recently, Snape and Redman published a study that investigated the two questions:  a) 
whether IR climate is best conceptualized at the individual-level or at the level of the workplace 
and b) whether IR climate was positively or negatively related to union commitment.  Using 
survey data from unionized workplaces in northeast England and the Hammer et al. (1991) IR 
climate measure, they found that perceptually IR climate is more appropriately considered as a 
workplace-level variable rather than solely as a variable measured at the individual level.  They 
argue their data “support the aggregation of employee ratings of IR climate to the workplace 
level, providing evidence that these are indeed measuring workplace ‘climate,’ rather than purely 
individual perceptions with variance solely at the inter-individual level” (2012, 24).  Using a 
workplace-level construction of IR climate, they find evidence that IR climate was significantly 
and negatively associated with union commitment, indicating there may be a “tendency for 
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members to feel less of a need for union protection where the workplace context is positive” 
(2012, 24).  Snape and Redmon note, though, that past studies of individual-level IR climate 
(Angle and Perry 1986; Magenau, Martin, and Peterson 1988) have obtained the opposite result, 
finding a positive relationship between IR climate and union commitment (2012, 24). 
 In this thesis I, too, argue for a workplace-level conceptualization of IR climate, but also 
for one that sees IR climate as primarly an effect of goals and strategies of IR actors.  Many of 
the previous models of IR climate in the literature have not taken a goals and strategies approach 
to IR climate.  For example, Dastmalchian et al.’s 1991 book, The Climate of Workplace 
Relations, in which the authors develop their widely-used IR climate measure, primarily uses a 
1987 survey of fifty-one Canadian organizations in the public and private sectors and twenty-two 
distinct industry groups (1991, 66).  The authors, though, follow-up their cross-sectional  
primary data collection with six longitudinal case studies in which their 1987 survey was 
repeated in 1989 in six of the fifty-one original organizations.  The model developed from the 
cross-sectional data shows IR climate (which, as previously mentioned, is comprised of 5 
dimensions of:  fairness, union-management consultation, mutual regard, membership support 
for unions, and union legitimacy) can be considered an intervening variable significantly 
influencing organizational and IR outcomes (1991, 111). 
 Using the longitudinal cases to focus on change in and context of IR climate, the authors 
acknowledge that their measure of the concept developed using their cross-sectional survey data 
when compared with the longitudinal case study data, “is a long way from the last word on 
industrial relations climate, and in particular on the many potential influences upon that climate” 
(1991, 118).  This divergence between the cross-sectional survey data and longitudinal case-
study data is explained by the authors as a way to “indicate the greater complexity of 
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organizational reality than the general results have so far allowed for” (1991, 117).  Even though 
it is indirectly addressed in the case study discussion, the authors do not focus on ‘intention’ of 
the IR actors to strategically manage their relations.  The survey methods used focussed on the 
actions and practices parties were undertaking as well as their views about their labor-
management relationships, but the survey data presented did not, for the most part, go behind 
these actions, practices, and views to investigate the intentions motivating them. 
 In their discussion of other factors that influence the same IR outcomes they are 
attempting to argue their IR climate measure predicts, the authors list “unions’ goals and 
strategies” along with “labor market conditions” and “declining power of unions” as additional 
factors outside of IR climate that influnce IR outcomes (1991, 156).  By separating “goals and 
strategies” into an additional influence on IR outcomes rather than investigating the ways that the 
union and management goals and strategies, including the intentions and motivations behind 
them, both influence and are influenced by IR climate, the authors miss an opportunity to create a 
more active and intentional IR climate measure that responds more to strategic choices by the 
parties than they ultimately do. 
 In another example, Deery and Iverson (2005) propose a model to predict whether a 
workplace will have a “cooperative labor-management relations climate” but also limit the input 
variables to “attitudes and practices” rather than goals and strategies.  The authors identify 
variables such as management “shares information with the union,” union “responsive to 
members,” that are at the level of tactics.  They also identify variables at the level of individual 
attitudes, such as individual employee “belief in cooperation” (590).  This thesis, which goes 
beyond surveys of attitudes and practices to analyze the motivations behind them, argues that 
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attitudes and practices should be thought of as emanating from strategic (or non-strategic) goals 
of the union and management. 
 The conflictual versus cooperative scale of IR climate can be seen to be a key element of 
“labor-management partnership,” a wide-ranging literature and area of study in the field of 
industrial relations for decades.  In brief, labor-management partnership can be defined as  
“agreements between competing actors who deliberately choose to co-operate instead of 
maintaining adversarial relations” (Harrisson et al. 2011, 412).  A good deal of research has been 
conducted on labor-management partnerships in the private sector, with much of the research 
generally finding benefits for unions and management (Rubenstein 2001; Arthur and Kim 2005; 
Eaton et al. 2004; Guest and Peccei 2001; Deery and Iverson 2005).  Partnerships have been 
shown, if functioning well, to “improve organizational functioning through active participation 
in matters such as productivity, quality, delivery schedules, responsiveness and flexibility” 
(Harrisson et al, 2011, 413).  At the same time, a partnership approach and the cooperative IR 
climate it requires has been shown to strengthen management power at the expense of union 
power (Bacon and Blyton 2004; Parker and Slaughter 1994, 145-165). 
 Opposition to labor-management partnerships understandably comes from those who 
primarily maintain a radical/materialist perspective on conflict, while those who tend to believe 
in pluralist or unitarist understandings of conflict believe that partnership can benefit both unions 
and management.  For example, in their guide for union leaders and activists, Working Smart: A 
Union Guide to Participation Programs and Reengineering, Mike Parker, Jane Slaughter, and 
Larry Adams argue that there are some interests that unions and management share that can 
intersect, including the interest of workers in making a “decent living and management’s interest 
in making a profit” (1994, 147).  But they argue, “Conflict of long-term interests between 
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companies and their workers is both fundamental and primary.  Some mutual interests do exist, 
but most are based on changing circumstances, and they are outweighed by the conflict” (1994, 
146).  Using this radical/materialist perspective on workplace conflict, Parker et al. go on to 
discuss union-management partnerships that they deem to be failures from the union’s 
perspective.  They argue, partnership means attempting to create one “circle” of mutual interest 
of labor and management, when unions and management truly have different interests:  “If the 
two circles in the mutual interest diagram are smushed further together, they ultimately become 
one.  If the circles overlap so much, do we really need a union?” (1994, 150). 
 Addressing the perceived conflicts of interest of unions engaging in labor-management 
partnerships, Harrisson et al. investigate the ‘role-blurring’ that union representatives in Quebec 
encountered when participating in labor-management partnerships.  The authors note a new 
identity of union representatives participating in a partnership, an identity that balanced unions’ 
traditional representational functions with a new “reframing [of] situations in the context of a 
joint project” (2011, 423).  The authors argue that the economic and institutional contexts of the 
decision to embark on a partnership relationship is important to understand.  In the private sector 
Quebec partnerships they studied, management and labor’s interests were seen to become 
increasingly aligned because of international competition.  Management was no longer seen as 
the main threat to the union, but competitors were (2011, 416). 
 In this context Harrisson et al. found that unions in the several partnerships they studied 
still represent employees in rights and disciplinary disputes but “instead of systematically filing a 
grievance, this might be done by working with management to find the solutions that are most 
satisfactory to all” (2011, 423).  That is, conflict management tactics shifted away from the 
grievance procedure to more informal negotiation.  At the same time, though, the authors found 
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difficulties for union representatives in:  “a) trusting people who have often been seen as 
adversaries; b) adapting to a radically different approach to labor relations; and c) managing 
tensions in order to strike a dynamic balance between often contradictory viewpoints” (2011, 
428).  While conflict management tactics did shift, in the partnerships studied it can be seen it 
was not necessarily easy or sustainable for the unions to continue to operate in partnership. 
 While Harrisson et al. did not make explicit the distinction between the choice of union 
and local management tactics regarding partnership and the external environment overlapping 
goals, I argue in this thesis that conflict management tactics chosen by unions and management, 
whether through a labor-management partnership or not, should be connected back to the goals 
and strategies they emanate from.  Tactic selection does not exisit in a vacuum.  Parties select 
tactics that align with their strategies.  Just because parties have chosen to enter a labor-
management partnership does not mean that those tactic selections are necessarily stable.  
Harrisson et al. provide an example of a change in union tactics from their research: 
  In one of the case studies, management was demanding job cuts as a solution to  
  profitability problems but without providing the union with all the information  
  related to the real costs, which would have helped to justify these cuts or allowed  
  for a re-examination of the problem on a common ground…When a major  
  disagreement arises and a consensus is not possible, and the decision to be made  
  is likely to greatly affect the interests of one of the parties, the parties tend to  
  change their approach by shifting from co-operation to the recognition of the  
  conflict, and the reinstatement of power relations.  Consequently, the union opted  
  for a conflict strategy and the dispute was quickly settled. (2011, 427) 
 
Harrisson et al.’s identification of this change in tactics over a specific issue conceptualizes 
labor-management partnership not as a stable strategic choice unions are locked in to, but one 
that can be modified due to changing goals.  Ultimately though, in the conclusion to their article, 
the authors return to a structural explanation for the “new identity” they observed union 
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representatives taking on in the labor-management partnerships they studied in Quebec.  They 
argue that since this type of partnership was: 
  Developed in response to a shifting competitive context, it is thus related to  
  circumstances and is transitory and may be ephemeral.  It will have to undergo the 
  test of time in order to become consolidated either by taking root in relations that  
  have become routine between the agents, or through state recognition by way of a  
  law or a legislative amendment, which would seal the issue of labour-  
  management partnerships.  (2011, 430-431) 
 
I agree that while it is essential to consider the external factors potentially giving rise to a 
partnership, like in my previous discussion of IR climate, I believe my goals, strategies, and 
tactics approach to analyzing why and what local unions and managers do is more helpful than 
an explanation solely based on structural factors or law.  Harrisson et al.’s hypothetical 
legislation mandating labor-mangement partnerships can be seen to already be in force in the 
U.S. federal sector.  Under President Obama’s 2009 executive order, executive branch agencies 
are required to create “labor-management forums” in which agency unions and top managers are 
to come together in a partnership framework to address issues of mutual interest.  The “issue of 
labour-management partnerships,” though, is far from “sealed,” though.  While some agencies 
report much progress in creating and measuring joint programs and initiatives, others have not 
(United States. National Councilon Federal Labor-Management Relations 2012). 
 
 I now move from a discussion of unions and workplace conflict to a review of the 
relevant workplace conflict management literature, a literature that primarily discusses non-
union workplaces. 
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Conflict Management Systems and Unionized Organizations 
 The workplace conflict management literature is a large one that addresses a wide-
ranging number of topics and audiences.  In this review, I focus on the literature on conflict 
management systems with a particular focus on research relevant to new approaches to conflict 
management in unionized organizations. 
 Research and writing on workplace conflict management systems has for the most part 
ignored unions and unionized organizations.  This is due primarily to the fact that conflict 
management systems are currently primarily found in non-union workplaces (Lipsky et al. 2003).  
As such, much of the literature has taken a unitarist perspective on conflict.  As David Lewin 
notes: 
  Much of the research on and practice of high-involvement human resource  
  management as well as ADR that has evolved over the last two decades or so, and 
  that focuses primarily on nonunion firms and workers, can be said to reflect a  
  unitarist conception of the employment relationships featuring relatively more  
  proactive, positive approaches to workplace dispute resolution. (2005,   
  230) 
 
While Lewin does identify what he sees as a trend, it is important to remember that it is still 
possible to view non-union and “proactive, positive approaches to workplace dispute resolution” 
with a pluralist lens, which I do. 
 Somewhat ironically, the book that can be seen to have launched the primarily non-union 
workplace “dispute systems design” literature was based on research done in a unionized setting, 
taking for the most part a pluralist perspective.  The book, Getting Disputes Resolved:  
Designing Systems to Cut the Cost of Conflict, was published in 1989 and aimed at managers 
who wanted to “persuade people or organizations to talk more and fight less” (1989, xi).  In the 
text, the authors, Ury, Brett, and Goldberg, develop the now classic “interests, rights, and power” 
approaches for resolving disputes.  Interests are defined as “needs, desires, concerns, fears--the 
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things one cares about or wants.  They underlie people’s positions--the tangible items they say 
they want.”  Rights are defined as using an “independent standard with perceived legitimacy or 
fairness to determine who is right.”  And power approaches entail using “the ability to coerce 
someone to do something he would not otherwise do” (1989, 5-7). 
 Ury et al. identify four criteria for prioritizing the above three dispute resolution 
approaches:  (1) transaction costs, (2) satisfaction with outcomes, (3) effect on parties’ 
relationship, and (4) recurrence of disputes.  They conceptualize the total “cost” of disputes as 
the combination of these four criteria (1989, 11-13).  Arguing, “in general, reconciling interests 
is less costly than determining who is right, which in turn is less costly than determining who is 
more powerful,” the authors advocate for an interest-based approach to resolving disputes, with 
rights and power-based backups if necessary (1989, 15). 
 The authors take a pluralist approach to conflict in their analysis when pointing out the 
difference between structural issues and personality in disputes.  Often disputes are structural in 
nature, with interests opposed and not aligning, but mistakenly framed “simply as personality 
clashes between key people” (1989, 25-26).  Although personality certainly matters in both 
fomenting and resolving conflict, a sole focus on personality misses important structural 
elements that are almost always present in conflict situations and falsely assumes a unitarist 
alignment of interests.  Approaches to conflict resolution that view rights-based and power-based 
dispute resolution procedures as ‘failures’ because an interest-based approach was not taken also 
fall into the trap of putting too much emphasis on personality and not enough on structural 
elements of conflict. 
 Empirical support for Ury et al.’s claims about dispute resolution procedures comes from 
their work in the U.S. coal industry, which is heavily unionized.  Called in to consult by the 
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management and national mine workers’ union, the authors study why some mines were 
experiencing large numbers of wildcat strikes while others were not.  One initial finding in a 
single union district indicated that in low-strike mines low-level supervisors were resolving 
conflict whereas in high strike mines conflict was often escalated.  At one high strike mine 80%-
90% of grievances had no contractual basis and therefore management was not interested in 
addressing the interests outlined in the grievance.   At low strike mines, managers dealt with 
these issues, the authors found (1989, 92). 
 Ultimately, the authors found IR climate (without using a specific measure of “IR 
climate”) to both affect and be affected by dispute resolution procedures: 
  The parties’ attitudes toward each other are a product of previous negotiations and 
  strikes.  Although unfavorable attitudes probably do not directly cause strikes,  
  they do affect perceptions and expectations about negotiations.  At high-strike  
  mines, management and union leaders expect adversarial negotiations and   
  develop appropriate strategies.  Over time, the parties’ expectations of conflict  
  develop a life of their own, which acts as a barrier to any change in the quality of  
  the relationship. (1989, 95) 
 
The authors also discussed a finding from a high strike mine regarding the content of grievances: 
  At Caney Creek, management by and large refused to consider claims based on  
  the informal contract (called ‘gripes’).  Neither the grievance procedure nor any  
  other procedure dealt with such claims… Perhaps most significantly, the   
  grievance procedure transformed the miner’s problem into a contractual grievance 
  that often bore little resemblance to the original problem. (1989, 107) 
 
The finding that grievants will mold or recast a grievance to fit a dispute resolution procedure is 
a fact not lost on designers of integrated conflict management systems, which often have 
extremely limited or no restrictions on the type of conflict that can be addressed by the system.  
Ury et al. found that wildcat strikes in certain mines functioned as ways for miners to have voice 
that they didn’t have in the grievance procedure.  They allowed them to vent emotions and send a 
signal to management (1989, 108).  A dispute systems intervention by the authors to change this 
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structural impediment to a well-functioning grievance procedure that primarily used mediation at 
one high strike mine mentioned above, Caney Creek, was deemed a success.  “Disputes 
continued to arise at Caney Creek, as well they should given the underlying structural conflict 
between management and labor.  But the dispute resolution pattern changed significantly and 
remained changed over the eight years since our design effort” (1989, 130).  Again, this success 
was measured using a pluralist approach that does not seek to eliminate conflict, but to channel it 
through well-functioning procedures. 
 Research and practitioner texts in the dispute systems design field following Ury et al., 
such as Costantino and Merchant’s Designing Conflict Management Systems and Rahim’s 
Managing Organizational Conflict, for the most part shifted the focus of the dispute systems 
design literature to non-union workplaces, arguably because that is where a majority of U.S. 
private sector employees were working.  Research conducted by Corinne Bendersky aimed at 
investigating the question of whether dispute resolution systems that combine rights-based 
processes, interest-based neutrals, and negotiation or conflict management training “more 
effectively improve organizational members’ attitudes toward conflict and behavioral responses 
to it than do any of the individual components or pairs of components” (2007, 204).  Her 
research site was a unionized Canadian government agency, where her focus was on linking 
“dispute resolution system characteristics to individuals’ conflict attitudes and behaviors at work 
in general” (2007, 220).  Bendersky conducted a matched case comparison analysis of two work 
organizations participating in a three-component pilot dispute resolution system, with non-
participating matched cases.  Cases were matched using the following criteria:  tasks conducted 
in the office, the region in which the offices were located, and the union representing the workers 
(2007, 208). 
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 Bendersky found, based on employee survey data, that the three component sites show 
statistically significantly more positive effects than the two-component treatment sites.  Also, the 
two component site was worse off after intervention than before it, indicating that potentially the 
fuller complementarity model works more effectively to encourage what Bendersky deems to be 
more positive, active, attitudes toward conflict at work and conflict behaviors (2007, 210-215). 
 Bendersky did not in this study, though, consider the union as an actor or organization.  
Rather, she controled for the international union and local union approach to conflict (either 
adversarial or cooperative), but did not investigate the impact of the dispute system design on the 
union and its strategy and conflict management tactics.  Although my thesis does not compare 
different conflict management systems designs, it does specifically consider the union’s role as 
an organization, adding to the study of conflict management systems in unionized workplaces. 
 Bendersky’s research has shown initial evidence of the importance of making integrated, 
multiple options available in what were to be referred to as integrated conflict management 
systems or, simply, conflict management systems.  In their comprehensive investigation focused 
on the conflict management system phenomenon, Emerging Systems for Managing Workplace 
Conflict, Lipsky et al. find through a survey of Fortune 1000 companies and interviews with 
selected companies a “substantial dissatisfaction with conventional approaches to [workplace] 
dispute resolution and an attempt to stem that dissatisfaction by replacing old approaches with 
newly minted dispute resolution systems” (2003, 5).  In their view, system designers should 
design an integrated conflict management system to have the following five characteristics:  (1)  
The broadest possible scope, (2) A proactive conflict culture:  the “system should welcome 
dissent (or tolerate disagreement) and encourage resolution of conflict at the lowest possible 
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level through direct negotiation,” (3) Multiple access points, (4) Multiple options that include 
interest-based and rights-based options, and (5) Support structures (2003, 13). 
 Lipsky et al. study the conflict management system choices of the executives and 
managers of Fortune 1000 corporations.  They identify three strategies:  (1) “Contend” 
organizations that prefer litigation to ADR;  (2)  “Settle,” the majority of the major 
corporations—they “use ADR either as a matter of policy or an ad hoc basis in a variety of 
different types of disputes”; and  (3) “Prevent” organizations that have designed ICMSs and 
“have developed a comprehensive set of policies designed to prevent (if possible) or to manage 
conflict” (2003, 118-119).  As will be discussed in Chapters 5 through 7, this approach differs a 
little from the approach I take toward union conflict management choices, in which I call union 
choices regarding participating in a conflict management system tactics rather than strategy.  
Nonetheless, my approach mirrors this approach as it argues conflict management tactics of 
unions have a strategic element. 
 In a helpful formulation for my thesis, Lipsky et al. argue it is important to examine “the 
interaction of environmental and organizational (or exogenous and endogenous) variables that in 
our model influences an organization’s choice of strategy” (2003, 124).  The environmental 
variables hypothesized to affect an organization’s choice of conflict management strategy are 
market competition, government regulation, statutory requirements and court mandates, and the 
decline of unionization, while the organizational factors are organizational culture, management 
commitment, role of a champion of the ICMS, the exposure profile of company to litigation, and 
a precipitating event that causes management to consider changes to its conflict management 
strategy (2003, 128-138). 
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 Unlike much of the dispute systems design literature, Lipsky et al. do specifically address 
unions in their discussion of integrated conflict management systems.  They write “unions have 
viewed the use of ADR in employment relations with some skepticism.  Many suspect that 
employers often institute workplace dispute resolution systems as a means of avoiding 
unionization.”  Recent history has proven union fears correct in several Fortune 1000 companies.  
“In the course of our field research... several corporate respondents readily admitted that union 
avoidance was a principal motive for their use of ADR in employment relations” (2003, 132-
133). 
 Lipsky et al. also report some unions have embraced ADR.  Two reasons for this are 
provided.  First, some issues are not easily resolved in the grievance procedure and second, 
unions recognize “that ADR systems can extend the authority and influence of a union into areas 
normally considered management prerogatives” (2003, 133).  As will be explored later in this 
thesis, my data confirms much of the first reason, but finds one union in the study is not 
influenced by the thinking underlying the second reason, as it conflicts with its strategy to 
differentiate itself from management and to handle conflict internally. 
 The authors go on to posit additional hypotheses regarding union participation in conflict 
management systems.  They argue there are three reasons why unions would be opposed to 
ICMSs.  First they posit unions may be satisfied with the traditional grievance procedure for all 
disputes; second, they argue union leaders may feel threatened by the “flexibility and employee 
ownership of conflict inherent in workplace systems,” and third, the fear that “union leaders will 
view workplace systems as undermining their authority and a mechanism to serve employers as a 
union-busting vehicle” (2003, 160).  As will be discussed in Chapters 5 through 7, I find the 
reaction of union leaders and members to an ICMS to be product of the individual local union’s 
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overall organizational goals and strategies rather than universal leadership fears or preferences 
for the traditional grievance procedure. 
 Another contribution Lipsky et al. make in Emerging Systems is introducing a 
“stakeholder” approach to the analysis of workplace conflict management systems.  Using a 
pluralist conception of workplace conflict, the authors argue: 
  The challenge in establishing fair and effective dispute resolution systems is to  
  take account of the sometimes compatible but often conflicting objectives of the  
  various stakeholders.  There are many pitfalls for organizations that are not able to 
  overcome all of the potential barriers from stakeholder groups with significant  
  interests in conflict management systems. (2003, 302) 
 
This stakeholder approach is useful as it acknowledges the pluralist reality of a variety of 
stakeholders in the workplace, including importantly unions and non-management employees, 
even though they are not mentioned here.  My thesis argues, though, that a stakeholder approach 
needs to go beyond thinking there is a need to “overcome” what are seen to be “potential 
barriers” to ICMS success.  In this vision, stakeholders should get ‘on board’ the ICMS train, 
once barriers to their participation are removed by organizational leadership.  My thesis shows, 
though, that it is important to acknowledge the fact that some stakeholder goals and strategies are 
incompatible with some ICMS designs. 
 Ariel Avgar in his 2008 dissertation, Treating Conflict:  Conflict and Its Resolution in 
Healthcare, looks at the design and implementation of an ICMS in an Ohio hospital.  Through 
survey, interview, and observation methods he finds generally, “organizational structure and the 
design of work affect the manifestation of workplace conflict, and that conflict management 
systems are, in part, an organizational response to this dynamic” (2008, Abstract).  Looking at 
the motivations for implementing a dispute resolution system and outcomes from it, Avgar finds 
different interests, motivations, and concerns of different stakeholder groups at the hospital.  This 
 38 
finding challenges a unitary view of “dispute resolution adoption and outcomes” and challenges 
future research to adopt a stakeholder approach to dispute systems (2008, Abstract, 312). 
 I focus on the hospital case study portion of Avgar’s dissertation here, as it is the most 
relevant to the subject of this thesis.  In 2003, “Ohio Medical” was selected by the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service to participate in its DyADS program, a program designed to 
help unionized organizations design and implement conflict management systems (2008, 234).  
The DyADS program will be discussed further later in this chapter.  Two unions, the 
Steelworkers and the Ohio Nurses Association (ONA), represented employees at the hospital and 
participated on a joint design team (2008, 237).  This differs from the Department of the Interior, 
where the local unions I studied did not participate in the design of CORE PLUS, DOI’s conflict 
management system.  In Avgar’s case study, unions, managers, and non-represented employees 
were appointed to a “Joint Operating Committee (JOC)” that would oversee the system, called 
AGREE, which is ironic due to the fact ‘agreement’ is not always possible nor desired for every 
issue brought to the ICMS (2008, 242).  In contrast to the Interior Department’s CORE PLUS, 
the JOC decided to limit AGREE subjects to issues that are not covered by the parties’ collective 
bargaining agreement (2008, 245).  In the DOI units I study in this thesis, ICMS participation is 
directly negotiated into the parties’ collective bargaining agreement or solidified via a 
Memorandum of Agreement.  Over time, Avgar finds the Steelworkers’ became more amenable 
to including CBA issues in the system, the ONA less so (2008, 246). 
 Avgar examines ONA’s resistance to AGREE and finds two main reasons for its lack of 
active participation even though the union’s leadership supported the ICMS.  The first reason 
Avgar finds is internal problems within ONA and the second is a “lack of clarity on the ways in 
which the program would benefit the union as a whole and its membership” (278).  These 
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findings lead Avgar to conclude that a “cost-benefit analysis” conducted by the stakeholders was 
the “base of cyclical support and resistance” to program (281).  In other words, unions conducted 
a cost-benefit analysis of the ICMS when determining when and if to participate.  Although my 
findings do not contradict a cost-benefit approach, I argue in Chapters 5-7 that it is more 
appropriate to look at union and management stakeholder choices regarding initial and ongoing 
participation in an ICMS in terms of how the tactic of participating (or not participating) in an 
ICMS fits (or does not fit) into their strategies for achieving their goals.  A cost-benefit approach, 
may signal that a rational cost-benefit calculation regarding ICMS participation is possible based 
on factors residing outside of the specific strategies and goals employed and chosen by unions 
and managers.  Instead, I find ICMS participation directly results from choices that unions and 
management have already made regarding goals and strategy along with how these choices do or 
do not align. 
 FMCS’s DyADS program, which started in 2002 and has now ended, was path-breaking 
in its quest to bring new options for conflict management that were appearing in non-union 
settings to unionized organizations.  Noting that unionized organizations almost universally had 
not developed conflict resolution systems that address what they deem “individual conflict,” 
Robinson et al. use their 2005 Harvard Negotiation Law Review article to serve as a final report 
for a working group FMCS convened to design DyADS, which stands for “Dynamic Adaptive 
Dispute Systems,” (340-341). 
 The authors argue organized workplaces operate “within the context of a well-established 
rights-based framework” (2005, 346).  The key for dispute systems designers, as they see it, is to 
embrace the notion that organizations are complex and therefore “directed, massive 
transformations” are not the best way to promote interest-based conflict resolution.  Instead, 
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Robinson et al. argue dispute system designers should “apply the simplest rules possible and 
create a nurturing environment that focuses on robust communications and open learning” (2005, 
348). 
 Another major contention Robinson et al. make is that “a growing proportion of 
workplace disputes, even in the unionized sector, involve individual conflict...rather than 
collective conflict.”  The authors define individual conflict as disputes such as discrimination 
claims, and personality clashes between coworkers, while collective conflict is seen as disputes 
over items and working conditions included in a collective bargaining contract such as wages 
and benefits (2005, 340-341).  But by dividing the above disputes into strictly delineated 
“individual” and “collective” categories, Robinson et al. make the distinction seem simple when 
it is not.  For example, in a case where an employee is discharged for what the employee, her 
union, and her co-workers believe to be discriminatory, the dispute is not solely an individual 
one.  The union may care a great deal about the individual’s treatment and its impact on the rest 
of the bargaining unit.  Therefore, fighting for her job can become a collective dispute through 
which the whole unit could possibly become engaged in with company management.  The 
dispute in this situation is not just between the employee and the employer, but a group of 
employees, the union, and the employer and thus could be seen as a collective one. 
 The authors discuss best practices for designing and implementing a conflict management 
system in an organized workplace.  Notably, like the AGREE program studied by Avgar (2008) 
and unlike the Interior Department’s CORE PLUS program studied in this thesis, Robinson et al. 
indirectly argue organizations should keep a new conflict management system outside of the 
collective bargaining agreement and its negotiation process due to the fact “when the agreement 
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is the driving force for change as opposed to key players in an organization, the change process 
can easily become formulaic or superficial, rather than organic and genuine” (2005, 357). 
 Moving away from the theory and practice of conflict management systems in organized 
workplaces to theory of workplace conflict management in general, Lipsky and Avgar in a 2008 
article extend the framework for analyzing the organizational adoption of conflict management 
systems and ADR first introduced in Emerging Systems into a “strategic theory of workplace 
conflict management.”  They argue that before their article there were two theories used in 
research on workplace conflict management to answer the questions, “What factors explain how 
an organization handles workplace conflicts?” and “How effective is the organization’s handling 
of workplace conflicts in settling or resolving them?” (2008, 144).  The first theory was based on 
the conventional explanation for rise of workplace ADR:  employers avoiding cost of 
employment litigation in 1970s and 1980s led to what the authors deem is the “legalistic theory” 
(2008, 143).  The other theoretical orientation the authors identify is “systems theory,” which 
attempts to explain why organizations use conflict management systems and includes internal 
and external factors such as those discussed in Lipsky et al.’s Emerging Systems text (2008, 144). 
 In the instant article, Lipsky and Avgar propose a “strategic theory of conflict 
management” in which  “the systems theory is augmented to include a critical link to the 
organization’s strategic goals and objectives” (2008, 145).  They continue, arguing: 
  We readily acknowledge that there is virtually no research on the link between  
  conflict management and organizational strategies.  But if we are right about the  
  growing recognition that such a link exists, then it is high time that scholars begin  
  to examine, both theoretically and empirically, the nature and effects of that  
  linkage. (2008, 147) 
 
While in this thesis I attempt to do just this, I also note here that my research finds no one 
“organizational strategy” in the unionized workplaces I study.  Instead, my research attempts to 
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identify organizational stakeholders’ strategies and goals and finds that their alignment (or non-
alignment) is more important in predicting conflict management system choices than a universal 
organizational strategy does.  My research also suggests that an “organizational strategy” that 
involves pro-active conflict management at the top of a large organization does not necessarily 
reach front line management or employees. 
 Lipsky and Avgar propose “that a firm’s conflict management practices play a key role in 
enhancing or hindering the survival of a particular employment pattern, thereby affecting the 
capacity to fulfill its general strategy” (2008, 181).  My research indicates that such a focus on 
“general strategy” is helpful but also removes a stakeholder lens from conflict management 
theory and simplifies an organization’s “general strategy,” conflating it with management 
strategy.  If organizational strategies are truly general, they should attempt to incorporate the 
diversity of stakeholder goals and strategies found within the organization. 
 In a 2005 book chapter, Howard Gadlin revisits the assumptions underlying what he finds 
to be the sometimes unspoken theory behind ICMSs.  He finds a focus in the ICMS and dispute 
systems design literature on reducing “the costs of conflict, to transform its destructive capacity 
into improved relationships among disputes, and to increase productivity and performance” 
(2005, 375).  He reviews the fact that in Ury et al.’s classic Getting Disputes Resolved text, 
interventions “carefully balanced the concerns and perspectives of both management and labor.  
However the conceptual framework of dispute systems design is formed almost exclusively 
around the concerns of managers:  cutting costs, enhancing productivity, and containing conflict” 
(2005, 375-376).  Thus, he finds as do I, a management-centered approach to conflict 
management in the literature following Ury et al.   
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 Gadlin argues, “ICMSs represent the integration of conflict resolution techniques, 
separated from their critical origins, into the repertoire of methods of managerial control” (2005, 
380).  He finds ICMS designers do not see themselves as involved in “systemic organizational 
management”, but argues they actually are (2005, 382).  Last, he finds: 
  Implicit in ICMS vision is a managerial view of organizational life that overlooks  
  a basic fact—employees are empowered individually but not collectively while  
  managers are empowered both individually and collectively.  In this way,   
  however well intentioned they are currently, ICMS threaten to become another  
  tool by which management wields power. (2005, 383) 
 
My research indicates that while conducting a power analysis of organizational stakeholders is 
extremely helpful, this simplistic conceptualization of the collective being empowered at the 
expense of the individual is not necessarily accurate in a unionized workplace. 
 An exploration of critiques of conflict management systems is the focus of Lipsky and 
Avgar’s 2010 article humorously titled, “The Conflict over Conflict Management.”  In it, the 
authors label Gadlin’s critique as the “progressive” critique of conflict management whose critics 
“oppose attempts by management to control the workplace and the workforce without taking 
account of the interest of other stakeholders.”  The other critique Lipsky and Avgar find is 
leveled at conflict management systems comes from the “traditional” camp.  These critics 
“believe that conflict management systems help legitimize workplace conflict and inevitably lead 
to higher levels of employee participation in decision making than is desirable.”  This critique 
can often be seen coming from authoritative ‘old-guard’ managers (2010, 11). 
 In this article Lipsky and Avgar argue: 
  The management of conflict, according to this approach, should complement the  
  organization’s strategic posture and existing structures.  We maintain that the  
  level of fit between an organization’s conflict management philosophy and its  
  strategic goals and objectives dictates whether the conflict management system  
  will enhance or hinder key stakeholder outcomes. (2010, 11) 
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I find in my research while this definitely is the case, organizations should not be thought of 
having solely one “conflict management philosophy,” which I also find to be conflated with 
management’s conflict management philosophy.  I find that the three unions in my study have 
very different conflict management philosophies, but all are part of the same organization:  the 
Department of the Interior. 
 To reach this complementarily with an organization’s strategic posture, Lipsky and Avgar 
argue conflict management system designers and advocates should shift from “a best practice 
approach to a ‘configurational’ approach that emphasizes best fit.”  The authors think they can 
do this by aligning the goals of the system with the organization (2010, 41).  I agree, as my 
research shows, there is no one ‘best practice’ for ICMSs in unionized workplaces, but I argue 
that there is also no one set of organizational goals or objectives shared by all stakeholders 
within it.  The authors conclude their article with the statement: 
  We strongly believe that designing and implementing conflict management  
  systems in a strategically aligned manner will provide organizations with a  
  competitive advantage and cause many of the criticisms of such systems to lose  
  their appeal. (2010, 42) 
 
Again, while I agree strategic alignment is key, Lipsky and Avgar’s focus on “competitive 
advantage” emanating from strategic use of conflict management privileges a management 
perspective as an organizational perspective.  Unions as the representative of employees have a 
concern regarding the continued viability of the organizations in which they have members, but 
they also have their own goals and strategies for achieving them that may not align with 
management’s. 
 
 A review of the wide-ranging relevant literature demonstrates research activity regarding 
conflict resolution in federal sector labor relations and workplace conflict resolution has 
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happened largely in separate spheres.  Past research in federal sector conflict resolution has 
focused almost exclusively on describing and analyzing the law governing rights-based dispute 
resolution mechanisms available through the grievance procedure outlined in the FSLMRS of 
1978 and the alternative statutory procedures available through the Merit Systems Protection 
Board and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  As noted earlier in this chapter, a 
few studies have examined alternative dispute resolution procedures as compared to the 
‘traditional’ processes, but have focused at the agency-level to discuss levels of ADR program 
adoption and examining the designs of such programs.  Therefore, this thesis adds to our 
understanding of how ADR programs actually function in federal workplaces. 
 My review of the private sector dispute resolution literature finds a lack of consideration, 
for the most part, of unions and their role in alternative forms of dispute resolution to the now 
seemingly universal union grievance procedure with binding arbitration.  Previous research 
shows the adoption of ICMS and other ADR programs in non-union workplaces.  The research 
that does address conflict management systems in union settings focuses on the design of such 
programs, rather than their operation.  Consequently, this thesis contributes to our understanding 
of the operation of such programs and consciously introduces the union’s perspective, as an 
organization, into the analysis of ICMS functioning in organizations.  Other than in the initial 
dispute systems design work of Ury et al. (1989), the dispute systems design literature has 
focused on the individual employee, rather than employees as a collective, as the key organizing 
unit of conflict management systems.  In unionized organizations, collective concerns and issues 
are often addressed by unions, and this thesis’s focus on local union perspectives and 
participation choices regarding conflict management systems provides an initial look at how 
conflict management systems can and cannot work in unionized settings. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND METHODS 
 
Methodology 
 
 Methodological, research design, and methods choices are key decisions every social 
science researcher makes, even if those choices are not made explicit in his or her writing.  For 
this thesis I use Schwartz-Shea and Yanow’s definition of methodology.  In their guide, 
Interpretive Research Design, Schwartz-Shea and Yanow define methodology as “the 
presuppositions concerning ontology—the reality status of the “thing” being studied—and 
epistemology—its ‘know-ability—which inform a set of methods’” (2012, 4).  Methodology, 
therefore, is seen to have an ontological component as well as an epistemological one.  
Researchers must decide if they will employ a methodology that assumes that there is one 
“reality” or potentially multiple “realities” and the “know-ability” of reality or multiple realities.  
Ontological and epistemological approaches that assume that there exists “an objective social 
world that is external to the researcher” that is knowable employ, generally, a “realist-
objectivist” methodology, while approaches that allow for multiple social realities and 
acknowledge the researcher is always necessarily present in the world he or she is investigating 
employ a “constructivist-interpretivist” methodology.  Schwartz-Shea and Yanow describe such 
a methodology as resting: 
  On a belief in the existence of (potentially) multiple, intersubjectively,   
  constructed “truths” about social, political, cultural and other human events; and  
  the belief that these understandings can only be accessed, or co-generated,  
  through interactions between researcher and researched as they seek to interpret  
  those events and make those interpretations legible to each other. (2012, 4) 
 
For the purposes of this study, I adopt such a methodology, as I believe it fits with my goal to 
understand the reasons why unions and local managers make certain tactical choices regarding 
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participation in an Integrated Conflict Management System and does not assume that there is one 
‘truth’ regarding such choices that is ever knowable.  I argue that through an iterative process of 
studying and learning from the unions and managers I study I can begin to come to terms with 
the variety of perspectives on my research topic.  Instead of standing behind the proverbial one-
way mirror, watching the world from a perceivably objective location and recording it, I take an 
active approach that emphasizes two-way engagement with my research participants. 
 My constructivist and interpretivist methodological choices align in many ways with the 
sociological theory of symbolic interactionism.  Its anti-determinism, in which ‘change’ is 
featured as a primary concern, allows actors in social systems to be “seen as having, though not 
always utilizing, the means of controlling their destinies by their responses to conditions” 
(Corbin and Strauss 1990, 5).  This theoretical orientation brings focus to the intentions of actors 
responding and not responding to their situations, rather than focusing strictly on more agency-
less structural explanations for social phenomena.  As discussed briefly in Chapters 1-2 and will 
be discussed in detail in Chapters 5-7, my analysis of the goals, strategies, and tactics of the local 
unions and management teams included in my study places emphasis on the actions of each 
group with regard to conflict management and the intentions behind those actions. 
 In this study I use an inductive approach and logic to answer my research question.  This 
approach builds up on what I find in the field, rather than pre-formulating hypotheses and testing 
them (Gibbs 2007, 4-5).  An inductive approach is a practice that fits squarely in an interpretivist 
methodology.  As Schwartz-Shea and Yanow write, researchers using an interpretive 
methodology “do not set out to test key concepts defined before the research has begun.”  Any 
concepts from the literature and/or prior experience are not brought in to the field to “test the 
accuracy of those understandings.”  The goal is to let the field experience help define the 
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concepts “that are shaped by their situational use and by the lived experience of those ‘naturally’ 
working, playing etc. in the study setting” (2012, 18).  Fieldwork methods (interview as well as 
observation) using this approach can be aimed at enabling “claims of constitutive causality, why 
humans act as they do due to their own understandings of their worlds” (Schwartz-Shea and 
Yanow 2012, 90). 
 
Research Design 
 In order to attempt to answer my research question I have designed a study using a 
matched case comparison design using a maximum variation sampling strategy.  This design is 
useful for determining why similar cases on many “critical dimensions” differ on the significant 
one of interest (Frost 2000, 563).  In order to attempt to rule out alternative explanations, I 
attempted to best match cases (‘bargaining units’ for the purposes of this study) along as many 
critical dimensions as I could. 
 The site for my study, the U.S. Department of the Interior, has roughly 150 bargaining 
units (U.S. DOI 2010).  Since my research question attempts to understand why local unions use 
different tactics regarding participation and non-participation in an Integrated Conflict 
Management System, a “maximum variation” purposeful sampling strategy is most appropriate. 
Purposeful sampling, unlike random sampling, does not use a probabilistic logic to attempt to 
make generalizations about the likelihood of findings being applicable to a larger population.  
Instead, using purposeful sampling, the researcher studies carefully selected “information-rich 
cases [which] yields insights and in-depth understanding rather than empirical generalizations” 
(Patton 2002, 230). 
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 Specifically, a maximum variation sampling design, as described by Michael Quinn 
Patton, “aims at capturing and describing the central themes that cut across a great deal of 
variation.”  “Any common patterns that emerge from great variation are of particular interest and 
value in capturing the core experiences and central, shared dimensions of a setting or 
phenomenon” (2002, 234-235).  To select cases that varied as much as possible on the dimension 
of ICMS participation, I first selected two bargaining units that were on the extremes of the 
participation dimension.  Details of each unit selected for this study appear in Chapters 5, 6, and 
7.  In Unit A, the union was opposed to CORE PLUS participation when management proposed 
it during the last round of bargaining for its current term collective bargaining agreement (CBA).  
Thus, bargaining unit employees could not participate in CORE PLUS.  Unit C can be seen to 
reside at the opposite extreme.  The union in Unit C initially approached the local management 
team asking to participate in CORE PLUS.  Soon after, the parties implemented the ICMS by 
way of a Memorandum of Agreement, which was appended to the parties’ CBA.  In this unit a 
union member serves as the CORE PLUS Coordinator for the office, and bargaining unit 
employees are using the system.  Unit B can be seen to reside in between Unit A and Unit C on 
the participation dimension—arguably closer to Unit C—as the union there ultimately agreed to 
participate in CORE PLUS, when the ICMS was proposed by management in negotiations for its 
first term collective bargaining agreement.  The union, though, has not had any bargaining unit 
employees use the system.  All three units were chosen from the same bureau of the Department 
to attempt to control for differences in organizational cultures of each DOI bureau.  While all 
three units were not able to be matched on size, job function, and international union dimensions, 
variation occurred in such a manner that still allows for inference, as will be discussed in 
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Chapters 5-7.  A chart detailing the critical dimensions of each bargaining unit can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
 Also using purposeful sampling design for her study on unions and workplace 
restructuring, Ann Frost discusses two issues that have the possibility to affect the inferential 
logic of the matched case comparison design.  The first is the idea that an “omitted variable, 
something unseen or unguessed-at, produced” the results she argued were attributable to certain 
explanatory variables.  While this always may be the case in interpretive research, Frost argues 
that by sharing her results with union leaders and managers in the industry she studied, as well as 
others, and getting positive feedback, she could be confident in her findings.  The second, 
connected, issue Frost raises is that of “reverse causation.”  By this, she means when something 
other than an explanatory factor presented in the research creates the conditions for that factor to 
seem to be explanatory.  While Frost uses historical evidence to give support to her argument 
that reverse causation is likely not at play, the model I propose in Chapter 8 is not a linear one.  
Therefore, I believe there is not one factor or multiple causal factors that influence union 
participation and engagement in an ICMS that are not affected or potentially affected by the 
other factors in my model (Frost 2000, 577). 
 
Methods 
 In order to study my selected bargaining units in depth, I spent one week in each unit 
conducting interviews and observing organizational life.  Over the course of the three field site 
visits I conducted 41 individual interviews with union members and managers in total in addition 
to conducting a group session with union members in Unit C.  I did not interview bargaining unit 
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employees who were not union members at any of the three sites.  I also attended a monthly 
union meeting of the union in Unit A that happened to coincide with my visit. 
 In addition to fieldwork in each of my three bargaining units I also attended a CORE 
PLUS conference for Department of the Interior employees involved in the ICMS in both full-
time and collateral duty capacities and interviewed key Department officials and national union 
leaders involved in labor relations, human resources, and CORE PLUS in the Department and 
the bureau I selected to study.  This allowed me to receive a broad introduction to the ICMS and 
learn about its current functioning Department-wide. 
 While an in-person site visit with individual interviews arguably is one of the most time-
intensive methods for data collection, I note here that my data quality likely would have been 
lower if I had used a survey to attempt to capture the nuances of union member and manager 
views on conflict and its resolution in the workplace.  For example, one employee interviewed 
for this study began the interview denying that conflict was an issue in the workplace.  By the 
end of the interview an hour later she revised earlier comments providing detail about latent 
workplace conflict she had experienced over the years in the workplace.  I believe this employee 
almost surely did not feel comfortable talking about such conflict at the beginning of the 
interview with me, who was a stranger to him/her and the worksite.  If I instead had used a 
survey instrument to attempt to capture this employee’s views on conflict in her bargaining unit, 
the employee may likely have reported her ‘first’ view that did not acknowledge latent 
workplace conflict because the survey instrument, as an impersonal measure, may not be able to 
build the trust needed to overcome participant uneasiness to discuss sensitive issues. 
 In addition to interviewing, direct observation of workplace life by the researcher is an 
important source of data that is infrequently used in workplace conflict research.  As David 
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Lewin notes, almost all research in the field is on written grievances and thus the need to utilize 
more “observation, participant-observation and other primary research methods that potentially 
permit greater documentation and analysis of the informal settlement of employment relationship 
conflicts” (2008, 462).  Direct observation, while necessarily filtered through the researcher’s 
own lenses and sensemaking abilities, should not be summarily dismissed as less accurate a 
method due to a belief that it is somehow more removed from the employees’ direct experiences.  
Instead, direct observation allows the researcher to analyze conflict in the workplace in ways that 
employees may not choose to discuss in a survey or interview or even be aware of.  In this study, 
I found moments in between interviews when walking around the bargaining units, chatting with 
many employees and observing the setting, just as instructive as the actual ‘on-the-record’ 
interviews.  Thus, I see my observations and experiences in the field as important data points that 
complement my interview data. 
 After completing my field visits, I analyzed my interview and observation data to look 
for themes and concepts that may provide an explanation of my research question.  Yin identifies 
this process as “explanation building,” which he describes as an iterative process the researcher 
takes, going back-and-forth between potential explanations to see if they are confirmed or 
discounted by the data at the same time as allowing the data to inspire potential explanations as 
well (2009, 141-144).  Eisenhardt, in a similar fashion describes this “highly iterative process” as 
one where the researcher needs to “compare systematically the emergent frame with the evidence 
from each case in order to assess how well or poorly it fits with the case data.  The central idea is 
that researchers constantly compare theory and data—iterating toward a theory which closely fits 
the data” (1989, 541).  Once I determined the factors that had the most explanatory power, I went 
back to each interview and sorted the data into these categories/factors to be sure that I did not 
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find evidence that contradicted my argument and therefore could not be grouped in such a 
manner. 
 Robert Gibbs in his 2007 text, Analyzing Qualitative Data, describes this process as one 
of “constant comparisons” that has two aspects.  First, he recommends researchers use the 
process to continually check the “consistency and accuracy” of their analyses of data.  Second, 
he argues researchers should “look explicitly for differences and variations” in the data that 
allow theoretical propositions to be made.  He states the importance of both focusing on treating 
the data comprehensively as well as dealing with what are perceived to be negative cases, 
iteratively as well.  The “discovery of negative cases or counter-evidence to a hunch in 
qualitative analysis does not mean its immediate rejection,” he writes.  “[Researchers] should 
investigate the negative cases and try to understand why they occurred and what circumstances 
produced them.”  This process, taken as a whole, allows researchers to use the seemingly 
‘negative’ evidence to revise codes and theoretical labels, making the revised or new analyses 
that result, better and more inclusive as a result of this iterative process (2007, 96). 
 
I now turn from my discussion of methodology, research design, and methods, to provide 
the historical, institutional, and legal background for collective bargaining at the Department of 
the Interior as well as for the CORE PLUS ICMS. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CORE PLUS AND LABOR RELATIONS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
 
The Department of the Interior and History of the CORE PLUS Integrated Conflict 
Management System 
 
The Department of the Interior, one of the fifteen cabinet-level executive branch 
departments, was created in 1848 when Congress took Indian affairs and land management 
responsibilities as well as the then-pension and patent offices and combined these functions into 
a new agency.  Today, the Department is primarily responsible for managing the United States’ 
public lands as well as the United States’ trust responsibilities to American Indians, Alaska 
Natives, and Native Hawaiians (U.S. Government Manual 2011, 213).  The Department is 
organized into eleven primary bureaus and offices.  In total, it employs approximately 70,000. 
 The work of the Department’s bureaus and offices is organized by several key functions.  
The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Office of the Special Trustee for American Indians 
administer the federal Indian trusts and serve as the U.S. government’s representatives to tribal 
governments.  The Office of Insular Affairs provides financial and technical support to the U.S.’s 
insular territories, which include American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.  The U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service and National Park Service manage the National Refuge and National 
Park Systems, respectively.  The Bureau of Land Management manages designated federal land, 
for preservation and active use, while the Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation, and 
Enforcement manages and leases federal land for mining as well as enforces mineral extraction 
regulations.  The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and the Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement manage leases and safety regulations, respectively, for offshore 
drilling.  Operating west of the Mississippi, the Bureau of Reclamation provides wholesale water 
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and hydroelectric power to the western United States, and last, the U.S. Geological Survey is the 
federal government’s earth science research agency.  It conducts research in the earth and 
environmental sciences and does not have any land management or regulatory responsibilities 
(U.S. Government Manual 2011, 213-225). 
In its daily work, one can see that conflict is hardwired into the mission of DOI.  
Managing public lands and American Indian trust resources means that the Department is always 
attempting to balance competing interests regarding the question of how best to manage the land.  
For example, conflicts between people and organizations that wish to utilize public lands for 
resource extraction, such as mineral and water resources, and those that wish to preserve the land 
are common at DOI.  Additionally, several DOI employees interviewed for this study 
commented on the independence of each bureau and each’s differing organizational culture.  
Organizational culture is defined by Trice and Beyer as the set of norms, values, and expected 
behaviors that are shared across most or all members of an organization (1993).  As one manager 
commented, “DOI was explained to me soon after I started as a holding company for eight 
independent companies that think they are more important than the whole.”  These comments, 
lead one to conclude that organizational culture elements, which emphasize a shared work 
identity and a common belief system are bureau-oriented, rather than found at the Department-
level. 
Strong, independent organizational cultures and cultures of institutionalized conflict may 
be one reason why the department led the charge in designing the federal government’s first 
departmental integrated conflict management system.  Like many other federal agency dispute 
resolution initiatives, the origins of CORE PLUS as an integrated system can be traced to DOI’s 
1996 policy on ADR, which was required following enactment of the Administrative Dispute 
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Resolution Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-320, codified at 5 U.S.C. 571-583).  The Act only 
provided minimal requirements for agencies:  to develop an agency-level policy addressing 
alternative dispute resolution as well as to designate a senior official to be an agency dispute 
resolution specialist:  a point person and advisor of dispute resolution programs and initiatives.  
Details of what were to be included in agency ADR policies were left up to the agencies 
themselves (Nabatchi 2007, 647).  DOI chose to develop a broad policy that covered the entire 
Department encouraging alternatives to traditional dispute resolution practices in all facets of the 
agency’s operations (U.S. Interagency Working Group 2007, 43). 
 In 2001, the Secretary of the Interior institutionalized dispute resolution in the department 
by creating a centralized office to coordinate DOI conflict management initiatives and programs.  
The new Office of Collaborative Action and Dispute Resolution (CADR) was designed to work 
closely with the Office of the Solicitor, the Interior Department’s general counsel, who 
designated a Senior Counsel to specialize in ADR and a new Interior Dispute Resolution 
Council, comprised of representatives from every DOI bureau and office, which was created to 
provide leadership, guidance, and feedback on the department’s conflict management programs 
(U.S. Interagency Working Group 2007, 43).  In her study of the institutionalization of ADR in 
the federal government, Nabatchi reviews the research on ADR program adoption by federal 
agencies.  That research, she argues, “suggests that the implementation of ADR varies 
tremendously, both within and across agencies” (2007, 647).  While many agencies did only the 
minimum required under the 1996 Act, the Department of the Interior designed and implemented 
an extremely comprehensive ADR policy as well as importantly backing it up with significant 
organizational resources. 
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 After the adoption of the agency’s ADR policy, the Department began to design and 
implement an agency-wide integrated conflict management system first called “CORE” and then 
expanded and changed to “CORE PLUS.”  The system has been available in its current form 
since 2007 to all non-bargaining unit DOI employees.  Notably, the agency acknowledged that it 
was moving beyond a strictly ADR approach that focuses in a reactive manner on alternatives to 
traditional forms of dispute resolution, with its decision to incorporate some ADR processes into 
a system that was focused more broadly on proactive conflict management (Lipsky and Avgar 
2008, 149).  In its handbook for the system, the Department offers its goals and objectives for 
CORE PLUS: 
The goal of CORE PLUS is for the DOI to fulfill its commitment to institute an 
integrated conflict management system that creates an environment throughout 
the organization ripe for raising all kinds of concerns, listening and being heard 
respectfully, and working collaboratively to solve problems effectively.  An 
integrated conflict management system helps to develop a workplace where issues 
and concerns can be raised at the appropriate level, with confidence that they will 
be respectfully heard and responsibly dealt with, and creates a system for raising 
and resolving concerns that is fair, friendly, and flexible. (U.S. DOI 2011, 2) 
 
Although effective resolution of identified disputes can be seen to be included in the objectives 
of the program, one can easily see the broader goals and objectives identified by the agency.  The 
handbook continues: 
CORE PLUS is designed to develop and integrate conflict management 
competencies into the culture of the Department.  CORE PLUS offers structures, 
skills, and processes to support early and effective conflict management and 
enhanced communications, thereby leading to a more productive and efficient 
workplace and one that embraces collaborative approaches to problem solving 
and open and transparent decision making. (U.S. DOI 2011, 2) 
 
The commitment to conflict management as an organizational culture change agent versus a sole 
focus on alternative processes for dispute resolution sets the vision of the Interior Department 
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apart from most other federal agencies.  In my next section, I turn to how this system with much 
potential to manage conflict productively in theory is operating in practice.  
 
The CORE PLUS Integrated Conflict Management System 
 CORE PLUS operates as a coordinated network of full-time and collateral duty DOI staff 
with external neutrals available via contract that can be utilized in certain situations.  The system 
is managed centrally and Department-wide by the Office of Collaborative Action and Dispute 
Resolution, located at DOI headquarters in Washington.  The organizational location of CADR 
within the office of the Assistant Secretary of Policy, Management, and Budget means it has 
access to the top leaders of the agency and key partners in Human Resources and the Office of 
the Solicitor, but remains organizationally independent of those offices.  Each bureau and office 
below the Assistant Secretary level has designated a Bureau Dispute Resolution Specialist to 
manage the CORE PLUS program within his or her bureau or office.  This specialist serves as a 
key liaison between the CADR staff at the Department-level and bureau management and 
conflict resolution professionals.  He or she also serves on the Interior Dispute Resolution 
Council, which is the policy-making and governing body of CORE PLUS.  The Council meets 
monthly to discuss the ICMS and other conflict management and resolution programs at the 
Department. 
 CORE PLUS can be accessed by any employee in the Department of the Interior except 
bargaining unit employees whose union has not come to an agreement with agency management 
to participate.  Employees reach the system initially either by calling, visiting, or emailing the 
CADR office in Washington, a CORE PLUS Coordinator, or CORE PLUS neutral roster 
member within his or her bureau.  A coordinator position is almost always collateral duty, 
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meaning that CORE PLUS responsibilities are considered secondary duties to an employee’s 
primary job.  But each bureau structures its program differently with a few bureaus having full 
time CORE PLUS staff.  Roster members are collateral duty (U.S. DOI 2011, 12). 
 Employees having conflict issues themselves or other interested and involved parties 
(such as supervisors, coworkers, HR staff, EEO staff, or union representatives in participating 
bargaining units) can contact CORE PLUS.  DOI does not limit the issues that may be attempted 
to resolved or managed in a CORE PLUS process, so long as they are related to employment, but 
the agency reserves the ability to designate that certain matters may not be dealt with by CORE 
PLUS (U.S. DOI 2011, 4).  When an employee or interested party contacts a CORE PLUS 
representative he or she starts a consultation process in order to determine the reasons why the 
employee or party initiated contact with the ICMS and what potential next steps could be.  
During the initial consultation, CORE PLUS Coordinators are instructed to ask what has been 
done prior to contacting CORE PLUS.  This could range from speaking with someone in Human 
Resources about an issue, to filing a formal grievance or initiating a statutory complaint, or using 
appeals processes available to federal civil servants.  Depending on the status of any other 
ongoing proceedings regarding the same matter, the CORE PLUS coordinator or staff member 
then has a range of ICMS options to explore with the employee or interested party.  Examples 
involving a single employee include a referral to another information source within DOI or a 
referral to conflict coaching for one-on-one conflict management assistance for that employee.  
Options for two or more employees in conflict include a referral to mediation or a larger group 
facilitation, which the coordinator can help to set up.  Another option, a climate assessment, may 
be appropriate if there are ongoing issues within a workgroup, team, or office.  Ultimately, the 
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objectives for the CORE PLUS consultant at this stage are “information gathering, reflecting on 
options, and forward movement” (U.S. DOI 2011, 80-81). 
 A key aspect of CORE PLUS that differs from programs in which all parties must always 
consent to participate voluntarily is that DOI must participate by sending a representative to a 
CORE PLUS process if requested by an employee.  The only exception to this policy is if a 
matter is in the formal stage of the Administrative Grievance Procedure (which is only available 
to non-bargaining unit employees) agency management serves as the final adjudicator for a 
formal administrative grievance, versus an outside arbitrator who is chosen jointly by a union 
and the agency to adjudicate grievances in the negotiated grievance procedure, and is available to 
bargaining unit employees (U.S. DOI 2011, 5). 
When two employees or a group of employees agree to begin a conflict resolution 
process, such as mediation or group facilitation, a part-time collatoral duty CORE PLUS 
coordinator or staff member works to schedule the session and neutral.  At this stage the 
coordinator or staff member is instructed to take care to select a neutral without a conflict of 
interest or perceived conflict of interest.  Often this is accomplished by selecting a neutral out of 
a different region of the bureau or office in which the mediation or facilitation will take place, or 
alternatively a neutral from a different bureau or office completely.  Additionally, CORE PLUS 
contracts for external neutrals, in cases in which it is decided that a neutral from outside the 
Department would be most appropriate.  These include federal sector neutrals from the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) and the federal Shared Neutrals program in the 
District of Columbia, as well as private sector neutrals (U.S. DOI 2011, 12). 
 Before entering a CORE PLUS mediation or facilitation session, the parties and neutral 
are required to read and sign an agreement to mediate (or facilitate) that includes a 
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confidentiality agreement to protect what is said and proposed in a CORE PLUS process.  This 
agreement lays out the ground rules for the session and reminds parties that the parties or the 
neutral can end the session at any time.  It also reminds the parties and the neutral about the 
confidentiality requirements of the federal Administrative Dispute Resolution Act and the 
additional confidentiality safeguards built in to CORE PLUS (U.S. DOI 2011, 32). 
 A mediation, facilitation, or other group process is ended by a party or the neutral when 
a) a resolution is reached, or b) a party and/or the neutral decide to terminate the process.  
Possible reasons for termination, absent a resolution, include reaching impasse, a confidentiality 
breach, or an understanding that furthering the process would not meet a party’s needs (U.S. DOI 
2011, 13).  Any resolution is memorialized in a resolution agreement.  The format of such an 
agreement differs depending on what (if any) formal process a complainant is ending through 
reaching a resolution in CORE PLUS.  Therefore, if the CORE PLUS process was initiated 
during an EEO proceeding, for example, the Department will require the resolution agreement to 
meet certain specific criteria to be in compliance with Departmental policy and government-wide 
regulations (U.S. DOI 2011, 38).  If no resolution is reached, the CORE PLUS neutral will issue 
a “Notice of Results and Options” form to the employee(s) initiating the process.  This form 
discusses the options an aggrieved employee has, which include filing a formal administrative or 
negotiated grievance (based on the employee’s bargaining unit status) and filing a formal EEO 
complaint (U.S. DOI 2011, 14). 
  
Now I will turn to focus on CORE PLUS’s relationship with the nearly 150 bargaining 
units in the Department. 
 
 62 
 
 
Unions in the Department of the Interior 
 The Interior Department has a history of collective bargaining that is longer than almost 
every other federal agency.  Most federal agencies did not recognize or collectively bargain with 
unions prior to a 1962 Executive Order issued by President Kennedy that directed them to begin 
recognizing and bargaining with majority-selected unions in an extremely limited fashion over 
working conditions, but not wages or benefits (U.S. Executive Office of the President 1962).  
The Interior Department was one of the few exceptions to this trend, as, beginning in 1948, it 
started to recognize and collectively bargain with ungraded hourly rate employees on its own.  
The Department itself ran elections and certified unions itself prior to Kennedy’s 1962 Executive 
Order (Wilson 1961, 87-92). 
DOI’s comparatively long history with recognizing unions at the local level for certain 
types of employees meant that unlike other agencies that have negotiated nationwide CBAs with 
unions, the Interior Department’s collective bargaining landscape is extremely fragmented.  In 
total, the Department has 150 exclusive recognitions ranging in size from a unit of 7400 
employees in the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Office of the Special Trustee for American 
Indians, to a unit of three employees at Glacier National Park.  The total number of employees in 
bargaining units at the Department nears 20,000, which is about 30% of the total number of 
employed by the agency (U.S. DOI 2010, 1). 
Even though the large number of units lead to a large number of separate local union-
management relationships and CBAs, the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute 
and FLRA rules permit national unions representing a substantial minority or outright majority 
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of employees in an agency to request “national consultation rights” with the agency.  At DOI, the 
American Federation of Government Employees AFL-CIO, the National Federation of Federal 
Employees-IAM AFL-CIO, and the American Federation of Teachers AFL-CIO have been 
granted national consultation rights (U.S. DOI 2010, 1).  FLRA rules require agencies with 
unions granted national consultation rights to consult with their recognized unions, in addition to 
and separate from the process of collective bargaining, providing “reasonable notice of any 
proposed substantive change in conditions of employment” and considering the unions’ views 
before finalizing any change in employment conditions (U.S. 5 CFR 2426.3).  The Interior 
Department has invited its unions with national consultation rights to join its labor-management 
forum, which the agency is required to maintain per Executive Order 13522 (December 9, 2009).  
The goal of a forum is to create a space in which unions and agency leaders can come together in 
an ostensibly non-adversarial setting to improve agency performance and to give unions 
additional avenues to voice ideas outside of the collective bargaining process. 
In its March 2010 plan for launching a labor-management forum, the Department 
describes its range of labor-management relationships in the following manner: 
DOI’s various union recognitions are characterized by the normal range of 
activity and labor- management cooperation. There are a number of inactive units, 
units with vibrant and productive dealings, and those which are extremely 
adversarial. However, DOI has historically encouraged labor-management 
cooperation as an effective and efficient means of doing “business”. Cooperative 
relationships have served to significantly reduce the number of grievances, unfair 
labor practices and other third-party disputes. (U.S. DOI 2010, 1) 
 
As of today, DOI’s forum is actively meeting and addressing a wide variety of labor-
management concerns in the Department. 
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CORE PLUS and Department of the Interior Bargaining Units  
 How does the CORE PLUS ICMS operate in the Department’s unionized workplaces?  
With 30% of the agency’s employees in approximately 150 separate bargaining units, the 
Department has a substantial minority of employees represented by a union.  In these units, the 
DOI has undergone an incremental strategy of proposing to implement CORE PLUS during term 
collective bargaining negotiations or in other units on a case-by-case basis.  Even though the 
negotiability of all elements of an ICMS has not been directly addressed by the FLRA in the 
interest of gaining union buy-in for the system the Interior Department has taken the position that 
before CORE PLUS can be used by or with any bargaining unit employee, the local union 
representing the bargaining unit must agree to a Memorandum of Understanding to participate in 
the program or incorporate language into its term collective bargaining agreement (U.S. DOI 
2011, 24). 
An important point to recognize here is that unions do not simply “opt-in” to the ICMS; 
they actively negotiate with agency management at the local level the contract language that will 
govern bargaining unit employees either mid-term through MOU negotiations or through term 
bargaining.  Of the two local unions in this study that agreed to CORE PLUS, one agreed 
through an MOU and the other in term bargaining.  Understandably, the process of negotiating a 
stand-alone MOU differs significantly from term bargaining when union and management teams 
often trade packages of proposals, dropping or modifying some proposals in exchange for others.  
Analysis of its CORE PLUS implementation handbook and interviews with agency BDRSs 
indicate that the agency’s policy has thus far regarded the ICMS as a permissive subject of 
bargaining for the union and has not taken a CORE PLUS proposal to the Federal Service 
Impasse Panel (the federal government’s interest arbitration panel) against the wishes of a union 
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when a term CBA cannot be reached through negotiation (U.S. DOI 2011, 23-24).  But, as will 
be discussed later, a union member in one of the bargaining units included in this study recalls 
management arguing that if the union accepted the ICMS, management could “lighten up” in 
other areas during term CBA negotiations (A-U-4). 
Lipsky and Avgar discuss another possible scenario for initial implementation of an 
ICMS in a union environment.  Recounting the case of a pilot ICMS implementation for the New 
York State Office of Court Administration, the authors found the “unions representing court 
employees were full partners in the design committee.”  With the unions involved in the design, 
the process of negotiating an MOU or CBA language may have cemented what had been already 
agreed upon in the design stage.  Lipsky and Avgar do not discuss whether the ICMS was 
ultimately agreed to formally in an MOU, CBA chapter, or in some other manner, however 
(2010, 40).  In Chapters 5 through 7, I will come back to this issue, as my research indicates that 
the form of agreement does matter a great deal, and a well executed agreement can serve the 
parties well over the long-term. 
 The Department’s Office of Human Resources and the CADR office do not keep data on 
the number of the agency’s bargaining units that have opted-in to CORE PLUS.  In interviews 
with Bureau Dispute Resolution Specialists, only rarely did one have knowledge of the specific 
bargaining units that had adopted CORE PLUS.  Most only were able to make a general estimate 
of the numbers of units participating.  The lack of exact data is due to the fact that the 
Department and CORE PLUS leaders have not made the collection of such data a priority.  Most 
BDRSs are not in bureau Human Resources offices and therefore do not frequently have the 
occasion to work closely with labor relations staff.  And in some bureaus, labor relations staff 
may have dozens of bargaining units and their respective collective bargaining agreements to 
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keep track of, whereas in the other bureaus there may be none.  The time when the two job 
functions understandably intersect is when CBAs are up for renegotiation or there is a decision 
made to attempt to negotiate an MOU.  Then, BDRSs or other bureau staff assigned to CORE 
PLUS work with labor relations staff to craft MOU or CBA language using a model provided in 
the Department’s CORE PLUS Implementation Handbook (U.S. DOI 2011, 26-27).                                                                                                                                        
 Bureau CORE PLUS staff (and CORE PLUS staff at the Department-level) need to walk 
a fine line between being (and being seen by employees and unions as) ‘management’ and being 
neutral.  Since they believe in the program and support expanding CORE PLUS to bargaining 
units that don’t currently have the system, CORE PLUS staff, primarily at the bureau level, are 
involved when management negotiates the system’s potential initial entry to a bargaining unit.  
For example, the Indian Affairs Bureau Dispute Resolution Specialist recounted recent term 
negotiations for one of her bureau bargaining units in which she worked with management to 
craft draft CBA language to bring to the table.  But at the same time she worked to establish a 
good rapport with the union and tried to serve the role of expert witness during the negotiating 
sessions, rather than being on management’s team (Interview August 19, 2012). 
 While the exact number of bargaining units with CORE PLUS is unknown, interviews 
with CADR staff and BDRSs, along with bureau labor relations staff, indicated a full range of 
bargaining unit relationships with the ICMS.  Anecdotally, DOI staff knew of unions that have 
not yet been approached about CORE PLUS, unions that have refused CORE PLUS when 
offered it in midterm and term negotiations, unions that have adopted CORE PLUS, and unions 
that had adopted CORE PLUS but in later negotiations were successful in getting it removed 
from their CBAs. 
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As discussed in Chapter 3, this study uses purposeful sampling, not to randomly sample 
all DOI bargaining units to attempt to make claims about the makeup of the entire population of 
DOI bargaining units, but to instead learn why unions make different choices regarding initial 
acceptance of and ultimate participation in CORE PLUS.  Therefore, in my next chapter I 
introduce and analyze the first bargaining unit selected for this study.  A chart with further 
summarizing the three units may be found in Appendix 1. 
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CHAPTER 5 
UNIT A 
 
Introducing Unit A 
 Like so many of the Interior Department work units and units within the bureau selected 
for this study, Unit A has a dual mission to protect America’s natural resources and cultural 
heritage, while at the same time being accessible to the public.  As a field site of a DOI bureau, 
the unit includes a range of occupations from jobs that primarily interact with the public, facility 
maintenance, back office support, as well as research and education.  The unit has around 150 
employees in total, who are classified as “non-professionals” under federal labor law.  Of those, 
the union indicated that 86 were currently union members.  The union also had 36 retired 
members, those members who had retired or moved on from government service, but 
nonetheless decided to maintain their membership in the union.  The national union, of which 
this local is a part, is the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), which is one 
of the three primary national unions representing DOI employees. 
The union has had a long history in the unit, with recognition by the Interior Department 
dating back fifty years to when collective bargaining in the federal sector was governed by 
Executive Order rather than by statute.  The union and management regularly negotiate 
collective bargaining agreements as their terms expire.  Negotiations were reported by both sides 
to be contentious and drawn out, with ground rules negotiations for the unit’s upcoming term 
negotiations taking over a year to complete (A-U-6). 
CBAs in recent memory have all been three years in length, the standard in federal sector 
CBAs.  Since striking is unlawful, federal sector CBAs almost always include language in which 
 69 
the CBA rolls over automatically from year to year, unless one of the parties moves to 
renegotiate the agreement during a specified period before the CBA’s anniversary date.  Unit A’s 
agreement contains this language, and interviews with the union indicate that it has been the 
moving party in the past two triennial negotiations (A-U-4).  At the time I conducted fieldwork 
for this thesis, February 2012, the union was writing its term bargaining proposals to turn in to 
management to begin term CBA bargaining.  The management negotiating team would then be 
developing counterproposals based on the union’s proposals. 
When compared to other federal locals, Unit A’s union membership can be seen to be on 
the active side.  Newly installed local officers, recounted the contested election the local had in 
December 2011, leading to the installation of a new executive board of six officers in January 
2012.  Only two races were uncontested and 50% of members voted in the election (February 
2012 Union Newsletter).  The local has monthly membership meetings after work hours that are 
relatively well attended.  I was invited to observe a monthly meeting during my visit to the unit 
and found members to be engaged actively, serving on committees and reporting back on their 
progress, and working through issues affecting the bargaining unit.  About one-quarter of the 
membership was present at the meeting I attended.  To be sure, non-active members do not 
attend union meetings, nor do bargaining unit employees who choose not to join the union.  But 
the agenda, involvement of members, and member engagement in union meetings is an 
important source of data on how the union sees it role and its members and leaders determine its 
direction. 
Currently, Unit A does not have CORE PLUS or any form of ADR in its CBA.  Nor does 
it have an MOU to that effect.  Conflicts currently are resolved through direct negotiation, after 
being channeled through the CBA’s grievance procedure, or statutory processes such as FLRA 
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unfair labor practice (ULP) proceedings, MSPB appeals, and the EEO process.  The union 
reported filing around 8 to 10 ULP charges in 2011 and about 25 grievances, which is about its 
average in recent years.  Numbers of MSPB appeals and EEO cases are much lower.  With a 
large number of grievances and ULP charges filed annually, the content of such filings will 
understandably vary.  Union members and leaders recounted recent grievances, such as 
individual performance evaluation grievances, a unit-wide time-off award grievance, and work 
schedule grievances.  ULP charges often were filed in regards to changes in working conditions 
the union claimed were not properly negotiated before being implemented by management.  For 
MSPB-appealable discipline and discharge cases for which filing a grievance was an option, the 
union almost always chooses to go the MSPB route and represents members in that process. 
Interviews with management and union indicated almost all of the ULP charges and 
grievances were resolved through direct negotiation after a formal process was invoked.  In the 
case of ULP charges the FLRA played an important role letting the agency know when a ULP 
complaint would likely issue, giving the agency additional incentive to settle a charge before the 
FLRA General Counsel approved a complaint.  Grievances were most frequently resolved at the 
Step 2 or Step 3 levels.  Step 3 is the step directly before the union would vote to take a 
grievance to arbitration.  In what may initially seem counterintuitive, grievances in Unit A 
almost never reach arbitration.  Management and union representatives recount a normal practice 
of reaching settlement after discussions with the #1 and #2 top management officials.  ULP 
charges, MSPB, and EEO administrative proceedings are usually settled before any 
administrative hearings are scheduled or take place. 
Of particular relevance to this study is a ULP charge against local management, regional 
management, and the Interior Department’s Solicitor’s Office filed in early 2012 regarding 
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CORE PLUS.  In this charge, the union alleges the agency has not been responsive to an 
information request it made requesting all CORE and CORE PLUS “agreements.”  The union 
says that it has evidence that the agency allowed some bargaining unit employees the opportunity 
to use CORE PLUS, when the union did not authorize the ICMS.  The union reported that after 
the FLRA began looking into the charge, the agency told the Authority’s investigator that it had 
no documents responsive to the request.  In interviews, union representatives indicated that 
several union members had turned over their CORE agreements to the union.  The union then 
turned over the resolution agreements to the FLRA to investigate further as to why the agency 
did not produce these agreements.  As of April 2012, the FLRA investigation was on hold while 
a hearing and forthcoming decision by an Authority Administrative Law Judge on an unrelated 
ULP complaint was in process. 
Even as controversy surrounds CORE PLUS in this unit, it is important to recognize that 
ADR has been used successfully in the past.  Union and management negotiators have utilized 
the services of Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service mediators to help move the parties 
forward during collective bargaining.  Every union and management representative interviewed 
saw the value that FMCS provided (A-U-4; A-M-8). 
 
Unit A: Union Goals, Strategies, and Associated Tactics 
 
 In the week I spent at Unit A, I interviewed union leaders and members to discern goals 
and strategies of their local as well as to learn about conflict management tactics chosen, 
including their decision not to participate in CORE PLUS and their views on conflict 
management systems.  I also had the opportunity to observe a monthly union meeting, and I also 
observed union leaders interactions with management staff during my visit.  I identified two big-
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picture goals of the union and two predominant strategies and related tactics the union utilized to 
attempt to achieve its goals. 
 
 Goal 1:  To build union power 
 It was clear during my discussions with Unit A leaders and members and my observation 
of the union’s monthly meeting that growing the strength of the union as an organization was a 
priority for members and leadership.  Members described the union as being an essential element 
of organizational life currently, but some discussed how it could have more of an impact.  A 
longer-term specific goal of local union leadership and AFGE is to work toward a regional CBA 
that would combine and allow for a more unified and powerful voice with its bureau’s 
management.  As noted in Chapter 4, DOI is one of the most decentralized agencies in the 
federal government for collective bargaining.  While other departments have nationwide master 
agreements (with local supplements), DOI bargaining units are almost all at the individual 
worksite level.  One member recounted that the recent ground rules negotiations for a term 
collective bargaining in Unit A took a year.  With a regional CBA, the length of time for 
negotiation may be shortened due to the higher-profile nature of a wider-scope CBA and its 
importance (A-U-6). 
 Union members commented on the fact that building union power also ultimately meant 
holding back threats to its power from management officials who were thought to be continually 
attacking it.  In this context, the notion of building power involves thinking about how to build 
strength for the union as an organization while at the same time not losing any power that you 
currently have.  A specific example of an issue on this front surrounded official time, the time 
union representatives are released from their jobs to provide representational services to 
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bargaining unit employees, receive training, and bargain term and midterm agreements for the 
union.  Union representatives felt management assumed that they were constantly abusing their 
official time privileges, when they were not.  A union representative told me that often a 
supervisor will see an employee talking to the union rep and will ask if the rep is on official time.  
“We know we are a target.  [Official time] is the only thing they can try to get us on.  They nig 
and nag at us” (A-U-6). 
 This contention over official time spilled over into my visit to the bargaining unit.  While 
DOI, bureau management, and local management all agreed to participate in this study, 
management limited the number of union members it would grant official time, to be interviewed 
for the study due to the fact that it was a busy week at the unit.  Several union members met with 
me after work hours so they could still participate in the study.  In Units B and C, management 
officials did not limit my access to union members. 
 
 Goal 2:  To provide and demonstrate the union’s value to members and non-members 
 In many senses, this goal is related to Goal 1, but it is distinguishable due to the fact that 
having an active engaged membership that appreciates the union’s value in the bargaining unit, 
throughout the federal government, and beyond was seen to be essential to the local union’s 
long-term stability and success.  This can be seen to be the case even if it could have achieved 
power through other means, such as through regional collective bargaining and ending attacks on 
its ability to use official time.  This goal was not tied specifically to raising the percentage of 
bargaining unit employees who choose to become union members, but to the ways that union 
members, non-members, and managers saw the union’s role in the workplace.  Like with Goal 1, 
union members stated they were frequently on the defensive, having to continually show the 
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union’s value through tactics such as filing grievances and ULP charges, when management was 
challenging their role and value to their members and to the American public in general.  One 
union member commented: 
  Without a grievance process, what do you do?  If you don’t have a say in your  
  workplace, employees will have much worse morale, agencies are going to violate 
  the law more often and there is nothing to keep the agencies in check.  And I think 
  that was Congress’s intent and the President’s intent in 1961.  In a place where we 
  spend 75% of our lives, employees should have a right to decide at least certain  
  things:  our work environment.  I think it is beneficial to the American people and 
  to the United States government and certainly not a waste of time or money.  I  
  want to show the American people that, yes, invest in your federal government  
  but also organized labor in federal government because you will get a much better 
  service than what you would without one. (A-U-8) 
 
 Managing a bargaining unit’s union membership rate is a goal for any union if it wants to 
survive, especially in an open shop environment like the federal government.  Lacking the ability 
to charge non-members agency fees, open shop unions rely on voluntary dues payments to fund 
all of their activities and collective bargaining.  Additionally, only dues paying members are able 
to serve as officers, negotiating team members, and attend union meetings, meaning that a local 
with a low membership rate will have fewer members to serve on committees, as stewards, and 
as officers.  Union members in Unit A did not indicate that they had a goal to raise the 
percentage of bargaining unit members who were union members, indicating that they did not 
see their current membership rate of about 57% of the bargaining unit to be a problem.  Indeed, 
the unit’s high number of retiree members (about 30) indicates that members see the value of 
staying a member in the local, even after retirement.  However, one union member observed, the 
fact that, “even though we have been around for 51 years as a local, it ebbs and flows in terms of 
membership.  When employees are happy our numbers shrink.  When they are not happy they 
grow” (A-U-8).  Employees see value in the union (rightly or wrongly) when conflict is 
 75 
perceived to be present in workplace and they think the union is able to help them deal with it. 
How does CORE PLUS enter into the union/value calculus for this local?  One member bluntly 
stated what others had also alluded to, “CORE PLUS waters down what the union does for the 
bargaining unit” (A-U-4).  This belief puts CORE PLUS in direct conflict with one of the 
union’s primary goals. 
 Previous research and theory development (Lipsky et al. 2003, Robinson et al. 2005, 
Avgar 2008) has posited that ICMSs have the ability to add value to unions’ representation of 
their bargaining unit.  Does the union in Unit A see adoption and use of CORE PLUS as a 
conflict management tactic that will, in the eyes of bargaining unit employees, add additional 
value to the union?  The answer in this case is clouded by the active ULP charge filed by the 
union regarding an information request regarding the implementation of the ICMS.  As was 
discussed earlier in this chapter, the union alleges that management is withholding documents 
that prove the agency allowed bargaining unit employees to use CORE PLUS when the union 
had not agreed to its implementation.  By filing a ULP charge regarding the information request 
and with the possibility of filing another ULP charge on the underlying, potentially illegal, 
conduct of the agency, the union is showing that it is standing up for its rights and fights when it 
feels management has broken the law.  This action can be separated from the union’s thoughts on 
CORE PLUS itself.  If the union’s charges are true, it is an example of an implementation that 
has the appearance of being behind the union’s back.  This makes it hard for the union to support 
the program, since the agency has stated that it will not use it in bargaining units that do not 
agree to it. 
 Comments from union members indicated a strong sense that the statutorily protected 
rights to union notification of and the opportunity to be present at formal meetings were seen to 
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be important ways the union shows value to its members.  One member stated referring to 
bargaining unit employees using CORE PLUS, “We are your exclusive representative.  If you 
are having formal meetings with management we should be involved with that.”  If formal 
discussions do not involve charges filed against the union or its representatives, “We should be at 
any formal meetings.  That is a basic right under the collective bargaining process” (A-U-6).  
Another member stated that even if a bargaining unit employee does not want the union present 
in a formal meeting, the union has the right to be there to protect the interests of the collective 
bargaining unit, “We represent everybody.  You can’t make some sweetheart deal” (A-U-7).  
Another member commented, “We just want our right to be recognized.  Our main point is that 
we have a right to be there,” indicating the fact that when the union is left out of formal meetings 
by not being notified by management of their occurrence, union members view that absence to 
be devaluing the union’s role in the workplace (A-U-8). 
 A different member stated, “We feel that an outside mediator is union-busting.  It kind of 
lessons the importance of the union being the sole representative of the bargaining unit,” 
indicating the member thinks that an outside mediator coming in through the CORE PLUS 
program would impinge on the union’s representational function, even though CORE PLUS 
neutrals are not permitted to perform a “representative” function for bargaining unit employees 
during a CORE PLUS process.  What is likely behind these comments is the belief that the venue 
of a CORE PLUS process is less in the direct control of the union than the grievance procedure, 
and therefore employees may think CORE PLUS mediators would be advocates for them rather 
than neutrals helping the parties reach resolution of the issue(s) that brought them to the ICMS 
(A-U-4). 
 77 
 In a local union with all-volunteer officers and stewards and no paid staff, providing 
value is a two-way street.  Union members must see the value in their efforts on behalf of the 
union or else it may become hard to find individuals willing to volunteer for union leadership 
positions.  One member described being actively involved in the union in the following manner: 
  I don’t do it for me at all.  I could spend my time with my family more; I could  
  spend my time doing whatever the hell it is that I do.  But there is a sense of pride; 
  there is a sense of camaraderie, fraternity that I get out of being a union member.   
  Knowing that I am not the only out there that is going through the same thing.   
  It’s all about going out talking to people, meeting people.  It’s the human factor.   
  That is what keeps me involved.  Yeah, I enjoy a good fight too intellectually and  
  maybe that’s a factor, but a very slim factor.  I kinda get off at the end of the day  
  being able to say ‘This employee, this group of employees, would have had  
  nothing if it weren’t for the union.  We didn’t get everything but they are better  
  off because we were here.’ (A-U-8) 
 
This member’s reflections suggest that union activists value the union’s ability to give them the 
opportunity to help their coworkers.  Therefore it is the process of managing and resolving 
conflict that some union members may see as the reason why they invest time and energy in the 
union.  To these union representatives it is important not just that the conflict was resolved (as it 
may be for the bargaining unit employee in conflict), but that the union played a role in resolving 
the conflict and that the union representatives played a role in the resolution that benefitted the 
worker.  If CORE PLUS is seen as a substitute for the union representative’s role, the ICMS 
understandably will not align with the union’s goal to provide value for members (including 
those serving in an official capacity) as well as non-member bargaining unit employees.  On the 
other hand, if CORE PLUS is seen as complementing (and as a part of) the union’s conflict 
resolution role it could serve as an additional tool for union representatives to use when 
appropriate.  In this vein, a union member who was supportive of the ongoing ULP case stated 
that if the union ultimately could agree with management to implement CORE PLUS in the unit, 
she would like to receive CORE PLUS training and would possibly volunteer to be a CORE 
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PLUS specialist “as long as we [‘the union’] are involved” and would also encourage other union 
members to be involved in the ICMS. (A-U-6) 
 
 I now turn to focus on the strategies (and related tactics) of the union in Unit A to achieve 
its goals, with a focus on their impact on conflict management in the unit.  As discussed earlier, I 
look at strategic behaviors, both those considered strategic by union members and leaders as well 
as those I identify to be strategic, even if the behaviors are not recognized as such by union 
members.  I found two primary strategies employed by the union in Unit A: 
 
 Strategy 1:  Prioritizing a vibrant ‘union identity’ and strong ‘union solidarity’ 
 In my interviews and site visit I found that union officials and members strategically 
prioritized the promotion of a strong union identity and notion of solidarity in order to build 
power and demonstrate the union’s value.  A component of this is outward expressions of union 
identity.  For example, in the union meeting I attended, a large minority, probably nearing 50%, 
of members, wore union polo shirts with the local’s logo.  Members frequently referred to each 
other as “brother” and “sister” both inside the meeting and outside of it.  A handful of retiree 
members and several members who were not working on the day of the union meeting attended, 
indicating a commitment to come in to the workplace solely for a union meeting.  This level of 
commitment is frequently not found in other federal locals. 
 One member indicated that in the past the union listed the whole membership on its 
bargaining team so that members could come in and out for their expertise.  This gives members 
more of an opportunity to be involved in the collective bargaining process; as most unions limit 
the bargaining team to a handful of members, often elected leaders (A-U-10).  The local also 
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recently started a union newsletter that it believes will help educate members about all the union 
is doing and encourage non-active members, as well as non-members to get active (A-U-7).  The 
local provided me a copy of the newsletter’s first issue, from which the editor’s note reads: 
  Welcome readers to the inaugural issue of [REDACTED]! The union created this  
  newsletter to facilitate communication with its members. Since not all members  
  can attend monthly meetings, this newsletter will help keep members informed  
  about important issues. We will keep you updated on wins by the union and  
  information about your rights in the work place. Lastly, in future issues, there will 
  be a section entitled spotlight on a member, which will include a photo, a short  
  note about them, their job, and why they joined the union. Participation is   
  voluntary and members will be contacted if they are selected. As always, active  
  participation in the union is encouraged. Remember; it is your union!  
 
 In the realm of conflict management, while decisions to move forward with grievances or 
individual employee issues are given consideration on a case-by-case basis, union members and 
leaders told me of the overriding question they attempt to answer when and if deciding to move 
forward: “What is the net result for the union?” (A-U-6).  This indicates a strategic connection 
between individual employees’ concerns and the union as an organization’s, with the union’s 
goals and strategic needs factoring in to the organization’s decision-making calculus. 
 Union leaders jokingly noted of a solidarity building tactic they were sure had caught 
management’s attention.  On the upper right-hand corner of their grievance forms, the union 
printed a small whisk.  Additionally, some members wore little mini-whisks in their front shirt 
pockets as a “solidarity thing” and reminder to members that they were constantly stirring the 
pot.  The action shows the union challenging norms of workplace dress, and grievance forms 
sending a moderately subtle message to management and each other that the union would not be 
taking a passive approach when it comes to workplace conflict.  The whisks indirectly connect 
the union’s ability to ‘stir conflict up’ to the union’s value.  The symbol also indicates the 
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importance of the grievance procedure to the union’s strategy, for if the procedure were not so 
important, why take the time to embed a whisk on every grievance form (A-U-6; A-U-8)? 
 How does CORE PLUS interact with the union’s strategy to build identity and solidarity?  
Since the union has not agreed to participate in the ICMS (and has an active ULP charge 
regarding the matter pending at the FLRA), perceptions of the ICMS matter a great deal.  Many 
union members interviewed had an overall negative impression of CORE PLUS and sometimes 
an inaccurate and not full understanding of how the program was structured and operated.  This 
will be discussed further later in the thesis.  Applicable to a discussion regarding a solidarity 
strategy are comments from a union member regarding internal union conflict.  The member 
stated that she found herself frequently mediating internal union issues “trying to calm people 
down.”  She would focus on getting members having a dispute to “try and move forward” and 
added, “We try to always keep things in house so that we give a united front to management” (A-
U-4).  Another member recounted a situation in which she served as a go-between between a 
member and a union officer in a dispute.  The member saw her role as effective as she was able 
to view the situation with “fresh eyes” and helped to resolve the issue between the two members 
(A-U-7). 
 While CORE PLUS ostensibly could be an option for union members with conflict, the 
member’s comment indicates that part of the union’s strategy for presenting “a united front to 
management” is resolving disputes internally, within and through the union.  Shifting these 
disputes to CORE PLUS may mean union members would perceive a loss of “a unified front” to 
management. 
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 Strategy 2:  Emphasizing a distinction between the union and management  
 The second primary strategy I found the union using to attempt to reach its goals was a 
strategy in which the union emphasizes clear delineation between the union and management.  
This strategy is connected to the previous strategy in that through doing so the union buoys its 
own identity as a union through often attempting to disparage management. 
 Union members frequently referred to themselves in opposition to management.  One 
member stated simply, “Since I am not in management, I’m going to side with the union” (A-U-
4).  Another member discussed the fact that the union was considering starting its own holiday 
party that would be separate from the larger workplace holiday party because that party 
represents management.  “No one wants to be at a party with management.”  When asked what 
she believed the role of the union is, the same member replied, “Making sure employees get what 
we are entitled to.  Helping us fight against management ” (A-U-5).  Another member stated that 
a bargaining unit employee who was deaf was not provided an interpreter at an all-employee 
meeting.  “They don’t give a shit about you,” the member commented when asked what she 
thought this meant (A-U-1). 
 About a year prior to my fieldwork, the union stopped meeting with top bargaining unit 
management in regularly scheduled labor-management meetings.  These meetings were not 
labor-management partnership meetings that fell under the auspices President Clinton and 
Obama’s executive orders, but rather local, informal attempts by the parties to meet with each 
other to discuss workplace matters outside of formal settings, like grievance meetings (A-M-5).  
A union member said the reason why the union stopped attending the meetings is that the union 
thought that management officials wanted to have the meetings solely to make themselves look 
good, rather than actually addressing workplace issues (A-U-9).  Commenting further, another 
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member said they “were a waste of our time.”  The same member added the statement, “The only 
time I want to meet with them is when I have a grievance” (A-U-6). 
 Union members did not argue that the distinction they drew between themselves and 
management was unrelated to management behavior.  Instead, many comments the union 
members made about management indicated that it was management’s behavior to which the 
union was responding.  “They constantly violate federal law and our collective bargaining 
agreement,” one member exclaimed.  “They have been brought up on many ULPs and we 
negotiated a solution.  If they would sit down with us and treat us like partners, but many times 
they out and out lie to us” (A-U-6).   While each side in any functioning collective bargaining 
relationship responds to the tactics and behaviors from the other side, it is important to recognize 
that both sides also develop strategies and employ tactics to manage their relationship through 
the negotiation subprocess that Walton and McKersie name “attitudinal structuring” (1965). 
 Some management officials interviewed for this study seemed to catch on to the union’s 
delineation strategy.  One commented, “I think the union now doesn’t want to meet with us 
because we want to meet with them so much.  It is out of spite” (A-M-5).  Others were frustrated 
and flummoxed by the union’s tactics.  One manager said, “I don’t understand the animosity 
from the union,” stating that management often upheld grievances on the union’s side and has 
made management changes when warranted (A-M-4).  Even though the union was frequently 
‘winning’ grievances, it still was seen to be maintaining its delineation strategy. 
 This strategy lends itself to tactically choosing formal, rights-based forums for dispute 
resolution.  In formal settings such as grievance and ULP proceedings, the “we” and “they” are 
clearly delineated, with (from the union’s perspective) “we” being the union and “they” being 
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management.  Notably, union representatives and management officials both referred to the other 
group in these “we”/”they” terms throughout my visit to the bargaining unit. 
 From the union’s perspective, CORE PLUS was also frequently referred to as a “they.”  
The ICMS was seen to be management’s program, and thus was viewed with skepticism by 
many union members.  The language union members used to describe their views of the ICMS 
reflected and reinforced this belief.  “It is some kind of mediation done through the regional 
office with [a person] who has stepped into our territory here.  They shouldn’t be meeting with 
our employees,” one member stated (A-U-6).  Another member argued that since management 
selects CORE PLUS coordinators and specialists, “the deck is stacked on management’s behalf” 
(A-U-4).  The view that CORE PLUS was inextricably linked with management does not mean 
that all members completely dismiss it as a viable option.  While many members were opposed 
to the ICMS based on what they had heard about it, some members, especially those who were 
not aware of the system, were interested in learning more.  “It would be interesting to know more 
about it to see if is beneficial for us…as a union and for the employees we are fighting for.  It is 
an uphill battle,” said one member (A-U-7).  Notably the member separates “the union” from 
“the employees,” signaling an awareness that the union’s needs as an organization can differ 
from those of the employees it represents. 
 
 I now turn to an analysis of the management goals and objectives as well as the impact of 
its strategic choices on conflict management tactics used by managers.  When discussing 
management goals and strategy throughout this thesis, I focus specifically on goals and strategies 
surrounding their management responsibilities versus goals and accompanying strategies in other 
areas of organizational life, such as service to the public and protection of natural resources. 
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Unit A: Management Goals, Strategies, and Associated Tactics 
 
 In my interviews with managers from Unit A and bureau staff organizationally located 
one level above them I found that the adversarial industrial relations climate had created a 
somewhat ‘war-torn’ and exacerbated mentality for management staff and the belief that the 
union had too much power in the bargaining unit. 
 
 Goal 1:  To strengthen management power. 
 In interviews with management officials in Unit A, I found wide-ranging agreement 
surrounding the belief that the union had obtained too much power and control in everyday 
organizational life and this power was not helpful for the organization.  Managers would not 
state this fact directly.  Instead, these views became evident through examples of recent labor-
management conflicts and comments indicating that they felt they were often on the defensive 
with the union.  A manager bluntly expressed frustration with the union:  “I don’t see a lot of 
what they do as particularly helpful or useful to anyone.  They would look for opportunities to 
raise issues and conflicts.  The union makes it worse rather than better” (A-M-2). 
 One manager recalled discussions with the union regarding the potential government 
shutdown in the spring of 2011, when Congress almost did not agree on a resolution providing a 
continuing appropriation for DOI.  Under the Obama administration’s policy issued in an attempt 
to facilitate labor-management cooperation, agencies are required to consult “pre-decisionally” 
with their unions over certain management decisions that they are not required to bargain and, of 
course, bargain over legally required subjects.  While under a tight time crunch to turn in a 
shutdown plan to the bureau, the manager stated the union filed multiple information requests 
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regarding the planning process, adding additional management workload to respond to such 
requests.  The union then filed multiple ULP charges saying it was not involved in the decision-
making process.  The manager went on to state that management “should make decisions about 
who would be working” in a shutdown.  There was limited time in this case to devise a plan, so 
pre-decisional involvement was hard.  “We have to do our jobs and they have to do their jobs,” 
the manager concluded (A-M-8). 
 Another manager in the unit stated that there have been “laxities” and employees often 
have a sense of entitlement and a lack of accountability to management (A-M-6).  An example of 
this can be found in the case of closing early on holidays.  Throughout the federal government, 
the President often authorizes an early dismissal of most non-essential employees the day before 
a federal holiday.  In the past some employees who were deemed essential, and therefore not 
released early, would be granted  “time-off awards” that would be added to their leave banks so 
that they could schedule the leave time previously granted for early dismissal at a later date.  On 
a day before a holiday after management released non-essential staff, a manager recalled seeing a 
union member working.  When the manager asked the employee why she was still at work when 
she had been released early, the employee stated she wanted to stay so she could “claim” the 
time through a time-off award.  The manager thought this employee wrongly felt entitled to an 
award that “should be a manager’s prerogative.”  Ultimately the union requested bargaining over 
this issue after management indicated that it intended to change what it acknowledged had been a 
past practice (A-U-8). 
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 Strategy 1:  Focusing on compliance with law, regulation, and CBA 
 In order to attempt to achieve its goal of strengthening management power in the 
workplace, management officials discussed the strategies and tactics they used in direct and 
indirect ways.  The first strategy I identified was a management focus on complying with federal 
collective bargaining law and regulation, but stressing that management could not fully embrace 
partnership strategies due to the adversarial behavior of the union.  This strategy leads the local 
management team (in common with the union) to be comfortable in formal dispute resolution 
processes such as the grievance and ULP processes, while at the same time not being encouraged 
by the union’s frequent use of these rights-based dispute resolution forums.  Managers 
commented upon the fact that union representatives frequently would file grievances and ULPs 
that would ultimately settle or be dismissed, as they were of questionable legality.  “I would love 
to talk to union reps who knew the rules” one manager commented.  Continuing she said,  “We 
have too many amateur hours” indicating that union representatives did not often have a good 
handle on the law before filing a grievance or ULP charge (A-M-8).  Addressing this concern, 
another manager stated that training was needed for management and union representatives.  We 
want training “on the CBA:  what it means and have everyone understand their roles… Annual 
training” (A-M-4). 
 Does CORE PLUS fit into this strategy?  While the union reported management eagerly 
supporting CORE PLUS during negotiations for the last term CBA, management officials 
interviewed for this study were generally cautious about the ICMS and were either cautiously 
optimistic or did not think it would be a conflict management tactic that would have an effect on 
the workplace.  One manager stated, “If the union is willing to give CORE PLUS a whirl, some 
individual conflicts could be helped, but with current union attitude, I am not sure it could make 
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a difference” (A-M-2).  Another reported that she knew people in other parts of the bureau that 
had CORE PLUS and experienced mixed results, adding that the non-management employees 
who used it there felt that it was more of a “band-aid” than a help (A-M-4). 
 
 Strategy 2:  Conveying management authority to the union and bargaining unit 
employees 
 Both the management officials interviewed and many union members inferred or 
commented that management often would take any opportunity to display its authority over 
bargaining unit employees.  Management staff claimed that this strategy was necessitated by the 
union’s rejection of more collaborative tactics to resolve issues in the workplace.  For example, 
management officials discussed how they thought they had been successful in working pre-
decisionally with the union on revisions to standards for performance evaluations but now are 
faced with several grievances and ULPs on the issue.  “Why do we try so hard to work with 
them?” one weary manager exclaimed (A-M-8).  Union members frequently would describe 
what they saw as abuses of authority by management.  One member commented, “Everyone in 
this [bargaining unit] will get fucked once.  It’s management’s way of telling you I told you 
so…People with power keep power.”  The same member gave a concrete example of a manager 
keeping a bulletin board with photos of people she wants to fire (A-U-1).  Another member 
described her belief that management hides information from the union as a veiled method of 
asserting its authority.  “I call it the mushroom treatment.  Keep them in the dark and feed them 
shit,” she exclaimed (A-U-10). 
 Discussing management’s rule enforcement strategy, a different union member stated, 
“They are like the angry sibling, babysitting… They say no to everything:  If it is not in the CBA 
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you are not allowed to do it, end of story” (A-U-5).  This tactic of strict enforcement of the CBA 
reserves for management’s discretion its authority to make decisions in all areas which are not 
covered by the collective bargaining agreement. 
 While these opinions from union members would likely be contested by managers, 
managers themselves often did not see CORE PLUS as a tool that could help them maintain 
authority in the workplace and instead saw the potential for CORE PLUS to be another venue for 
labor-management strife.  One manager stated that CORE PLUS is not a priority for 
management and thought that a more basic need to “to just get these people communicating” was 
a necessary first step before any new conflict resolution programs could be considered (A-M-8). 
 Union representatives complained that management’s strategy to frequently assert 
management’s rights under federal labor law was frustrating because at the same time it was 
asserting its rights, management would challenge the union’s rights.  A union member used the 
ongoing ULP over the union’s information request regarding potential illegal use of the CORE 
PLUS program with bargaining unit employees as an example.  She said that the whole issue was 
frustrating because the right of the union to request information from management is considered 
by the union to be a fundamental employee and union right, yet whenever management asserts its 
rights the union is supposed to sit there and take their word for it.  “So, our only recourse is a 
grievance or ULP.  What do you expect us to do?  We only have a few tools in our toolbox when 
you all don’t give us information, what do you expect us to do” (A-U-8)? 
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Industrial Relations Climate 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, Hammer et al.’s IR climate measure analyzes levels of trust, 
respect, cooperation, and labor-management relationship quality in a given labor-management 
dyad.  Using this framework, I find the IR climate in Unit A to be highly conflictual, with low 
levels of trust and low to medium levels of respect.  As noted earlier in this chapter, union-
management relations were extremely adversarial with communication between the two parties 
currently taking place primarily through formal channels such as the grievance and ULP 
procedures.  One quote from a union member, “We are not a partner here.  We are the enemy 
here,” succinctly expresses what I heard to be many union members’ views on the labor-
management relationship (A-U-9). 
 Specifically on the dimension of trust, union members and managers frequently 
commented that trust of the other party was low.  For example, one union member said 
management makes agreements that the union cannot put any trust in.  She said agreements are 
written on “are a double-sided piece of fucking toilet paper.”  The same member continued, 
“Management needs accountability—I can’t trust anybody in this [unit].”  As can be predicted, 
tactical choices of this union member reflect this low level of trust:  “When I walk into a 
grievance meeting and I look at that manager I know that manager is out to screw me.  So I turn 
the table and let them screw themselves into the wall” (A-U-1).  Another member expressed a 
distrust of management’s intentions in the sphere of union legitimacy:  “I don’t trust them.  I 
think they have some motive to say we are spending a lot of official time:  spending taxpayer 
dollars,” and inferring the union is wasting taxpayer-funded time (A-U-3). 
 When reflecting on Unit A’s IR climate, one management interviewee noted “most of the 
relationships have been more adversarial than cooperative,” while another stated the belief that 
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“a good relationship takes two sides.  There is nothing you can do if they don’t like you” (A-M-
4; A-M-5).  I found respect to be low between the union and management, at both the personal 
level and organizational level.  A union member gave an example of the respect she believed the 
union as an organization was not afforded by management.  She described posters that were hung 
on bulletin boards in the unit titled, “CORE Program for all Interior Employees,” after the union 
did not agree to allow bargaining unit employees to participate.  The action of the agency in 
posting the poster, in the union’s eyes, was seen as disrespectful to the union’s choice and the 
collective bargaining process.  The same member commented, “If everybody respects each other 
and everybody respects each other’s rights, then ultimately you are going to have a good 
relationship.”  But respect is a two-way street.  The union member also discussed the fact that the 
union put its term contract proposals on rainbow colors of paper before turning its proposals in to 
management.  Every other page was a different color.  Union members jokingly put a union 
membership form in the binder along with their proposals for management.  The multi-colored 
proposals made it impossible for management to scan them before an electronic copy was 
ultimately exchanged (A-U-8). 
 
 
Role of the International Union 
 As will be seen, each of the three bargaining units in this study had differing levels of 
influence from higher levels of their respective unions.  The influence of the international union 
in Unit A came primarily through two means:  1) through communication with a staff 
representative of the union’s district office and 2) through the local’s use of and support for the 
international union’s model collective bargaining agreement language. 
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 Local union members recounted a meeting during preparations for term bargaining for 
the 2007 CBA currently in force.  During the review of contract proposals developed by the 
union’s team, a member brought up the question:  “Is CORE PLUS in the proposal?”  Another 
member recounted what happened next, “We said no there is no CORE PLUS in there, but there 
is an ADR proposal in there.  A couple of the old-timers flipped out and started yelling and we 
had to call the meeting to order.”  At that meeting, a union district representative was in 
attendance.  This was a special occurrence, as district representatives do not regularly attend 
local meetings.  She served as a full time staffer for the union’s district office serving the region 
in which Unit A is located.  The district rep attempted to convince the membership why it should 
support the bargaining team’s ADR proposal.  As the union member remembered it, the district 
representative expressed her belief that ADR is “another tool in your toolbox… You guys are 
stupid if you don’t build in some ADR.  Why not have an ADR system that doesn’t bind you?  
All of your grievances are being settled at Step Three or before arbitration.  Why not have 
another option” (A-U-8)? 
 While this statement in and of itself should be not seen as an endorsement by the national 
union of ADR, it indicates that at least grievance ADR, as compared to a more comprehensive 
program such as an ICMS, is not considered a threat to the union’s strategic objectives.  At the 
same time, though, the views of one district representative are hardly representative of a large 
nationwide organization. 
 A better indicator of the international union’s position on ADR is its own model contract 
language that it provides to locals negotiating and renegotiating CBAs.  As mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, one of the specific goals expressed by the union that I categorize under the rubric of 
“building power” is to negotiate a regional CBA covering multiple bureau locations.  As a first 
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step to achieving this goal, a member discussed the desire of leaders of the local for its CBA to 
resemble other locals’ CBAs.  The same member indicated that ADR language was included in 
the international union’s model language provided to locals and that language would be serving 
as the basis for the union’s term proposal on this issue.  Such language did not mention an 
Integrated Conflict Management System.  The lack of guidance from the international union in 
this area meant the local union would be on its own to develop a proposal for an ICMS, which it 
had chosen not to do.  Therefore, negotiations over the ICMS would begin at the table when the 
union expected management to present a CORE PLUS proposal (A-U-8). 
 
 
Negotiation Mechanics and Content of Agreement 
 The negotiation process in this case proves instructive because it had spanned over two 
CBA negotiations, negotiations over the 2007 CBA currently in force, and term bargaining 
preparations for a new CBA being undertaken by both parties when the fieldwork for this thesis 
was being conducted.  As discussed in previous sections of this chapter, during the negotiations 
over the 2007 CBA, internal debate surrounding CORE PLUS had been rancorous.  One member 
recalled the negotiations in which the management negotiators proposed language adding the 
ICMS to the parties’ new CBA and proposed that if the union accepted the language 
management would “loosen up” in other areas, like compressed work schedules (A-U-4).  The 
recollection of the member indicates the ICMS was being used in a traditional bargaining process 
by which the parties would trade off proposals, thinking of the CBA as one total package that 
encompasses numerous compromises that make up its components.  This approach, while the 
norm in collective bargaining, differs from the guidance found in the DOI CORE PLUS manual 
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in which the agency indicates it views CORE PLUS as a permissive subject of bargaining for the 
union and writes, “We encourage you to consider using the CORE PLUS program in your 
bargaining unit” (2011, 24). 
 Members recalled the way the management negotiating team discussed CORE PLUS 
during the 2007 CBA negotiations: 
  They approached me with the conflict resolution baloney and I asked them what  
  exactly was involved in that.  They told me that management picks two people  
  and they get them trained and these are sort of like your arbitrator so to say.  I say  
  what if we pick four and the union will pick two and then we can flip a coin…  
  and we can have an even shot.  They said no.  How can that be fair?  Who will  
  these people be beholden to? (A-U-10) 
 
The member’s recollection expresses frustration and distrust of what was seen to be a 
management-dominated program that did not seem to be open to negotiation, even though CORE 
PLUS coordinators and specialists did not serve as arbitrators and could be bargaining unit 
members (as will be seen to be the case in Unit C).  With this experience and understanding of 
CORE PLUS as a backdrop, union leadership presented the program to the membership, where it 
was rejected, allowing the union team to go back to the negotiating table with a strong 
bargaining position, which was opposed to including any CORE PLUS or ADR language in the 
CBA (A-U-4). 
 Over five years later, remnants of the union’s negative experience from the 2006/2007 
CORE PLUS negotiations remain.  One member explained, “Our local really hates CORE.  Our 
older folks who were around to take that vote, it was like a riot when we were talking about it.  
They think it supersedes the grievance process” (A-U-8).  While some union members were 
supportive of the contract language provided by the national union on ADR, for others ADR was 
conflated with CORE PLUS, which was perhaps permanently tainted in the minds of some 
members. 
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 Another factor that has influenced some union members’ views of CORE PLUS is the 
ULP charge, mentioned earlier in this chapter.  The union claims the agency permitted 
bargaining unit employees to participate in ICMS mediations when no agreement with the union 
was in force.  Union members believed agency managers were going around the union when 
conducting CORE PLUS sessions, and they also believed the agency may be hiding documents 
regarding its past behavior.  With the ULP charge outstanding, union members viewed the 
chance of it adopting CORE PLUS in its entirety as extremely low, but the fact that some 
members and many in the new leadership team sworn in at the beginning of 2012 were not 
dismissive of some sort of ADR meant there would be more room for negotiation this time 
around.  What was clear from the union’s perspective was the fact that any ADR CBA language 
negotiated must make the union feel that it has a role and place in any new dispute resolution 
system or process that is adopted. 
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CHAPTER 6 
UNIT B 
 
Introducing Unit B 
 In terms of job function, Unit B could be described as a sibling of Unit A.  The 
occupations included in Unit B almost exactly mirror Unit A.  If one were to look at a bureau 
organizational chart, she would see that Units A and B are organizational equals, on the same 
level.  But if the two units can be considered organizational siblings, they are not identical twins.  
Unit B is composed of about 70 employees, which is a little less than half the size of Unit A.  
Like Unit A, these employees are also classified as “non-professionals” under federal labor law.  
The union membership rate in this unit is significantly lower than that of Unit A.  As of March 
2012 it had seven members.  The national union, the National Federation of Federal Employees, 
a unit of the International Association of Machinists AFL-CIO, is one of the three national 
unions with the largest presence in the Department and accordingly has been granted national 
consultation rights. 
The union is also much newer to Unit B than Unit A.  After a short campaign period, it 
was certified by the FLRA, and the unit’s first collective bargaining agreement was signed in 
April 2010. Like most other federal sector CBAs, its term is for three years, with one-year 
renewals if neither of the parties requests to renegotiate it.  Union interviews indicated that an 
employee who transferred to Unit B from a bargaining unit position in another federal agency 
spearheaded the union campaign, putting workers in Unit B in touch with NFFE, which was the 
employee’s former union.  NFFE then sent organizers to the unit and ultimately employees voted 
for its exclusive recognition. 
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Compared to Unit A, the local union in Unit B is not as active.  It has not held any 
meetings since the CBA was ratified in 2010.  One union member commented, “The union 
experience here has not been much of a union experience” (B-U-6).  Union members recounted 
that while a majority of employees voted for the union during the secret ballot FLRA election, 
after the union was certified it was extremely hard to get members to join.  In an open shop each 
employee makes an individual choice to join or not join the union, and union members 
interviewed pointed out that many employees did not feel comfortable joining the union for fear 
of retaliation from management.  Union members also reported that in their conversations with 
non-members many claimed they did not see the value of paying dues to an organization that had 
not been seen as making an impact in their workplace.  Union members responded regarding this 
chicken-and-egg problem that a low membership rate means that, a) management did not take 
the union as seriously as it would if it had a larger percentage of the bargaining unit as members, 
and b) the same few members could only do so much on behalf of the union.  Additionally over 
the past year, the union had a few members who left the union or retired, leading it to its lowest 
bargaining unit membership rate since it was certified (B-U-6). 
 Unit B has CORE PLUS in its collective bargaining agreement.  The ICMS is 
incorporated into the “Grievance Procedure and Alternative Dispute Resolution” chapter.  An 
analysis of the CORE PLUS language in the agreement indicates that the program is available 
before, during, and after the grievance procedure.  Personnel actions that are appealable to the 
Merit Systems Protection Board, such as suspensions of greater than 14 days or removals from 
federal service, are exempted from CORE PLUS or any form of grievance mediation and instead 
proceed directly to Step 2, for a response from the Superintendent.  Step 3 is for either the 
agency or union to file for arbitration of the grievance.  For all other issues CORE PLUS is 
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available at the employee and/or union’s request.  The CBA states that all grievance time 
regulations are tolled while the grievant, union, and agency attempt to resolve the grievance 
through a CORE PLUS process.  The agreement also states that if an issue is presented that is 
outside the grievance timelines, CORE PLUS will accept it, but it will not ultimately be able to 
be grieved if not resolved in CORE PLUS. 
 Even though it has language permitting CORE PLUS in its CBA, the union has not 
reported knowing of any bargaining unit employees using the ICMS since its agreement went 
into effect.  Management interviews indicated the same.  The union has also not filed a formal 
grievance or a ULP charge.  Bargaining unit employees have used the EEO process, but this 
occurs rarely.  Within the past year the union filed a negotiability appeal with the FLRA over 
mid-term bargaining language that it was proposing in response to a management change in 
working conditions.  The FLRA denied the appeal, declaring the language non-negotiable (B-U-
2; B-U-5; B-M-4). 
 Although the union has only sparingly used formal dispute resolution processes and has 
not had a bargaining unit member use CORE PLUS, this should not imply that the union is 
completely inactive.  Union and management interviews indicated that issues such as overtime 
compensation, standby pay, position description issues, schedule changes, changes in working 
conditions including office space and moves have been addressed by the union.  The process for 
addressing these issues usually consists of the local union president approaching management, 
usually through email, stating the issue(s) and asking for a meeting with agency management.  
Meetings are usually with the unit’s HR specialist along with a unit supervisor and/or upper 
management depending on the issue(s).  The issues are almost always resolved through this 
process.  As will be discussed further later in this chapter, however, this does not mean that all 
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issues are actively addressed.  Both union and management interviewees stated that a long-
standing culture of fear of retaliation encourages employees to hold issues and workplace 
grievances in, for fear that if they raise them they will be deemed troublemakers.  For example, 
one union member commented: 
[There are] a lot of misconceptions.  Poor information out there about the union 
about what they can do.  People aren’t comfortable with it.  Even now when I talk 
to people about different things, whether or not they are members, I ask them 
have you considered going to the union… ‘well no’ because they expect 
retribution. (B-U-8) 
 
Acknowledging this culture of attempting to bury conflict in Unit B, one manager recounted that 
“I often let sleeping dogs lie,” due to the fact that employees and managers here sometimes work 
together for 20 years or more (B-M-4; B-U-2). 
 
 
Unit B: Union Goals, Strategies, and Associated Tactics 
 
 As a new union, the local union in Unit B can easily be seen to be in a different 
institutional environment than Unit A.  The union organizing campaign was fresh on employees’ 
minds, and management officials were learning how to manage now that the union was a new 
institutional actor in the workplace.  Another essential distinction of relevance for this thesis is 
that Unit B’s union accepted CORE PLUS into its initial CBA with the bureau. 
 How do the union’s goals, strategies, and tactics differ from (or are similar to) those of 
the union in Unit A?  It is to this question that I now turn.  Based on my interview data and 
observations from my week at Unit B, I have identified two primary goals and one non-
developed strategy for achieving those goals. 
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 Goal 1:  To gain legitimacy 
 As any new union must do, the union in Unit B identified the goal of gaining a basic level 
of legitimacy, a notion in the workplace that it was now here and a full actor in employment 
relations issues in the bargaining unit.  As noted earlier, the unit has extremely low turnover, 
which means employees sometimes have been working in the unit for 20 to 30 years.  In 
interviews union members stated their frustration that things were moving slowly with the union.  
“The union experience here has not been much of a union experience,” one member stated (B-U-
6).  Another member said,  “Right now management can sneer at the union.”  Because 
membership is so low “management can and will ignore it” (B-U-4).  Union members indicated 
the membership rate suffered due to the fact that bargaining unit employees were taking a 
cautious approach to the union.  “We get a lot of, ‘I am waiting to see what you are trying to do’ 
before joining,” one said (B-U-5).  Bargaining unit employees were seen to be in a holding 
pattern.  Members would note the chicken-and-egg problem, namely, that without more people 
paying dues and thus being eligible for union office or to be a union representative, the union 
was extremely limited in what it could do with just a few members and no staff. 
 
 Goal 2:  To provide and demonstrate the union’s value to members and non-members 
 Like the union in Unit A, the union members in Unit B wanted bargaining unit employees 
to join the union, but they did not share the same strategy for maintaining a large active 
membership.  Instead, the union was struggling to find ways to demonstrate union value to get 
more members, which was difficult because many of the members doubted the union’s value 
themselves.  One member said, “People are tired of paying dues and not seeing anything for 
them” (B-U-6).  Others questioned the value of the union for themselves: 
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   I have considered dropping out of the union. I have never been in a union.  
   I expected the union to be more available.  The union wants the   
   employees to be the officers and entities within the park.  I am a   
   worker.  The union wants us to be trained as stewards.  I didn’t join  
   the union for that. (B-U-3) 
 
Interestingly, this member refers to the union not as a “we,” but as a “they.”  The union is seen 
here as an external entity that is expected to provide service and support, but the union lacks 
members volunteering to step up to that role. 
 Frustrated and without a solution to the problem, one member stated that she wanted to 
be doing more than “taking money out of people’s checks every two weeks” (B-U-7).  But 
another said it is hard to figure out how to do that since the union was relatively new and the 
members did not know what they could or should do to get the union to a place where it could 
start showing value to members and non-members alike.  Because of this fact, “Most of us are 
like sheep,” a member said.  “We just follow” (B-U-8).  Additionally, members noted that the 
first formal appeal the local filed with the Federal Labor Relations Authority, a negotiability 
appeal over mid-term bargaining language that the Interior Department said was over a 
prohibited subject, was decided in favor of the agency.  This loss made bargaining unit members 
“think what good is it” to join, thought one union member (B-U-6). 
 
 Strategy 1:  No overall strategy to overcome the fear of raising issues and joining the 
union 
 In interviews union members could identify a major obstacle to achieving their goals, but 
had not yet developed a strategy for addressing it.  This obstacle was a widespread pervasive fear 
of retaliation for speaking out on issues or being seen as opposing management.  This fear, it was 
expressed to me, did not come about after the union gained representation.  Instead, it had been 
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part of the workplace climate for years and was claimed to be part of the reason employees 
looked to organize.  For example, during the organizing campaign “there was a lot of trepidation 
about revealing that you were in the union, interested, or affiliated in the union because there had 
been retaliation in the past.”  Everything was secretive:  “No one would come out and everyone 
was afraid” (B-U-7).  The current state of membership also indicates this:  over 50% voted for 
the union in a secret ballot election conducted by the FLRA, but only about 10% were currently 
union members. 
 This lack of a strategy to combat the climate of fear issue meant the union had been 
unable to articulate specific tactics it could use to attempt to change the climate.  Feeling like 
things were not going to change, a union member reported, “There is a stigma attached to the 
union as if you are with some secret cult.  Big fear that a lot of employees don’t want to be 
associated with the union.  I don’t know how to change it.  I have tried.”  The same member 
continued: 
  The problem with most employees here that I have noticed more here than in  
   [other parts of the bureau] is that fear thing going on.  People don’t want to come  
  forward and say anything.  They are very scared... People were afraid to sit in on  
  meetings with management as a union rep.  You had a lot of people say I will be  
  your eyes and ears but you can’t mention my name.  They wanted to meet at  
  restaurants far away from [work]… If people could see what the    
  union is doing it would help.  (B-U-5) 
 
Even though increasing the union’s visibility was identified as a potential strategy by other 
members of the union, the union did not identify specific tactics to do so. 
 Based on this lack of strategy, it follows that CORE PLUS has not been promoted by the 
union and is not considered a helpful conflict management tactic for the union.   As noted earlier 
in this chapter, while the union agreed to CORE PLUS when management proposed it in 
negotiations for its first term collective bargaining agreement, it is aware of no bargaining unit 
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employee who has used the system.  When asked about CORE PLUS, union members reacted 
universally similarly, stating their belief that unless the fear of retaliation was erased or severely 
lessened, the system would not be helpful in the long run.  For example, one member said that 
CORE PLUS currently meant “nothing.  We get all kinds of emails:  ‘We do not tolerate 
reprisals, discrimination…they say it, but they are not doing it… It is a constant fight… 
Reprisals are a palpable thing [here].”  She continued, “Of course CORE PLUS could help.  But 
is it real?  Or are there going to be reprisals” (B-U-3)?  Another member commented, “I have 
read enough propaganda in the last [x number of] years… I don’t have any faith if they say they 
have a conflict resolution program” (B-U-1).  Still another member commented,  “Just because 
you give a training, send out emails, and put up a bulletin board does not change a culture… 
How do you change that culture in a healthy way” (B-U-8)?  Managers were also aware of the 
employee skepticism of CORE PLUS.  One said that it is a “hard thing to get employees to think 
that there won’t be retaliation for using the program…Hard to get employee to not feel like there 
might be an issue later on” (B-M-4).  Even though one can come up with several ways in which 
the union could potentially gain from actively embracing CORE PLUS, members felt that the 
fear of retaliation would outweigh any potential gains, and therefore felt that CORE PLUS was 
not truly an option, even though it was technically available.   
 
Unit B:  Management Goals, Strategies, and Associated Tactics 
 Like many employees in the bargaining unit, a good number of managers in Unit B had 
been in management in the unit for an extended period of time.  Therefore, like the union 
members interviewed, managers interviewed for this study discussed the fact that now that there 
was a union in the unit meant that changes in longstanding management practices needed to be 
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made and that changing managers’ management styles to involve the union was not an overnight 
process.  Different managers expressed two goals, which may look contradictory at first glance. 
 
 Goal 1:  To make the union seem unnecessary to bargaining unit employees 
 A common goal for many private sector and public sector managers alike is to create a 
workplace where employees see forming or maintaining a union is unnecessary.  In this view, 
which stems from the unitarist perspective of conflict, unions are a reaction to bad management 
or poor working conditions.  If management and/or working conditions are improved, the need 
for the union is perceived to have disappeared (Gall and Hebdon 2008). 
 Following in this vein, managers who hold these views are interested in making 
improvements in the way organizations are run so that they reduce the the causes of employee 
interest in unionization.  As one manager claimed: 
  In an ideal world there wouldn’t be a need for unions in the federal government.   
  If we had good supervisors employees wouldn’t feel the need… My job here is  
  to make people feel that the union isn’t necessary.  I don’t see any line between  
  management and labor.  We just have different positions and different levels of  
  responsibility. (B-M-6) 
 
This view animates much of management’s attempts to improve working conditions in the unit.  
This view also means that some managers wanted to acknowledge and address employees’ fears 
about retaliation.  Others were either not aware of it or did not express a need to change this 
aspect of the organizational climate. 
 
 Goal 2:  To acclimate to unionized organizational life 
 At the same time as some managers wanted to work toward eliminating the perceived 
causes for the union to be voted in, the same managers and other managers expressed the need to 
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better acclimate to the new reality of having the union in the workplace, although it seemed some 
managers have adjusted to the union faster than others. 
 One manager said that the biggest change with the advent of the union management that 
had been used to doing things on its own or getting employees together to solve issues now 
needed to involve the union before taking any action (B-M-2).  Union members reported going 
through an education process with management to make members of the management team 
aware that even if they prefer to deal with employee issues directly, the union now needs to be 
involved (B-U-5).  Another manager expressed the belief that the decision to have a union was 
the up to employees and that management should respect that decision, but that the union does 
add “an extra layer” into managing the unit.  At the end of the day though, this manager believed 
that the union shared management’s desire to resolve conflict in the workplace and that both 
groups wanted to help employees (B-M-3).  A third member of the management team expressed 
the belief that management and the union had already created effective formal communication 
processes.  Employees are starting to approach the union president to address issues, he noted.  
The union president will then contact HR and then HR will either resolve the issue or schedule a 
meeting with the appropriate members of the management team.  Then the union and 
management to attempt to negotiate a resolution (B-M-4). 
 
 I identify three strategies currently being used by managers in Unit B. 
 
 Strategy 1:  Bypassing the union and not being fully aware of its role 
 As was just mentioned, the union and local management in Unit B were in a new union-
management relationship, and both parties were still in the process of navigating the uncharted 
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waters of their ongoing relationship.  Some managers were learning about what managing in a 
unionized organization entailed, but others were perceived by union members as deliberately 
undercutting the union.  For example, one union member recounted an instance where a 
supervisor misrepresented that the “union won’t agree” to a potential work schedule change that 
would have benefited employees in the work group, and therefore the schedule could not be 
changed.  The union claims it never received a request to discuss or negotiate the matter.  “All 
those employees in that division [now] think the union is a roadblock,” the member exclaimed 
(B-U-8).  Another union member described an issue over developing a workplace wellness 
program.  A manager spearheaded the program’s design process, but when the plan for the 
program was ultimately proposed and the union then attempted to discuss it with management, 
the member recounts that management decided to shut the program down, leaving the unit 
without it.  Whether this was done with anti-union animus is unclear, but the member indicated 
that the effect of ending the program was interpreted by employees to be anti-union (B-U-7). 
  
 Strategy 2:  Addressing, while suppressing, conflict and dissent 
 From my interviews with managers and union members I found active conflict 
management and resolution in some areas, and conflict suppression in others.  A manager and a 
union member both discussed an issue between the two of them regarding scheduling of shift 
start and end times.  Even though the manager stated that she felt the discussion over the issue 
that occurred over email, with the union president cc’d, went well, the union member did not feel 
satisfied with the outcome in which no substantive changes to his or her schedule were made.  
While the member still had the ability to contact CORE PLUS or file a grievance regarding the 
matter, the member asked him or herself the question, “How bad do I want this?  Do I really 
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want to go through the process when I am busy?”  Ultimately the member decided to “shelve it 
for now.”  This case provides a good example of a direct discussion about an issue, but at the 
same time it also reveals the ways in which conflict is suppressed because of a climate of fear in 
Unit B.  If this same issue had occurred in Unit A, a union member likely would not have had 
any second thoughts about filing a grievance, as this tactic was a common practice in that unit. 
 Managers had different opinions regarding the fear to raise issues.  Some managers did 
not acknowledge it.  Others saw it as an issue.  One manager believed that since conflict is often 
not actively addressed, it is “simmering under the surface.”  The manager added that there are “a 
lot of closed doors.  People talking.  Hearsay in the workplace” (B-M-5).  Another manager 
believed that the climate was changing and there was less fear of raising issues in the workplace.  
The manager recounted an all-employee meeting in the recent past in which employees presented 
issues, questions, and concerns in an anonymous letter.  “That was interesting.  And that has not 
happened since… I think they find that they can raise any issue, absolutely no concern about 
repercussions and retribution.  We don’t have that atmosphere here.  It is a different atmosphere 
than it used to be,” the manager stated (B-M-6).  Another manager discussed the fact that upper 
management in the bureau prioritized conflict management and resolving employee concerns.  
While CORE PLUS wasn’t promoted per se, conflict resolution issues would be discussed in 
upper management meetings (B-M-3). 
 But the behavior of employees in writing an anonymous letter may have been predicated 
by past memories of all-employee meetings.  One union member recounted the story of a 
manager who spoke in an all-employee meeting and was then chastised by another manager in 
front of everyone, “which was the wrong thing to do.  [The second manager] eventually wrote 
[the first manager] up saying that [she] disrespected [him/her].  That got across [the workplace] 
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and [employees] learned that if you speak up, you get written up and they to try to fire you.  The 
damage has been laid.  Now employees are afraid so they are never going speak up unless you 
change things ” (B-U-5).  A union member commented, “Management doesn’t want any 
eruptions.  They don’t say ‘here is something we need to fix.’  Instead they let it fester until the 
boiling point.  Then you get real brush fire… They think you don’t have conflict if you don’t 
have a grievance” (B-U-2). 
 
 Strategy 3:  Ambivalently accepting third-party conflict management options 
 The final management strategy I identified to be associated with Unit B is a strategy that 
embraces third-party conflict management options, but only ambivalently.  Third-party options 
refer to involvement by a neutral or decision-maker (who is not a part of management).  This 
could be an arbitrator, the FLRA in the case of a ULP or negotiability proceeding, an EEOC 
administrative law judge, or a CORE PLUS neutral.  While managers all knew that all three 
options were available and ordained for use in the unit, there was ambivalence toward believing 
that any of them were helpful management tactics.   
 For example, a manager thought the union’s recent negotiability appeal before the FLRA 
was a “horrible waste of taxpayer dollars” (B-M-6).  Another manager stated his or her belief 
that, “Anytime you can not have grievance or EEO complaint, I would like to see that happen” 
(B-M-5).  When it came to CORE PLUS, managers continued to express an ambivalent attitude 
toward the ICMS.  While some managers thought CORE PLUS could be helpful in the right 
circumstances, most did not wholeheartedly embrace the system.  One manager thought that 
CORE PLUS could be a good alternative to counseling for employees who may be averse to 
seeking counseling support, even though CORE PLUS is not designed to be such a substitute (B-
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M-5).  Another expressed the belief that supervisors need to want to use CORE PLUS.  “That’s 
our job” (B-M-3).  As discussed in Chapter 4, this belief mirrors the policy of DOI that states 
managers must participate in CORE PLUS if one of the employees they supervise requests that 
they do. 
 Other managers, while acknowledging CORE PLUS’s legitimacy, indicated they would 
not seek out the ICMS, as it was not particularly useful or helpful in their view.  When asked 
about CORE PLUS, one manager stated, “Hope to not have to use that stuff.  Hopefully none of 
those tools will be needed.  That is my goal.”  When asked if she would be interested in taking 
training offered as part of CORE PLUS, the manager continued, “I don’t have time for that.  I 
have a job to do.  But if any of my staff wanted to do it, I would support them.” (B-M-1).  While 
this statement indicates support for staff using CORE PLUS, the fact that the ICMS is separated 
from the manager’s “job to do” indicates that she has not fully accepted the program as a 
component available as part of her job and organizational life.  When discussing if she would 
want to use CORE PLUS with a hypothetical employee who may be headed toward removal 
from his or her position with the federal government, another manager stated, “No, I think the 
management system needs to work and good supervision needs to happen” (B-M-6).  Other 
managers indicated that they, too, felt that CORE PLUS was not appropriate in many situations.  
One manager thought that in removal cases CORE PLUS would not help because “you don’t 
want those type of people in the workplace.”  The same manager believed CORE PLUS would 
not help as an early intervention tools either.  She thought that whenever a matter involved “legal 
issues” or  “day-to-day issues” CORE PLUS is not appropriate:  “There is a certain time and 
place for it” (B-M-2). 
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Industrial Relations Climate 
 Unit B’s union-management relationship is much newer than the relationships in Units A 
and C.  With its first collective bargaining agreement signed only two years prior to this study, 
union members and managers indicated both sides were still learning their relatively new roles.  
That said, an analysis of IR climate, composed of the dimensions of trust, respect, cooperation, 
and the quality of the labor-management relationship, finds the unit to be more on the lower end 
of the scales, primarily due to the fact of the newness of the relationship between the parties and 
an organizational culture (that predated the union) which kept conflict “simmering” under the 
surface rather than being actively addressed. 
 On the cooperative/conflictual dimension of IR climate, I found signs of much 
cooperative effort at the formal level.  For example, one union member recounted negotiations 
for the unit’s first collective bargaining agreement to have taken only a week, a much shorter 
period than most federal collective bargaining negotiations, some of which stretch multiple years 
(B-U-6).  Other managers and union members shared the belief that in most cases once the union 
presented issues, management, usually at the upper levels of the unit would work to resolve the 
issues raised.  One manager, however, believed the normal process in which the union president 
would email top management concerns was excessively formal.  “I think you lose a lot when you 
do it that way,” the manager stated, commenting that it was her belief that face-to-face 
communication is always better (B-M-2).  As discussed earlier in this chapter, many issues in the 
unit were not raised, because either bargaining unit members or the union did not feel 
comfortable moving the issue forward, either through initially approaching management about 
the issue, using CORE PLUS, and/or filing a grievance.  This meant that on the surface, the 
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union and management exhibit a seemingly cooperative relationship, but under the surface trust 
and respect issues remain.  
 As discussed earlier in this chapter, I found trust between the parties to be low.  From the 
union’s perspective, a major contributor to its low level of trust of management was union 
member fears of retaliation for speaking up and not believing the union had yet fully gained a 
sense of legitimacy in the eyes of management.  From management’s perspective, managers 
frequently commented they were still getting accustomed to organizational life with a union and, 
while some believed that union member and bargaining unit employee fears of retaliation for 
proactively addressing conflict were misplaced, others frequently saw employees not feeling 
comfortable going directly to management with issues.  One manager spoke of a “consistent” 
tendency she observed for employees “it is easier to go to the union becuase it gives them a level 
of anonymity” (B-M-4). 
 On the dimension of respect, I again found the “simmering” conflict undermining long-
term relationships.  While there was a palpable sense of community and civility in the bargaining 
unit built up over the decades many employees and managers had worked together, this outward 
civility allowed the “simmering” of conflict and talk “behind closed doors,” discussed earlier, to 
take root (B-M-5).  As the same manager put it, “I don’t think everyone is happy all of the time.  
On the surface we try to behave ourselves, but there are things I would like to see people doing 
that they are not doing” (B-M-5).  And as a union member commented, “There had been bad 
employee-management relations in this [unit] for a long time.  Partly from abusive supervisors 
and abusive management practices…People don’t forget” (B-U-6). 
 Even in an IR climate with low trust and respect levels, it is interesting to note that the 
parties easily adopted CORE PLUS into their collective bargaining agreement, giving support to 
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the argument that IR climate on its own does not fully explain the variation in union participation 
in an ICMS.  As will be discussed below, the international union played a much larger role in the 
union’s ultimate support for including CORE PLUS in its collective bargaining agreement than 
in the other two units included in the study.   
 
Role of the International Union 
 Unit B, as a new local, had more contact with the international union and its assigned 
business agent than most well-established locals that are accustomed to conducting day-to-day 
union business on their own.  This business agent had a larger role in helping the local decide 
upon its priorities in the initial CBA negotiations than in the other two local unions, which 
manage their own negotiations.  For example, one union member in Unit B, when asked if she 
knew about CORE PLUS, answered that she knew it was a “conflict resolution process that is 
short of going to the labor relations board… If we have it, it is because [our business agent] said 
it was a good thing.  [She] is the expert” (B-U-6).  Recollections of the business agent’s 
perspective on Integrated Conflict Management Systems and ADR centered around the fact that 
the international union, like the union in Unit A, had model ADR language that stressed 
“supervisor accountability” in any ADR process.  Supervisor accountability means that a 
supervisor must participate in any ADR process if the employee uses it.  This accountability 
features prominently in the design of CORE PLUS (B-U-2). 
 While the pro-CORE PLUS position of the union’s business agent was the primary 
reason union members said they initially agreed to include the system in their collective 
bargaining agreement, as noted earlier in this chapter, the larger union organization did not 
attempt to promote use of the system with union members.  Without such an intervention, the 
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fear and distrust of the program remained with the union members who knew about its existence.  
One union member commented: 
  I guess I don’t have a lot of faith in the [bureau’s] CORE PLUS… If they are  
  aware that there has been discrimination it is trying to protect that person.  CORE  
  is a way to try and push something under the bus and hide it and take care of a  
  problem real quickly.  To me it is like pat on the wrist, o.k. you did wrong, don’t  
  get caught. (B-U-5) 
 
With beliefs like these, it is not hard to see why members would be opposed to using CORE 
PLUS, even if they have the option. 
 
Negotiation Mechanics and Content of Agreement 
 In the case of Unit B and as discussed in this chapter, management proposed CORE 
PLUS during term negotiations for the first CBA for Unit B and the union accepted the ICMS.  
One member stated she didn’t know about it before negotiations, but that the union’s business 
agent said it was good, and clearly management wanted it.  With these interests aligned, it was 
easy to reach agreement on CORE PLUS language that tracks the language found in the 
Department’s CORE PLUS Implementation Handbook (B-U-6; 2011 DOI, 24; Appendix 2). 
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CHAPTER 7 
UNIT C 
 
Introducing Unit C 
 The final unit in the study differs from Units A and B in the composition of job functions 
that comprise the bargaining unit.  While Unit C still includes only employees designated “non-
professionals” under federal labor law, Unit C provides back-office design and planning support 
for other parts of the bureau of which all three units in this study are a part.  Therefore job titles 
in this unit include engineers, architects, and planners, which are also included in Units A and B 
but are a small minority of those unit populations.  Unit C has around 225 employees making it 
the largest unit in the study.  Union members number 70 in the unit, making its membership rate 
about 31% of the bargaining unit.  Like Unit A, Unit C’s union is a local affiliated with the 
American Federation of Government Employees (C-M-3; C-U-2). 
 The local’s number of years in existence falls in between that of Units A and B.  Formed 
in the late 1990s, the union was in direct response to a planned “Reduction in Force” in the unit, 
which is the federal government’s highly regulated procedure for the layoff of civil servants.  
Management and union interviews recounted the challenging time for the unit’s employees and 
local management, under orders from Washington to reduce staff of up to 50% in the unit and to 
contract out much of the work that had previously been done in house.  The union was voted in 
as a defensive mechanism, which allowed unit employees to have a little more say in the process, 
through negotiation of an RIF Memorandum of Understanding with the agency.  This MOU was 
the union’s first item of business once it was certified and was negotiated before a collective 
bargaining agreement was.  As one union member recounted, the union was important at that 
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time for “solidarity for one:  having a group of employees that banded together for our best 
interest and the best interest of the organization.  We were all pretty damn happy with our 
position in [the bureau], the function we were serving, and we definitely wanted to keep that.”  
The RIF that was conducted in 1999 ultimately ended with much less involuntary separation than 
was initially predicted.  The MOU allowed for transfers to different positions in DOI outside of 
the unit, and allowing many employees the option to stay if they accepted a demotion.  
Consequently, only 11 employees left the agency involuntarily (C-M-3; C-U-2; C-U-6). 
 After this process was complete, the union and management began negotiating their first 
collective bargaining agreement.  The agreement differs from most others in the federal sector as 
it is titled a “Partnership and Collective Bargaining Agreement.”  The CBA reflected President 
Clinton-era terminology for labor-management cooperation initiatives under an Executive Order 
issued by President Clinton; President Obama’s labor-management forums’ Executive Order is 
modeled after Clinton’s.  Rather than create a separate partnership agreement, as many federal 
union and management pairs did, Unit C decided to incorporate the partnership agreement into 
its CBA, including language outlining the role of such a council:  “The purpose of 
the…Partnership Council is to design, implement, and maintain a cooperative, constructive working 
relationship between labor and management to achieve common goals.” 
 As will be discussed later in this chapter, even though “common goals” were identified in 
framing the partnership agreement, the IR climate of Unit C has varied over time.  Even though 
they had a partnership agreement in force, union members recounted an adversarial climate 
during the initial years of the union’s presence in the unit.  Recounted one member, the “gulf 
between management and labor was really bad.  There was no trust” (C-U-6).  The union and 
management began to embrace more fully a partnership approach after the RIF was completed.  
 115 
Both union and management stated that in the over ten years since, their relationship has 
continually evolved toward a partnership framework with a cooperative IR climate being found 
in the unit.  One management official commented when asked about the cooperative labor-
management relationship, “[I] think it is a solid, supportive relationship… We have a lot of good 
activity” (C-M-3).  On the union side, similar sentiments were echoed.  One member commented 
that when joining the unit as a new employee: 
[I found the union] worked pretty well hand in hand with management.  I had 
asked a couple of managers around what their impression was of the union 
generally speaking that it seemed to complement management here.  It was a way 
for the managers to also get what they needed in solving their problems so it 
seemed to be something worthwhile. (C-U-1) 
 
 The CBA/Partnership Agreement originally negotiated by the union and management in 
1999 is still the CBA that is in effect.  Union and management representatives reported that for 
the most part it is functioning well and there is no pressing need to reopen negotiations, although 
both sides could quickly list several improvements they would offer in term negotiations.  The 
parties conduct mid-term bargaining over new issues not addressed by the CBA.  Monthly 
Partnership Council meetings, while required by the CBA, have not been occurring on a regular 
basis, however.  Instead, the parties meet informally and in other management venues.  Managers 
noted that the union president frequently met with top managers in the unit.  The union president 
also attends management monthly communication council meetings.  In these meetings top 
managers “go over high level topics” facing the organization with branch and squad chiefs (C-
M-1; C-M-3). 
 Like Unit A and unlike Unit B, the union in Unit C has monthly meetings.  Although I 
was not able to attend a meeting while visiting the unit, union members indicated the usual 
format includes getting a Washington, DC legislative report on federal employee issues and 
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hearing if there are any issues or grievances over a pizza lunch.  But as one member commented, 
this seems to be a one-way conversation: 
Basically I get the sense that members are supporting the union because they 
know that it is what’s needed so that if some emergency happens, it is there.  But 
this is static, passive.  This doesn’t develop the union as an organization.  That 
takes a lot of energy. (C-U-1) 
 
This observation can be compared to Unit A where non-officer members took a more active role 
in their meetings and there was more use of committees.  And also unlike Unit A, the union in 
Unit C has never had a contested election for union officers.  Officers therefore serve longer 
terms, with the current president having been in office since 2003.  One union member 
commented, “We are really lucky not to have [contested elections] and people have been 
generally supportive of the direction we have been moving.”  At the same time, though, the same 
member admitted that it is hard to get people to step up and take a leadership role in the union 
(C-U-6). 
 In terms of formal grievance and statutory process activity, the union in Unit C falls on 
the less active side, and attempts to go to a formal process only as a last case scenario when 
faced with an issue.  Still, it does not avoid heading to a formal process when it feels it is the 
right approach for a matter at hand.  A union member discussed the local’s approach: 
We have filed grievances, but we really try and avoid that.  There have been some 
egregious issues where we’ve had to, but for the most part it’s really trying to find 
a reasonable solution at the lowest level.  It’s that long-term building and 
maintenance of the relationship that leads to your ability to resolve issues in a 
constructive fashion so constant communication is important. (C-U-6) 
 
When grievances have been filed in the past ten or so years, union members indicated issues 
involved have included classification, disciplinary cases, inappropriate workplace language, and 
performance matters.  But in terms of getting a sense of average yearly activity, in the past two 
years, only one grievance has been filed.  It was ultimately settled in mediation with an FMCS 
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Commissioner (C-M-4).  No ULPs were filed in the unit in the past two years.  Interestingly, the 
Partnership/Collective Bargaining Agreement requires a ‘preventative’ ULP procedure as part of 
the two parties’ partnership.  The agreement states: 
If a ULP is proposed by either party, there will be a seven (7) calendar day cooling-off 
period and an emergency meeting of the partnership council will be convened. If this 
situation arises, the parties agree to implement appropriate non-binding alternate dispute 
resolution techniques prior to filing with the Federal Labor Relations Authority within 
seven (7) calendar days of the emergency meeting. 
 
While this language was adopted before CORE PLUS was available in the unit, one can easily 
see CORE PLUS’s applicability in this situation.  In the realm of EEO matters, one union 
representative indicated a preference for recommending that bargaining unit employees use the 
grievance procedure rather than filing a formal EEO complaint because that process is much 
slower.  However, discussions with management and union officials indicate that bargaining unit 
employees do use the federal EEO process.  Exact numbers were not available since the CBA 
does not require a notification to the union of bargaining unit employees who contact the EEO 
Office.  Additionally, the EEO Office does not ask employees of their bargaining unit status.  
EEO counselors only ask employees if they have filed a written grievance or MSPB appeal 
before coming to the EEO Office, as they are required to ask to be in compliance with federal 
law.  In an interview, an official in the unit’s EEO Office reported that in a majority of EEO 
cases handled, the employee agrees to use CORE PLUS at the informal stage.  The union could 
not recall an MSPB appeal in which it was involved. 
CORE PLUS was a topic addressed in a 2008 mid-term bargaining session.  Unlike Units 
A and B, though, in this unit the union proposed adopting the ICMS to management rather than 
management introducing it initially.  A union member who supported CORE PLUS knowing of 
it through work as an EEO counselor, encouraged union leaders to learn about the program.  “I 
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don’t think CORE PLUS was a hard sell,” the member commented.  Another member reported 
the chief steward at the time was a big promoter of CORE PLUS as well.  The negotiations were 
recalled by a union member as “pretty painless.”  The union drafted a Memorandum of 
Agreement and “ran it past management.  I think they might have made a few corrections and 
basically signed off on it,” the member who was involved with the drafting recounted (C-U-6).  
An analysis of the MOA indicates that the CORE PLUS program is available to any bargaining 
unit employee and is initiated by an employee contacting a CORE PLUS Specialist or HR 
representative.  It states that if the parties agree to a resolution of their issue(s) in CORE PLUS 
that resolution agreement will be binding.  If they do not, a bargaining unit employee has 15 days 
to file a written grievance under the parties’ CBA.  What remains unclear is if the CBA’s 
preexisting filing of 30 days after a grieveable incident or 30 days after an employee becomes 
aware of an incident would still apply.  The agreement indicates that any union representative 
asked to serve as an employee representative in the CORE PLUS process will receive reasonable 
official time to do so.  There are no notice requirements to the union included in the MOA, 
meaning the union may not know about every CORE PLUS intervention if it is not contacted by 
a bargaining unit employee directly.  Final copies of any agreements are to be maintained by the 
Bureau Dispute Resolution Specialist and the parties and their representatives, meaning the 
union is not provided with a final copy unless it is serving as an employee’s representative. 
 Union leadership could recall approximately six times a bargaining unit member had 
utilized CORE PLUS services, acknowledging this number is almost certainly lower than the 
actual usage.  But as noted above, the CORE PLUS MOA does not require notification to the 
union if the employee goes first to CORE PLUS and does not otherwise contact a union 
representative.  And as noted above, employees were using CORE PLUS as part of the EEO 
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process as well.  In some instances employees did not designate union representatives to 
accompany them in that process. 
 A unique feature of the union’s relationship with CORE PLUS in Unit C is the fact that a 
union member from the bargaining unit serves as the CORE PLUS Coordinator for Unit C as 
well as for another small group of offices.  In Units A and B, the CORE PLUS Coordinators 
serving those units are non-bargaining unit employees in different locations from the bargaining 
units.  Although CORE PLUS Coordinators are trained mediators and potentially in other 
conflict resolution techniques, they almost never serve as neutrals in their home offices.  Instead, 
usually they are on the receiving end of a call from an employee or manager in the unit, and they 
conduct initial consultations and make recommendations on whether a CORE PLUS process may 
be beneficial for a caller, and if so which one(s).  If the caller and any other parties in the conflict 
agree to participate in a CORE PLUS process, the Coordinator then schedules a session.  If a 
mediation, he or she uses the CORE PLUS network of DOI and non-DOI neutrals to find and 
schedule a mediator who is acceptable to both of the parties. 
 
 
Unit C: Union Goals, Strategies, and Associated Tactics 
 
 As the title of this thesis indicates, local union strategies for managing the relationship 
with management range from the drawing of a clear and unmistakable distinction between the 
union and management (Unit A), to a collaborative approach where the line between union and 
management is more blurry (Unit C).  In this section of the chapter I delve specifically in to the 
union’s goals, strategies, and tactics.  I preview here the interesting and important fact that 
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strategies and associated tactics for the union have changed a great deal since the union was first 
certified, while the union’s overarching goals have remained the same. 
  
 Goal 1:  To ensure the long-term sustainability of the organization/bargaining unit 
 In Units A and B the unions’ goals were to build union power and legitimacy, 
respectively.  But the union in Unit C maintained a goal of the long-term sustainability, not of 
the union, but of the bargaining unit.  As previously discussed in this chapter, Unit C was faced 
with budget cuts in the mid-1990s.  After a Reduction-in-Force (RIF) emanating from these cuts, 
the union in Unit C over time began to consider its own fate intricately tied to local 
management’s.  Memories of the budget cuts and the RIF were still fresh in many union 
members’ minds even though they occurred over ten years ago.  Thus, much of the union’s 
activity since focused on of one of its goals, which as one member stated, was the “stability and 
longevity of the organization.”  The member continued: 
  If that doesn’t exist, nothing else matters.  And so that has always been my  
  primary concern and I think that is the interest we share with management and I  
  think they’ve operated on basically the same premise.  And I think that makes  
  everything easier if you share that one paramount interest a lot of other things fall  
  into a clearer focus. (C-U-6) 
 
Because of a continuing tough budget environment, which has included a unit-wide hiring freeze 
the past for a couple of years, union members would often express a general sense of happiness 
with their situation, but realized that “external” budget pressures could continue to get worse.  In 
the words of one member: 
  I think more or less we are fine as an organization, although there are certain  
  issues we can address.  It’s how do we equip ourselves with these external  
  pressures and not being totally reactive and trying to anticipate reasonably what  
  will happen.  I think overall the management team has been proactive and very  
  strategic about how they are approaching things, but it’s not going to get better.  
  (C-U-5) 
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 Goal 2:  To provide and demonstrate the union’s value to members and non-members 
 Like the unions in Units A and B, the union in Unit C also shared a goal of providing and 
demonstrating value to bargaining unit employees.  Where it differs is in its strategies for doing 
so.  Like Unit A, the union in Unit C did show value to members and non-members through 
handling individual employee and group grievances and issues.  Process-wise, though, the union 
in Unit C was much more likely to use more informal methods, such as informal discussions and 
negotiation with managers, than formal processes, such as the grievance procedure and ULP 
process.  Though all three locals in this study are part of larger national unions that represent 
employees across the federal government, union representatives and members in Unit C 
expressed their belief that the union showed its value outside of the bargaining unit through its 
lobbying on Capitol Hill, the White House, and the Office of Personnel Management (the federal 
government’s HR policy office).  Every local union meeting included a legislative update 
component in which members were informed on the latest from Washington regarding federal 
employee issues and on national union advocacy and activism around these federal government-
wide issues (C-U-1). 
 As discussed earlier in this chapter, members reported the union membership rate is 31% 
of the bargaining unit, which falls in between that of Units A and B.  Several members expressed 
frustration about the membership rate, which had fallen from around 60% when the union was 
started in the late 1990s.  One member stated that the current membership rate is a “product of 
our own success.  Employees don’t see need to join.”  She continued, adding, “Unions are 
analogous to democracy.  They both seem to function best under adversity… Anyone coming in 
would go… ‘What is the problem’?” (C-U-6).  Another expressed frustration that, “We have 
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been dropping membership.  It is very hard to get people to join.  It is impossible to get anybody 
to do any work, to be an officer, it is really really hard” (C-U-2).  An explanation for the 
decreasing percentage of members and lack of widespread member engagement came from a 
member who also rhetorically asked the question:  “Is there a reason to be a member?”  The 
member also observed that membership in the union was clumped in certain subunits of the 
bargaining unit, with membership being stronger in certain professions and job titles than others.  
The member noted that the local did not actively “sell” the benefits of union membership.  
Instead, there was an “intellectual assumption that you should know why unions are good,” 
which in some ways could be seen to absolve the union of the need for the active recruitment and 
education of bargaining unit employees (C-U-5).  As another member put it, “The right to 
organize in the private sphere is analogous to the right to vote in the public sphere.  I have not 
communicated that enough… If you don’t have a union, you have nothing, you are utterly 
dependent on management” (C-U-6). 
 
 Strategy 1:  Focusing on organization as a whole 
 As opposed to the unions in Units A and B, the union in Unit C constructs its identity 
more as a part of a larger organizational whole, rather than a separate subunit of the organization.  
The best and most pervasive illustration of this view was union members’ use of the pronoun 
“we” to refer to the entire local organization of which their bargaining unit was a part rather than 
the union.  One example of this occurred in a conversation with a union member regarding hiring 
before the hiring freeze went in to effect.  “The office has done good job of recruiting talent over 
the past five years.  The people are superb.  Just about everyone we hire is right off the top shelf” 
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(C-U-6).  In this statement, which could have just as easily been uttered by a manager, “we” 
referred to the organization rather than the union. 
 When discussing the purpose of unions generally, one member stated her belief that 
unions existed to “protect workers’ rights” as well as to “strengthen working relationships and 
make a better functioning organization” (C-U-2).   Again, the “organization’s” interest, which 
can easily be seen to also be management’s interest, is paramount. 
 Social events and activities are another area in which the union uses tactics to implement 
its strategy of thinking of the organization as a whole.  Union members and managers 
commented on the union’s practice of paying for snacks and coffee at all employee meetings.  In 
the words of one manager, the “union funds all-employee meetings’ coffee and snacks.  They 
always step up.  They bought coffee for a deputy going away.  These are little things, but to us 
they mean a lot.  They don’t distinguish bargaining unit, non-bargaining unit” (C-M-3).  The 
union also sponsors the office holiday party, for which all bargaining unit employees and 
managers are invited.  Said the same manager, “We don’t do a holiday party any more, the union 
hosts the party off site.” (C-M-3).  This can be seen to be at the other extreme from the tactic 
used by the union in Unit A, which is considering starting its own holiday party for union 
members only. 
 
 Strategy 2:  Letting management use its discretion 
 Union members in Unit C had a more accepting and permissive approach to management 
than did the union in Unit A.  Instead of serving primarily in a watchdog role that assumed that 
management was out to ‘get’ union members, union leaders in Unit C often “worked pretty well 
hand in hand with management” to solve issues in the workplace (C-U-1).  This general trusting 
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attitude meant the union allowed management more latitude than the union in Unit A, not 
frequently filing grievances and ULP charges to keep management in check. 
 Letting management use its discretion can be seen as a union strategy to manage the 
relationship between the union and local management: 
  We are always trying to help individuals the best as I can tell and at the same  
  time because we work closely with management we are also very keenly aware of 
  the need for maintaining that relationship and that our ability to get things done  
  for individual members is heavily dependent on that relationship.  We know that  
  at the bottom it is our members that we are looking out for.  We are not looking  
  out for management, but we see that our relationship with management is critical  
  to achieving to what our members want. (C-U-1) 
 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, federal law severely limits the scope of bargaining in the federal 
sector as compared to the private sector.  Therefore, unions representing federal employees are 
usually eager to negotiate over all mandatory subjects of bargaining.  In Unit C, though, the 
union has decided not to pursue certain subjects, which are not included in its CBA, even though 
it could demand to bargain term CBA language, or MOU language, when management makes 
changes to such areas.  An example of this is Unit C’s employee awards program.  One manager 
described the program in which three management-determined elements factor in to an award 
pool, with the pool being completely quantified based on those three elements (C-M-1).  Even if 
the union was completely happy with this arrangement, it could ask for CBA language to cement 
the practices, at least until the next round of negotiations.  Managers compared the contract and 
MOU language in Unit C as much less onerous and restrictive for management than other CBAs 
in the bureau (C-M-4, C-M-5). 
 Another area in which union members indicated that they would let management use its 
discretion was in EEO matters.  Unlike the union in Unit A, which indicated it would like to be 
actively involved in any mediation or formal meeting as part of the EEO process if a bargaining 
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unit employee were involved, some union members in Unit C indicated they would let 
employees deal directly with managers and EEO officials in that process.  One member stated 
that the union will refer people over to EEO and that the union probably wouldn’t come with an 
employee to EEO.  “If it is an EEO issue, it is an EEO issue.  If it is discrimination it is not 
something we should be involved in” (C-U-2).  Another member said that the union did not have 
a place in mediation situations taking place after an employee has entered the EEO informal or 
formal processes due to the fact that the agency’s EEO office “has that legal providence to deal 
with those.”  The same member, though, indicated that unlike the member above, the union 
would want to participate in meetings surrounding a formal EEO complaint, if mediation fails 
(C-U-6). 
 Some of this strategy comes from the union’s view that management isn’t the complete 
‘other’ to the union.  Union members uniformly saw the promotion of union members to 
management positions as a benefit to the union rather than a union-busting strategy, in which the 
best union representatives are neutralized by being removed from the bargaining unit.  One 
member stated, “There will be former union employees who go into management, go to the ‘dark 
side’, but generally speaking it is the best possible thing for the union to have former members in 
supervisory positions” (C-U-6).  Maintaining relationships with managers who are former union 
members were key strategies of the union in maintaining its overall relationship with 
management. 
 
 Strategy 3:  Embracing active, informal conflict management tactics 
 The final strategy I found the union using was that one that embraced active conflict 
management outside of traditional, formal processes, which included primarily CORE PLUS.  
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This strategy is exemplified by the alternative approach taken by the union in Unit C to initially 
introduce CORE PLUS to its bargaining unit as compared to the unions in Units A and B.  While 
the unions in Units A and B responded to CORE PLUS after management proposed it to them 
(with Unit A rejecting CORE PLUS and Unit B accepting it), the union in Unit C proposed 
CORE PLUS to management after union members had heard about the program and decided that 
they wanted it in Unit C.  A union member recalled the negotiations from 2008 in which the 
system was introduced to the bargaining unit through an MOU.  “It was pretty painless.”  The 
union drafted a Memorandum of Agreement and “ran it past management.  I think they might 
have made a few corrections and basically signed off on it.”  The same member recalled that the 
chief steward at the time, along with other members, was a big proponent of CORE PLUS (C-U-
6).  The fact that the union proposed CORE PLUS to management, and the program had 
strongstrong support from union representatives, indicates that the tactic of initially choosing to 
participate squarely fit into the union’s overall conflict management strategy. 
 As another member put it, “I like the idea of CORE PLUS because we can use all of the 
help we can get.  I don’t see it as a threat.  I see it as a help.”  The same member indicated, 
however, that it was still important that the union be aware of the problems bargaining unit 
employees are bringing to CORE PLUS.  The member acknowledged that there was no language 
in the MOA requiring the union to be notified whenever a bargaining unit employee contacts 
CORE PLUS, and thus the union is not notified when this occurs, except when an employee 
notifies the union him or herself.  The same member commented that other than the notification 
issue, it would not be an issue if bargaining unit employees went to CORE PLUS without 
contacting the union.  “I don’t really care where they go as long as they get a satisfactory 
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resolution because I think it is more important that issues get resolved in a positive manner 
instead of being a control freak” (C-U-2). 
 Another member reported knowing about six CORE PLUS mediation sessions with 
bargaining unit members since it became an option, but also acknowledged due to the fact there 
is no reporting requirement to the union, this figure likely underestimates the number of times a 
bargaining unit member has contacted or been referred to CORE PLUS (C-U-6).  The same 
member also indicated that it would not be seen as problem if bargaining unit employees used 
CORE PLUS without the union having a role: 
  Since that is a right available to any employee, it seems like if it didn’t work, the  
  union’s role would then emerge and we would be involved if the employee was  
  not satisfied and we needed to carry it further.  If it does work, we don’t really  
  need to be there… Our major goal was just to sort of get it codified with   
  management that CORE PLUS would be implemented... It has always been our  
  objective to settle disputes with the minimal amount of hard feelings in general.   
  The union is always there if you have to escalate, but I think that that is in   
  everybody’s best interest to have that lower level first step. (C-U-6) 
 
The union, in this member’s view, is clearly seen as an escalation step rather than the ‘front line’ 
of conflict management.  Another member echoed this view when discussing disputes that pit 
one union member against another and expressed her belief CORE PLUS would be a more 
appropriate conflict management venue than the union dealing with these issues internally, 
because “we represent both members” (C-U-2).  This view can be compared to the opposite view 
expressed by a union member in Unit A, discussed earlier in this chapter, in which she stated the 
union preferred to keep internal member issues in-house. 
 Last, it is important to note that unlike Unit B, where the coordinator is not a bargaining 
unit member, the CORE PLUS coordinator for Unit C is a union member.  She has responsibility 
for the bargaining unit in addition to management employees as well as additional bargaining 
units and non-represented employees in other bureau offices.  The coordinator applied and was 
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competitively selected by management for her current position.  While there are issues specific 
to the duel role of a “neutral” role of CORE PLUS coordinator as well as a “non-neutral” role of 
union member that I plan to address in future work, it is important to note here that the union 
actively supports having a member serve as CORE PLUS coordinator and respects her need to 
maintain a somewhat special status in the union because of this role. 
  
 
 
Unit C: Management Goals, Strategies, and Associated Tactics 
The final group of goals and strategies that I analyze in this thesis are those of the management 
of Unit C. 
 
 Goal 1:  To ensure the long-term sustainability of the organization/bargaining unit 
 It became clear after analyzing my interview data, that the central concern of the 
management team in the unit was to ensure the long-term sustainability of the office.  Like the 
members of the bargaining unit who were constrained and threatened by budget cuts of the late 
1990s, so were local managers who were called upon to implement budget cuts being decided on 
by higher levels of the bureau in Washington.  Managers remembered that time vividly and 
recounted the pressure to cut about 250 jobs during that period and to do so in a way that 
minimized its effects on productivity and involuntary terminations (C-M-1, C-M-3).  Managers 
also discussed the unit’s current hiring freeze for permanent positions in the federal competitive 
civil service.  Although implemented by local management, as opposed to bureau headquarters, 
due to an extremely tight budget environment, the hiring freeze put pressure on managers and 
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bargaining unit employees alike.  Like union members, managers wanted to see the budget 
environment improve, and like union members they did not feel that their organization was ever 
totally secure from future cuts.  One manager discussed how tough it is when an employee leaves 
the organization and cannot be replaced.  While managers and employees are personally happy 
for an employee, they all wonder how the work can effectively be redistributed, if at all (C-M-3). 
 
 Strategy 1: Treating the union president as a manager 
 
 Managers would frequently discuss their belief that the Unit C union president acted in 
such a way to earn their trust and respect and that he was treated in such a way that could be seen 
to be much of the same way other managers were treated.  This approach by local management 
to the union president was not seen in Units A and B.  Managers would often relate their 
comments to the union president’s qualities signaling that almost surely a new local president 
would not immediately be treated the same way.  Nonetheless, management’s approach to 
managing its relationship with the union president is a strategic choice.  As one manager opined, 
“[The union president] is just so practical about things.  [She] is just very reasonable about 
things.  [She] will stand up and defend the employees but [she] also understands when stuff has 
to happen from a management perspective.”  The same manager continued, “I really rely on [the 
union president] as a manager and friend.  [She] is so open and gives good advice so I will say 
‘Hey what do you think about this?’ So it’s really very helpful” (C-M-2). 
 Another manager commented: 
  Here I clearly believe that [the union president] is management’s first ally in the  
  process.  I say that only because the fact that [in recent memory we have] only  
  had one grievance… I firmly believe that [the union president] would have a  
  heart-to-heart with the employee and letting her know what [she] feels about the  
  case and if it still is an issue she calls [management].  (C-M-4) 
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The union president is seen by this manager to still be doing his or her job in representing 
bargaining unit employees, but is also seen to provide a screening function, only bringing 
important issues and grievances to management’s attention. 
 Management in the organization has monthly squad meeting for supervisors and branch 
chiefs and the union president comes, reported another manager.  In those meetings managers 
and the union president, “go over high level topics” facing the organization (C-M-1).  
Additionally, during my visit to Unit C, observational data provided evidence of the 
collaborative relationship the union president had with local management.  A good example of 
this was the fact that the union president walked in to the director’s office and introduced me to 
the director without a prior appointment and felt very comfortable stopping by.  This comfort 
level and informality was not exhibited by the local union presidents in Units A and B, which 
maintained a more formal relationship with the top manager in each of their respective units.  
Also, the union president in Unit C was able to call a meeting during the workday for union 
members and bargaining unit employees to meet with me to learn about my study and either sign 
up to be interviewed or give comments in a large group setting. 
 
 Strategy 2:  Solving problems informally 
 
 Like the union, management in Unit C had a strategy to deal with problems informally, as 
opposed to through formal negotiation with the union or the grievance procedure.  The union 
president was the main point of contact between the union and management with each side 
feeling comfortable in bringing up issues with the other.  Also, in a similar fashion to the union, 
management officials saw CORE PLUS as a desirable, informal process that is preferable to 
formal procedures.  One manager stated why she preferred CORE PLUS: 
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  Any tool that keeps you out of litigation, or even the union’s grievance formal  
  process—it doesn’t lead to discussion and resolution.  It’s a retort type process.   
  Sometimes that is necessary, but if you can use CORE PLUS before that to find  
  out what is underlying that is best. (C-M-3) 
 
Another manager expressed the view that no matter the outcome, the process of participating in 
CORE PLUS was beneficial for managers and employees alike, “Whether you get a resolution or 
not, the parties have gone through a learning experience.  They walk out of there differently than 
when they walked in” (C-M-5).  Another example of management’s support for the ICMS is its 
promotion of conflict management training, which has included DOI’s “Getting to the CORE of 
Conflict” course, which is the Department’s general course for employees on conflict 
management issues in the workplace (C-U-5). 
 While I did find a notable preference for informal methods, including CORE PLUS, 
versus formal procedures, this preference did not translate to a fully active conflict management 
strategy on the management side.  One manager reported that some of her colleagues are open to 
engaging with conflict while others avoid it (C-M-2).  Since there is an aversion to formal 
grievances, sometimes when a grievance is filed the manager sees the issue as taking time a 
away from their work rather than as part of their work and an opportunity to address the 
underlying issue(s).  “Managers see every grievance as a problem,” one interviewee commented, 
most say “this is distracting me from my job” (C-M-4).   
 
 
Industrial Relations Climate 
 Interview data presented in this chapter show the IR climate in Unit C is high on the 
cooperative scale and high on the trust and respect scales.  Interestingly and importantly, union 
members reported that this has not always been the case.  Unlike the IR climates of Units A and 
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B, which have remained relatively stable over the years, the IR climate of Unit C has 
dramatically shifted in the years since the union’s certification.  One member discussed a more 
conflictual non-trusting IR climate during the period immediately after the union was 
recognized. The “gulf between management and labor was really bad.  There was no trust,” she 
said (C-U-6).  This IR climate was due to different union and management goals and strategies in 
the face of imminent budget cuts and potential job losses.  After the budget crisis ended, union 
members and managers reported that the IR climate began to change; goals and strategies began 
to be more aligned.  “We certainly have evolved into a true partnership,” one member stated.  
“We have gone through at least three directors and each one has become more accepting of 
having the employees have a say in how things go” (C-U-2).  Another member recounted a story 
of a bureau official visiting the office for the first time during the early 2000s, after the IR 
climate had begun to shift to a more cooperative and trusting one.  Making a disparaging 
comment in an all-employee meeting about the work being done there, the official ignited a 
firestorm.  As a response the union president and director of the office jointly wrote a letter 
asking for an apology and ultimately were granted a meeting with Deputy Secretary of the 
Interior to receive an apology and to talk about the work they were doing.  One member 
explained that a joint meeting would have been unthinkable just a few years before: 
  Four or five years before that, if you told people that the union president and the  
  [office director] would be going to meet with the Deputy Secretary of the   
  Interior, nobody would believe that.  Why?  The relationship was toxic.  We  
  wanted that distance. (C-U-6) 
 
This comment gives credence to the argument that the IR climate changed in the unit not on its 
own accord, but through active strategic management of the relationship by the union.  The 
change in workplace IR climate over time shows in this bargaining unit that specific IR climates 
are not inherently linked to job function or the innate personalities of managers, union members, 
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and bargaining unit employees.  The jobs, professions, and for the most part the actual 
employees in the bargaining unit (due to extremely low levels of turnover) stayed the same, but 
the goals, strategies, conflict management tactics, and ultimately the IR climate changed.  These 
observations provide additional data that IR climate is most useful when conceptualized as an 
intervening variable.  It ultimately can be seen to be more of a consequence of strategy and 
tactics than a primary explanation that stands on its own. 
 
Role of the International Union 
 The local union in Unit C indicated that the international union had no role in its push to 
negotiate an initial CORE PLUS memorandum of agreement with unit management.  Union 
leaders did not recall contacting the international union in DC or its regional office for advice 
during their consideration of the CORE PLUS program and their negotiation of the MOA 
implementing it.  The local union felt it had an adequate understanding of the ICMS and did not 
feel that it warranted contacting higher ups in the union.  The union’s behavior indicates a high 
level of autonomy, which the international union gives to its locals generally.  While one can 
imagine a union where all CBA and MOU language must be approved at a higher level, this 
union operates in a very decentralized manner. 
 
Negotiation Mechanics and Content of Agreement 
 As was discussed earlier in this chapter, unlike in the other two bargaining units included 
in this study, the local union proposed CORE PLUS to management rather than the reverse.  This 
indicates CORE PLUS was seen by the union as a strategic conflict management tactic that it 
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wanted to use.  The negotiations over the MOA were described by a union member as quick and 
“pretty painless” (C-U-6). 
 The content of the agreement, which can be found in Appendix 3, shows a high level of 
union trust of the CORE PLUS process.  The MOA is worded in such as way that it does not 
require the agency to notify the union when a bargaining unit employee requests to use or uses 
CORE PLUS unless she asks that the union serve as a representative.  In fact, the union member 
currently serving as the CORE PLUS coordinator for the bargaining unit indicated that she did 
not notify the union when a bargaining unit employee contacts CORE PLUS.  The coordinator 
recounted a past incident in which union members were conflicted about what to do regarding a 
member in a dispute with her supervisor.  The member had opted to use CORE PLUS.  Union 
members wanted to get the CORE PLUS coordinator to share what was going on in the CORE 
PLUS process and how things were progressing so they could decide what to do.  The 
coordinator recalled responding, “Wait a minute… you don’t get to know—process is 
confidential.”  While the CORE PLUS coordinator did not personally have trouble saying no to 
the union, this example indicates the union’s interest in bargaining unit employee usage of 
CORE PLUS and differing opinions about the level of access it should be given to the process 
when a member has not requested union representation. 
 The CORE PLUS coordinator here, though a union member, did not think the union had 
a role in this case.  And based on the MOA negotiated, the union did not have an opportunity to 
be notified when the member contacted CORE PLUS or to be present in the CORE PLUS 
session if not requested by the employee.  Another member explained the rationale the union 
used when negotiating the MOA arguing: 
  Our major goal was just to sort of get it codified with management that CORE  
  PLUS would be implemented.  Since that is a right available to any employee it  
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  seems like if it didn’t work, the union’s role would then emerge and we would be  
  involved if the employee was not satisfied and we needed to carry it further.  If it  
  does work, we really don’t really need to be there.  (C-U-6) 
 
DOI acknowledges the right of the union to negotiate an option for it to be notified and present at 
all CORE PLUS sessions involving a bargaining unit employee.  The union in Unit C at the time 
of the initial negotiation of the MOA did not see this as an essential element to include in an 
agreement. 
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CHAPTER 8 
PROPOSED MODEL AND CONCLUSION 
  
 Having discussed the goals and strategies of both local union and local management 
teams in Units A, B, and C, I now summarize my findings, recapping the goals and strategies of 
each group and identifying the level of overlap between the two.  I first look at Unit A: 
 
Table 8-1 
UNIT A 
Union Management 
Goal 1:  To build union power 
 
Goal 2:  To provide and demonstrate the union’s value to 
members and non-members 
 
Goal 1:  To strengthen management power 
Strategy 1:  Prioritizing a vibrant ‘union identity’ and strong 
‘union solidarity’ 
 
Strategy 2:  Emphasizing a distinction between the union and 
management  
 
 
Strategy 1:  Focusing on compliance with law, regulation, and 
CBA 
 
Strategy 2:  Conveying management authority to the union and 
bargaining unit employees 
 
 Comparing goals between the union and management, one’s first impression may be to 
see a total mismatch.  If building power is seen as a zero-sum problem, with the two parties 
believing that one party’s power comes necessarily at the other’s expense, than these goals are 
completely non-aligned.  While the parties themselves tended to see power building in this 
fashion, I argue that it is not essential to view these goals as completely non-aligned.  One can 
also think of building power in a variable-sum fashion in which both the union and management 
simultaneously build power (along with the union demonstrating value to the bargaining unit).  
One can imagine a scenario in which management can still influence and motivate employees to 
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help meet goals without resorting to coercive tactics and the union can still be seen to effectively 
represent its constituents without believing that management is wholly the problem and not part 
of the solution. 
 Analyzing the strategies of the union and management, I find even more divergence.  In 
emphasizing the distinction with management on the union side and authority of management on 
the management side, I find each side involved in strategies that are zero-sum.  To build its 
identity as the union, the union chooses tactics that differentiate it from management.  
Management, for its part, chooses tactics such as inflexible enforcement of terms of the CBA 
that attempts to demonstrate to the union that if not required by the CBA or law, management 
will take charge and be in control of the situation.  As can be imagined, use of CORE PLUS is 
not a tactic that fits with these strategies.  Thus, I argue it is not surprising that the union is not in 
favor of the ICMS as it is currently designed.  The union’s current portrayal of CORE PLUS as a 
management program fits into its strategy while local management, though officially in support 
of CORE PLUS due to department policy, does not see the ICMS as a helpful conflict 
management tool in the current local environment.  Like in the previous discussion of goals, it is 
important to remember that for every goal, there usually are a number of strategies that can be 
selected to achieve it.  Thus, if the parties were to come up with new strategies for reaching their 
goals, CORE PLUS likely could play a part. 
  
 I now turn to analyze the goals and strategies found in Unit B:   
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Table 8-2 
UNIT B 
Union Management 
Goal 1:  To gain legitimacy 
 
Goal 2:  To provide and demonstrate the union’s value to 
members and non-members 
 
Goal 1:  To make the union seem unnecessary to bargaining 
unit employees 
 
Goal 2:  To acclimate to unionized organizational life 
 
 
Strategy 1:  No overall strategy to overcome the fear of raising 
issues and joining the union 
 
 
 
Strategy 1:  Bypassing the union and not being fully aware of 
its role 
 
Strategy 2:  Addressing, while suppressing, conflict and dissent 
 
Strategy 3:  Ambivalently accepting third-party conflict 
management options 
 
 
 Analyzing the level of alignment between the goals and strategies of the union and local 
management, one sees first a direct conflict between the union’s goals and management’s first 
goal.  The union’s goal to gain legitimacy means that it wants to be seen as a legitimate actor in 
employment relations in the unit, which will not only help it grow in membership, but also to 
represent bargaining unit concerns effectively with management.  Management’s first goal to 
manage in a manner that makes employees feel the union is not needed can be seen as 
delegitimizing the union’s role.  At the same time, some managers in the unit do not feel this way 
and others who do, realize that they have a legal obligation to deal with the union now that it has 
been certified. 
 The union’s second goal of providing and demonstrating value matches the goal of Unit 
A, as the union also wants to show that it matters.  But unlike Unit A, the union in Unit B has not 
yet developed a strategy for achieving its goals.  This does not mean that the union is non-
functional—far from it.  The union has been effective in contacting management, raising issues 
and resolving them with upper management through direct negotiation.  It has been selective, 
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however, in the issues it raises and many issues never reach the union due to the fear employees 
in the unit have about raising issues with management.  Also, the union has not yet developed a 
strategy for addressing such fears in order to make more employees feel comfortable in joining 
the union.  Most importantly, the union has not yet considered itself an it.  Instead, members 
either see the union as nonexistent or as a national organization that has not invested much in 
getting the local off of the ground.  For the most part, members do not see themselves as the 
union in such a way as members of the union in Unit A do. 
 As discussed in Chapter 6, management officials were espousing what can seem at first 
glance to be contradictory goals to both acclimate to life in a unionized workplace as well as at 
the same time making the union seem unnecessary.  Management officials see the union as a 
legally authorized representatives of the bargaining unit, but all managers are aware of the 
extremely low percentage of membership and most remain unsure about the benefits of having a 
union. 
 It is not surprising that management and union did not have trouble agreeing to add the 
CORE PLUS program to their initial collective bargaining agreement.  With the union being 
brand new to the unit, one could argue the negotiations occurred during the nascent stage of 
goals and strategy development for the union as a brand new organization and for local 
management specifically now that the union was certified.  This being the case, both the local 
union members and local managers looked upward in their organizational hierarchies to receive 
guidance.  With both DOI upper management and the international union supporting CORE 
PLUS and ADR generally, there was no reason for either party to oppose including it in their 
new collective bargaining agreement. 
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 But the fact that after ratification of the CBA, no bargaining unit employee has used 
CORE PLUS and the union and management are not actively promoting it as an option indicates 
the ICMS does not fit into any aligned strategies between the parties.  While some managers said 
that they supported CORE PLUS, overall, managers were not actively encouraging use of the 
program and frequently thought that using the ICMS meant one had already failed as a manager.  
The union did not believe CORE PLUS could be used as a tactic that could help it gain 
legitimacy and show value to its membership, and therefore did not actively promote or 
encourage the system’s use. 
 
 I now turn to Unit C: 
Table 8-3 
UNIT C 
Union Management 
Goal 1:  To ensure the long-term sustainability of the 
organization/bargaining unit 
 
Goal 2:  To provide and demonstrate the union’s value to 
members and non-members 
 
Goal 1:  To ensure the long-term sustainability of the 
organization/bargaining unit 
 
 
Strategy 1:  Focusing on organization as a whole 
 
Strategy 2:  Letting management use its discretion 
 
Strategy 3:  Embracing active, informal conflict management 
tactics 
 
Strategy 1:  Treating the union president as a manager 
 
Strategy 2:  Solving problems informally 
 
 
 
 As was discussed in Chapter 7, the union in Unit C was organized in a time of great 
turmoil that threatened the continued existence of the organizational unit of which Unit C is a 
part.  That context is essential to understanding why the overarching goals of both the union and 
management overlap exactly with regards to the ensuring the long-term viability of the 
organization.  Of course, other lower level goals that are not addressed in this study including 
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those dealing with day-to-day unit management issues do not overlap, nor does the goal of the 
union regarding demonstrating the union’s value.  But the fact that both the union and 
management are committed to ensuring that the unit is sustainable means the potential for 
collaborative approaches to conflict management is great, yet not guaranteed. 
 One will remember the discussion in Chapter 7 of the major shift in IR climate in the 
over the decade the union has been in place bargaining unit due to changing conflict 
management tactics of both the union and management.  This shift has meant that both the union 
and management have now embraced active, informal conflict resolution methods as tactics that 
advance their strategic goals, but in the past at the height of the Reduction-in-Force process used 
more formal and adversarial conflict management tactics, even though their goals to keep the 
office open and operating were still aligned. 
 Even though both parties actively embrace CORE PLUS, and a union member serves as a 
CORE PLUS coordinator, I did not find employees beating down the doors to use the ICMS.  
Though Unit C arguably is an extremely supportive environment for CORE PLUS, one must 
remember that such support does not overcome cultural and individual perceptions of using 
conflict resolution programs as somehow indicating an individual’s failure to address issues on 
his or her own.  But, as can be seen with the support of both the union and management officials, 
the system stands a good chance of flourishing in years to come, especially after joint union-
management training, which the parties indicate will occur in the near future. 
 
 In this thesis I have argued an analysis of the alignment of union and management goals, 
strategies, and tactics is essential to understanding the parties’ choices to participate and engage 
with an Integrated Conflict Management System.  I argue that this alignment ultimately matters 
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more than other factors influencing union and management choices of conflict management 
tactics, such as the IR climate of the bargaining unit, and the influence of the international union.  
While these factors are included in my proposed model of ICMS participation and use in 
unionized organizations, my thesis has shown they cannot fully account for the variation in 
choices of union and management teams by themselves.  Nor can other more descriptive unit 
characteristics such as type of employee, details of which can be found in Appendix 1. 
 As I discuss in Chapter 3, a theoretical lens that proves helpful in my attempt to explain 
union decisions surrounding conflict management systems is that of symbolic interactionism.  
This sociological theoretical tradition, which arises out of the pragmatist philosophy, focuses on 
the social interactions between individuals and groups as its unit of analysis rather than “focusing 
on the individual and his or her personality characteristics, or on how the society or social 
situation causes human behavior” (Charon 2004, 28).  A symbolic interactionist perspective 
separates itself from other theoretical orientations that do not prioritize agency for individuals 
and groups.  As Joel Charon writes: 
  In contrast to other social-scientific perspectives that emphasize how passive and  
  caused we all are, symbolic interactionism describes the actor as a being who  
  interacts, thinks, defines, applies his or her past, and makes decisions in the  
  present based on factors in the immediate situation. (2004, 29) 
 
Though I believe actors in any social system write at the same time as they are written by the 
social texts of which they are a part, nonetheless the symbolic interactionist approach gives 
explanatory power to actors’ choices and their control of their futures.  Thus, I find this approach 
particularly helpful as it privileges, as do I in this thesis, conflict management tactical choices 
unions and local management teams take in response to their own analyses of their goals and 
strategies.  This approach gives the parties more agency than other work in the industrial 
relations climate and labor-management partnership literatures, which I discuss in Chapter 2.  
 143 
These literatures attempt to identify the structural factors causing certain industrial relations 
behavior, namely adversarial or cooperative.  I find my approach, which looks at the strategic 
decisions of the actors allows for more creative analyses and leaves more room for change in 
behavior of the parties and ultimately is less deterministic. 
 
 Based on my analysis of the variation in union strategies regarding participation and non-
participation in an ICMS, I propose the following model: 
 
Figure 8-1:  Proposed Model 
 
Level of Alignment of Goals and Strategies of a) Union and b) Management ←←←←←← ← ←←←←←← 
↓  ↑                                                                                                                                                                           ↑ 
↓  ↑(Potential to impact)                                                                                                                                          ↑ 
↓  ↑                                                                                                                                                                           ↑ 
Conflict Management Tactics → Negotiation → Union Participation/Engagement in ICMS → →→→→     ↓     
↑  ↓                                                                                                                                                                           ↓ 
↑  ↓                                                                 ↑                                                                                                           
↑  ↓                                           Role of International Union                                                                                ↓ 
↑  ↓ 
↑  ↓                                            ↓                    
IR Climate in Bargaining Unit   ←←  ← ← ←  ←← (Potential impact of ICMS) ←←←←←← ← ←←←← 
 
 
 
 I find this model fits squarely within a pluralist conceptualization of workplace conflict 
and provides a challenge to individual personality-oriented and “why don’t we try to all just get 
along” tendencies found in a unitarist approach to workplace conflict and its management.  I 
hope one contribution of this study is that it shows the clear benefits of a pluralist approach to 
workplace conflict and that pluralism needs to be fully brought to ICMSs. 
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 Whereas ICMSs are still new to Units B and C, this model includes the potential for an 
ICMS to change the IR climate in a bargaining unit, leading to potential change in conflict 
management tactics.  One can imagine a scenario in which union and management pairs who 
have agreed to participate in and use an ICMS learn new approaches to managing conflict, which 
ultimately begins to change the organization’s IR climate.   
 One can also imagine an even greater impact of ICMS participation being unions and 
local management teams changing their goals and strategies as a result of ICMS participation and 
engagement.  Though this likely would happen after changes in IR climate, the potential for 
changes in goals and strategies depends on the nature of the goals and strategies in the first place.  
One can doubt a private sector union paid below its industry peers will change its hypothetical 
goal of a compensation package comparable to its peers due to its participation in an ICMS.  But, 
one could imagine a union changing its conflict management tactics if it is losing members due 
to the perception that there is less of a need for the union with the ICMS present, an idea I will 
explore next. 
 The open-shop environment of the U.S. federal sector provides a fortuitous research 
setting in which I am able to explore local union approaches to management of membership 
rates.  An open shop environment means employees are free to choose or not choose union 
membership, with non-members required to be represented in the negotiated grievance procedure 
under the common law of duty of fair representation.  As a membership-driven organization, low 
membership rates mean a smaller number of union members can be active in the union and take 
leadership roles.  It also means less dues money is coming in, limiting what the union can do and 
even possibly blocking the union from bringing strong cases to arbitration due to lack of funds.  
As members in the union in Unit B frequently mentioned, low membership means low power.  
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The locals discussed the fact that management is cognizant of the membership rate and how 
much of the bargaining unit is active participating in the decisions and strategic planning of the 
union.  This being the case, it is not surprising all three local unions in this study recognized the 
importance of their membership rates. 
 In a discussion of strategies for managing union membership rates, Peetz and Frost write 
“a key issue is building a sense of collective identity among union members that includes 
promoting norms that encourage collective behavior, developing social capital among members.”  
Continuing they argue, “Unions will also have to ensure that employees perceive that their union 
membership brings with it power and a sense of ongoing involvement in a collective that is 
providing real benefits” (2007, 175). 
 What is the role of an ICMS in a unionized workplace, then, when one considers a 
union’s need to serve as “a collective that is providing real benefits” in order to maintain and 
hopefully grow its membership?  As was discussed in Chapters 5-7 and noted in Appendix 1, the 
membership rate among the three locals included in this study varied widely.  With 57% of 
bargaining unit employees in the union, Unit A had the largest percentage in the union.   Unit B 
had the lowest with 10%.  Unit C fell in the middle with 31%.  Through its newsletter, meetings, 
and one-on-one conversations, the union in Unit A arguably did the most effective job informing 
the bargaining unit of the “real benefits” it provided, while the union and Unit B did the least.  
The union in Unit C, while providing much assistance in the realm of conflict resolution was not 
as public in communicating its efforts, and as noted in Chapter 7, did not take as active and direct 
role in certain types of conflict situations.  For example, if a bargaining unit employee chose to 
contact CORE PLUS directly the union would not be informed or asked to get involved unless 
the employee approached the union.  This was seen as effective conflict resolution by members 
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of Unit C, but one can also see the potential for the union to be seen by bargaining unit 
employees as ‘absent’ in the ICMS process.  This paradox was not lost on members of Unit C’s 
union.  As discussed in Chapter 7, members of the union conceded their current membership 
rate, down from around 60% in the late 1990s is “product of our own success” (C-U-6).  The 
“success” identified by this member included the shift to more cooperative conflict management 
strategies and resultant tactics along with the interconnected shift in IR climate.  But can this 
truly been seen as “success” when it is contributing the union’s loss of membership and one of 
the union’s goals is to demonstrate value to the bargaining unit? 
 In their 2001 book, Mutual Aid and Union Renewal, Bacharach, Bamberger, and 
Sonnenstuhl argue there are two “logics of union-member relations.”  Such a logic is a 
“cognitive framework guiding union strategies for legitimizing the union to its members, 
securing the commitment of its members, and attracting new members to the union.”  The two 
logics the authors identify operating in contemporary U.S. labor relations are the “servicing 
logic” and the “mutual-aid logic” (2001, 7).  In a servicing logic: 
  Members assume a passive role toward the union, relying on union leaders to  
  provide them with a variety of services, which include contract bargaining for  
  high wages, excellent benefits, and good working conditions as well as protecting  
  members through the grievance process. (2001, 7) 
 
In contrast, a mutual-aid logic envisions: 
  Members assume an active role in the union, involving themselves in every facet  
  of its activities.  Distinctions between leaders and members are minimized  
  because everyone is expected to be involved in the union, voluntarily helping to  
  negotiate and enforce collectively bargained contracts as well as acting to protect  
  one another. (2001, 7) 
 
Bacharach et al. continue, arguing that the servicing logic predominates in today’s labor 
movement, whereas the mutual-aid logic predominated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
in the U.S. (2007, 50).  Though I agree that one can make an historical argument about the 
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predominant logic of an era, I find it easy to see the variation in the logics of union-member 
relations in my three case studies.  Unit A can be seen to be operating the most under the mutual-
aid logic, while Unit B operates using a servicing logic.  I argue Unit C lies in the middle, 
although on a “logics” spectrum it would be closer to Unit B than Unit A. 
 Merging a “logics of union-member relations” approach with my focus on union and 
management goals, strategies, and conflict management tactics, I find it interesting that the union 
with a strong mutual-aid logic had rejected participation in an ICMS while the two unions 
operating under more of a servicing logic adopted it, although the union that was fully operating 
under a servicing logic was not using the ICMS.  One could imagine a union with strong 
servicing logic union not participating in an ICMS, if it were seen to be a competitor for the 
union’s conflict resolution services.  Like Bacharach et al., I found in my analysis of union goals 
the need of all three unions to show ‘value’ to current members and potential members and find 
the authors’ logics a helpful complement to my approach which argues the conflict management 
tactical approach a union takes depends ultimately on its goals, which necessarily will look at the 
value question.  Thus, for an ICMS to be embraced by a union with a strong mutual-aid logic or 
a strong servicing logic for that matter, the ICMS must contribute rather than take away from the 
value the union perceives it provides. 
 
Future Research 
 Even though ICMSs have been in the human resources and industrial relations lexicons 
for over a decade, much of the research in the area as discussed in Chapter 2 focuses primarily 
on the non-union private sector and issues of design and organizational strategic choice 
surrounding the decision to initially adopt or not to adopt a conflict management system.  This 
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thesis’s focus on a) a wholly unionized setting, b) a public sector setting, and c) on ICMS 
implementation rather than solely on the question of adoption, expands significantly the 
institutional arrangements and ICMS processes under study when compared to the existing 
research. 
 That being said, there is much research left to do.  First, this thesis does not explore 
variation in the design and implementation choices unions and management negotiators have in 
either designing and/or implementing an ICMS through the collective bargaining process.  
Examining the various arrangements (and potential arrangements) negotiated for union 
notification of bargaining unit ICMS usage, union presence in ICMS sessions, and union 
involvement in ICMS governance are important future areas of research.  Additionally, in a 
future paper I intend to investigate the implications of my study of the differing ICMS 
engagement choices of the unions in Units A, B, and C on issues of confidentiality, neutrality, 
integration with the negotiated grievance procedure, as well as on other topics.  In this paper, I 
intend to revisit Robinson et al.’s (2005) best practices for ICMSs in unionized settings, and 
offer my own best practice recommendations based on the research conducted in the three 
bargaining units included in this study. 
 The maximum variation sampling design chosen for this study while providing much 
theoretical leverage to explore the reasons behind the different reactions to the same ICMS by 
different local unions did not bring a longitudinal element into the case selection process.  For 
example, a larger study could have included bargaining units where unions had initially rejected, 
but now have accepted CORE PLUS as well as bargaining units where unions had initially 
accepted and used the ICMS, only to now have negotiated to no longer allow its use in the 
bargaining unit.  The perspectives of unions and local management teams who have transitioned 
 149 
between embracing and opposing CORE PLUS would provide important additional data points 
for the model of union participation and engagement in ICMSs I propose earlier in this chapter. 
 
Theory of ICMSs Revisited  
 ICMSs are not a panacea for removing conflict from the workplace, nor should they be 
seen to be.  This thesis, in adopting the pluralist perspective, understands processes for conflict 
management will always come up against structural conflict in which goals are not aligned.  In 
these instances, the best that can be hoped for is that the parties will accept moving to rights 
and/or power approaches to conflict resolution that usually reside outside of an ICMS, or 
understand and be at peace with the fact that the conflict will not be resolved and may even be 
productive in the long-term. 
 There is great potential for an ICMS to give parties additional conflict management tools 
that were previously not available.  The tools, though, in and of themselves are not enough.  
Acknowledgement must be given to a variety of objectives and strategies of unions as well as 
management for ICMSs to realize their full potential.  In other words, ICMSs must not be 
grounded in a unitarist conception of workplace conflict and instead should be firmly wedded to 
a pluralist one. 
 Underlying the argument for using an ICMS is often a notion that a conflict management 
system is ultimately designed around the needs of “the organization” and benefits the 
organization itself first and other stakeholders second.  ICMS designers and managers should 
recognize that other organizational stakeholders have strategic interests that do not align with the 
organization/management’s interests (Avgar 2008; Gadlin 2005). 
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 Challenging the construction provided by Lipsky and Avgar (2008), I find  
“organizational strategic goals and objectives” are often assumed to equal management strategic 
goals and objectives.  We should therefore be extremely critical in analyzing organizational 
goals and objectives for conflict management to be sure they are not conflated with management 
goals and strategy. 
 An analysis of union/management goal and interest alignment is not only essential, I 
argue, to understanding ICMS adoption and usage:  alignment of employee and management 
interests into an ‘organizational’ interest has been a goal of managers and human resources 
professionals since “Theory Y” of management was introduced by Douglas McGregor in his The 
Human Side of Enterprise (1960).  McGregor frames the development of his “Theory Y” by 
contrasting it with the more traditional “Theory X” view of management, which assumes the 
average worker “has an inherent dislike of work and will avoid it if he can” (1960, 33).  The 
assumptions about human behavior underlying Theory X, McGregor argues, leads it to a “carrot 
and stick theory of motivation” whereby management “by direction and control—regardless of 
whether it is hard or soft—is inadequate to motivate because the human needs on which this 
approach relies are relatively unimportant motivators of behavior in our society today.”  Instead, 
he argues “social and egoistic” needs motivate workers in a modern society and therefore 
management philosophy should take account of this fact (1960, 41-42). 
 Management strategies based on McGregor’s “Theory Y” attempt to do just this.  In 
subtitling his chapter explicating Theory Y, “The Integration of Individual and Organizational 
Goals,” McGregor makes clear his view that management does not necessarily need to use the 
carrot and stick approach to managing employees.  “Theory Y,” he argues, “assumes that people 
will exercise self-direction and self-control in the achievement of organizational objectives to the 
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degree that they are committed to those objectives” (1960, 56).  McGregor believes in 
organizations operating predominantly under a Theory Y philosophy will be continually 
“seek[ing] that degree of integration in which the individual can achieve his goals best by 
directing his efforts toward the success of the organization” (1960, 55). 
 An organization that chooses to implement an ICMS is almost surely heavily influenced 
by Theory Y approaches to management as McGregor argues that Theory Y management “leads 
to a preoccupation with the nature of relationships” in the workplace, while Theory X leads 
“naturally to an emphasis on the tactics of control” (1960, 132).  But in the end, is Theory Y 
simply repackaging ‘control’ in a different form?  And are ICMSs one method of such a 
repackaging? 
 Like the progressive critics of ICMSs discussed in Chapter 2, I agree that ICMSs have the 
potential to be methods of “systemic organizational management” as Gadlin describes them 
(2005, 382).  Unlike the “progressive” critics ICMSs, though, I believe this does not have to be 
seen solely in a negative fashion.  In this vein, a key question arises:  Does an ICMS contribute 
to more authoritarian control or democratic control of the workplace? 
 This thesis supports the argument that the theory of workplace conflict underlying the 
design, implementation, and operation of an ICMS matters.  While a management operating 
under a unitarist perspective on conflict may lead an organization to start an ICMS, such an 
ICMS will likely be designed and implemented in such a way that other stakeholders, including 
unions and individual employees, will not be heard.  Resolving conflict quickly and efficiently 
becomes the most important function of the ICMS.  Instead, one can imagine an alternative 
workplace operating under a more pluralistic conception of conflict, in which the ICMS serves as 
a mechanism for stakeholder input and feedback on what is not working in the organization and 
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allows the organization to collaboratively make changes.  The ICMS becomes a key data point 
for organizational learning, rather than seen as a failure if a dispute continues to a rights-based 
process such as grievance arbitration or litigation.  
 To the extent ICMSs allow ‘organizational goals’ to be separated from ‘management 
goals’ and influenced by other stakeholder concerns (including individual employees and 
unions), will the systems be less likely to turn into authoritarian control mechanisms and instead 
truly empowering for all in the organization.  The reason Unit C’s ICMS implementation 
experience was the most successful of the three case studies in this thesis, was that the union and 
management had the most overlap in their organizational goals and strategies to achieve them.  
My findings, though, indicate that when overlap does not exist, or is around much more narrow 
areas, a pluralistic conception of workplace conflict is important as it will support a larger role 
for non-management stakeholders to participate in the governance of the system without the 
stifling tendencies of an ICMS operating under a more unitarist view. 
 Unions’ abilities to engage or not engage in CORE PLUS supports this argument.  When 
the ability and power of stakeholders to be heard is low, ICMSs, on their own, may exacerbate 
those power and voice differentials, leading to a more authoritarian, “Theory X” organizational 
management approach.  Likely, ICMSs designed and operated in organizations where 
organizational strategic goals and objectives aren’t seen as equal to management strategic goals 
and objectives and incorporate a pluralistic view of the legitimacy other stakeholders provide the 
organization, including importantly unions representing the organization’s employees, will be 
more successful and sustainable.  The ultimate test for ICMSs success may therefore be their role 
in decoupling ‘the organization’ from ‘management’.  Rather than ignoring, threatening, or 
silencing non-management stakeholders (both in union and non-union contexts), the ICMS is 
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perfectly suited to be one of tools organizations and their stakeholders use to come to new 
understandings of what organizational goals and objectives can and should be, but only if the 
will to do so exists. 
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APPENDIX 1 
SELECTED DETAILS OF BARGAINING UNITS 
 
 UNIT A UNIT B UNIT C 
Job function Natural resources 
protection, public 
outreach, 
administrative, 
research, education 
Same as A Back office planning, 
design, and support 
services for the 
bureau 
Bargaining unit 
employees 
150 70 225 
Percentage of unit 
employees in union 
57% 10% 31% 
Years union active 50 + 2 13 
National union AFGE NFFE/IAM AFGE 
Frequently used 
conflict management 
options (Outside of 
CORE PLUS) 
Grievance procedure, 
Unfair labor practice 
process 
Avoidance, Formal 
negotiation 
Informal negotiation, 
Grievance procedure 
CORE PLUS? No Yes, through CBA but 
not using 
Yes, through MOA 
and using 
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APPENDIX 2 
UNIT B CORE PLUS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT LANGUAGE 
 
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE AND  
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
 
Section 1. The purpose of this agreement is to provide a procedure for the consideration and 
resolution of grievances. The procedure as stated herein will be the exclusive procedure available 
to the Union, the Employer and employees for resolving grievances. 
 
Most grievances arise from misunderstandings or disputes that can be settled promptly and 
satisfactorily on an informal basis at the immediate supervisory level. The Employer and the 
Union agree that every effort will be made by the Employer and the aggrieved party (ies) to 
settle grievances at the lowest possible level. 
  
Section 2. A grievance may be undertaken by the Union, Employer, an employee or 
group of employees. Only the Union or representatives approved by the Union may represent 
employees in such grievances.  
 
However, any employee or group of employees may personally present a grievance and have it 
adjudicated without representation by the Union, provided that the Union is given the 
opportunity to be present at all discussions related to the grievance between the grievant(s) and 
the Employer and be provided with copies of all correspondence/data relating to the grievance 
and provided to the employee.  
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In exercising their rights to present a grievance, employees and Union representatives will be 
free from restraint, coercion, discrimination or reprisal. 
 
Section 3. A grievance is defined as any complaint: 
 
a. By any employee concerning any matter relating to the employment of the employee; 
b. By the Union concerning any matter relating to the employment of any employee; or 
c. By an employee, Union, or the Employer concerning: 
1) The effect or interpretation of a claim of breach of the Agreement, or 
2) Any claimed violation, misrepresentation, or misapplication of any law, rule, or 
regulation affecting conditions of employment. 
 
Section 4. Excluded from coverage under this grievance procedure are matters concerning: 
 
a. Any claimed violation related to prohibited political activities; 
b. Retirement, life insurance or health insurance; 
c. Suspension or removal for national security reasons under Section 7532 of the 
Statute; 
d. Any examination, certification or appointment’ 
e. The classification of any position which does not result in the reduction in grade or pay of an 
employee; 
f. Termination of an employee during the probationary period; 
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g. Non-selection for promotion from a group of properly ranked and certified candidates; 
h. Any proposed actions under 5 U.S.C. §752 or 432 (action taken under 5 U.S.C §752 
OR 432 may be grieved) unless procedure errors occur in the proposal phase; and 
i. Reduction-in-force actions. 
 
Section 5. An employee and her Union representative will be given a reasonable amount of 
official time without loss of pay or charge to leave for the purpose of filing the grievance at each 
of the steps of the procedure including arbitration. 
 
Section 6. In the event either party should declare a complaint non-grievable or nonarbitrable in 
writing, the original complaint will be considered amended to include the determination of this 
issue. The grievability/arbitrability issue will be decided as a threshold issue when the grievance 
reaches arbitration prior to the consideration of any other issues by the arbitrator. 
 
Section 7. Unless mutual agreement is reached for extending time limits, failure to meet the 
specified time limits will result in the following: 
 
a. If the Employer fails to respond within the required time limits, the grievance may be 
advanced to the next step in the procedure and the Employer will be responsible for 
arbitration cost; 
b. If the grievant fails to meet the time limits at any step of the procedure, the grievance may be 
dismissed without further consideration. The grievant may further receive a written explanation 
of the determination to dismiss the grievance. 
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Section 8. Employees may grieve actions effected under 5 U.S.C §752 (adverse actions) or 5 
U.S.C. §432 (actions based on performance) (Suspensions of 14 days or more or removals) by 
filing a grievance under this procedure or they may file an appeal to the Merit Systems 
Protection Board within 30 days of the decision, but not both. The filing of appeal to the MSPB, 
or a grievance under this procedure, prevents the employee from using the alternative procedure 
described in Section 13. All grievances under 5 U.S.C. §752 and 5 U.S.C. §432 will be initiated 
at Step 2 of the Negotiated Grievance Procedure. 
 
Section 9. Step 1 grievances should be initiated at REDACTED.    
 
Section 10. An employee or group of employees, wishing to initiate a grievance may 
proceed as follows: 
 
Step 1: 
The grievance will be submitted in writing to the employee’s REDACTED within 28 calendar 
days of the occurrence of the event or action prompting the grievance or the date the grievant 
became aware of the action.  The REDACTED will, within 15 calendar days, render a written 
decision. (See Section 9 of this Article.) 
 
The responding official may make whatever investigation she considers necessary and will 
provide a written response to the grievance within 15 calendar days of receipt of the grievance. 
The response must indicate the right to submit the grievance at the next step of the procedure.  
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All discussions with the grievant concerning the grievance shall be with the Union 
Representative present.  
 
Step 2: 
If the matter is not satisfactorily settled at Step 1, the grievant/Union may submit the grievance 
in writing to REDACTED within 28 calendar days after receipt of the Step 1 decision. The 
REDACTED will review the grievance and issue a written decision to the grievant within 15 
calendar days after receipt of the grievance. 
 
If the Step 2 decision is unsatisfactory to the employee and the Union, the Union may, within 30 
calendar days after receipt of the step 2 decision, request arbitration of the grievance. (See 
Article 42) 
 
Copies of all decisions will be provided to the grievant(s) and the Union. 
 
Section 11. Grievances initiated by the Employer or the Union will be processed in accordance 
with the following:  
 
The Union or Employer will present the grievance in writing to the other party within 30 
calendar days after the occurrence of the action or incident being grieved or within 30 calendar 
days of the date the grievant became aware of the incident. 
The written grievance will contain: 
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a. The specific nature of the grievance; 
b. The section of the law, rule, regulation, collective bargaining agreement or condition of 
employment allegedly violated, policy; and 
c. The corrective action desired. 
 
The parties will meet within 14 calendar days after receipt of the grievance to discuss the 
grievance. The party filing the grievance will be furnished a decision by the other party within 15 
calendar days from the date of this meeting. If dissatisfied with the decision, the grieving party 
may request arbitration (See Article 42).  
 
Section 12. The parties agree that employees may utilize the Department of the 
Interior’s alternative dispute resolution process, Conflict Resolution (COREPLUS). The parties 
agree to follow the procedures established in Chapter 770 of the Departmental Manual (DM 
770). 
 
In the event the employee chooses COREPLUS, the time frames established by the grievance 
procedure are extended to either the issuance of a Notice of Results and Options or written notice 
by the employee or her representative that she no longer elects to utilize COREPLUS.  
 
Grievances submitted under COREPLUS that are outside the time frames of the grievance 
procedure will be considered not timely, but will be accepted by the COREPLUS to attempt 
resolution of the issues. 
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Employees may elect to be represented in the COREPLUS process in accordance with Section 2 
of this agreement. Provisions for official time for the COREPLUS process are in accordance 
with the basic agreement between the parties. 
 
Section 13. Grievance Mediation 
 
The parties agree the Department of the Interior’s alternative dispute resolution process, Conflict 
Resolution (COREPLUS), may serve as an early intervention alternative to the traditional 
dispute process. The purpose of the COREPLUS program is to provide a fair, equitable and 
effective means for resolving workplace disputes at the earliest opportunity, at the lowest 
organizational level, and to the mutual satisfaction of the parties. 
 
The parties agree to implement a grievance mediation option. This option is available only where 
the Union is serving as the employee representative. Either a mutually agreed to mediator or a 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) Commissioner assigned by FMCS will act 
as a mediator in grievance procedure so long as the grievance is timely invoked.  
 
The parties agree that grievance mediation may be an effective method of resolving grievances 
efficiently and economically by using the services of an objective third party to help the parties 
gain mutually acceptable grievance resolutions. The parties agree to the following as governing 
procedures for the grievance mediation process. 
 
a.  Grievance mediation may occur in each grievance step providing: 
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1) Either party requests mediation in writing.  
2) The other party agrees to mediation, although it is understood that a supervisor will 
generally participate in mediation if requested by the employee(s).  
 
b.  Coverage: 
 
1) All matters subject to the negotiated grievance procedure are appropriate for inclusion in 
the grievance mediation process. 
2) In the case of disciplinary action, grievance mediation may be invoked as an intermediary 
step between the decision of the deciding official and before arbitration, if arbitration has 
been invoked. 
 
c.  Requesting Mediation: 
 
While the mediator shall have no authority to impose a resolution on the grievance, either or both 
parties may request that the mediator suggest a resolution or offer a recommendation to the 
parties. The mediator will have the authority to meet separately with either or both party. 
 
d.  Proceedings: 
 
1) The grievant or her representative will request mediation in writing. 
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2) Proceedings before the mediator will be informal. Rules of evidence shall not apply.  No 
record of the meetings shall be made. 
3) The parties will present a brief statement to the mediator stating the facts, the issue, and 
providing arguments in support of their positions at the beginning of the mediation 
conference. 
4) The parties may be represented by the representative(s) of their choice; however, 
discussion shall be open to all participants. 
5) The grievant is entitled to be present at the grievance mediation conference. 
 
e.  Records: 
 
1) The parties agree to maintain joint records of the use of grievance mediation including 
the number of grievances addressed in grievance mediation, the number resulting in 
settlements, the issues covered, direct and indirect costs and the time frames involved. 
The parties agree to jointly develop a form to report the above information. 
2) Those employees and supervisors who were successful and reached a resolution of the 
grievance will develop a written settlement agreement. 
3) Contractual time limits shall be waived or extended to permit grievances to proceed to 
either the next step or arbitration, as appropriate, should mediation be unsuccessful. 
4) An employee who agrees to utilize mediation does not waive her right to continue to 
process the grievance once the mediation phase is completed. 
 
f.  Termination of Mediation: 
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1) Either party may terminate the mediation at any time during the process. 
 
2) Employees and supervisor cannot be forced to reach agreement. If the employee is not 
satisfied with the mediation results, she may proceed with the next step of the grievance 
procedure. 
 
3) Step 2 grievances not resolved through grievance mediation may proceed to arbitration. 
Any arbitration proceeding will be held as if grievance mediation had not occurred. 
Nothing said or done by the parties or the mediator during the grievance mediation 
session may be used or referred to during the arbitration proceedings. 
 
4) Any materials presented to the mediator shall be returned to the party presenting the 
materials at the termination of the mediation conference. 
 
5) Employees and supervisor cannot be forced to reach agreement. If the employee is not 
satisfied with the mediation results, she may proceed with the next step of the grievance 
procedure. 
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APPENDIX 3 
UNIT C CORE PLUS MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT LANGUAGE 
 
Memorandum of Agreement 
Use of the CORE PLUS Program 
 
The parties, REDACTED, (Union) and the REDACTED (Agency) hereby agree that bargaining 
unit employees may elect to utilize the CORE PLUS Program established in the Departmental 
Manual, 370 OM 770, and in the CORE PLUS Handbook. The CORE Program is in addition to 
the Grievance Procedures outlined in Article VI. of the Partnership and Collective Bargaining 
Agreement between the REDACTED. The parties therefore agree to the following provisions:  
 
1. If CORE PLUS services are requested, the bargaining unit employee shall contact a CORE 
PLUS Specialist (or request assistance from their Servicing Human Resources Office) within the 
designated Bureau/Office. The parties agree to use the CORE PLUS Program guidelines 
established in the Departmental Manual, 370 OM 770 and accompanying CORE Handbook.  
a) If the parties voluntarily reach an agreement/settlement through CORE PLUS mediation, they 
will be bound by the agreement/settlement. If no agreement/settlement is reached, the party may 
seek formal redress, as provided in the "Grievance and Arbitration Procedures" of the 
Partnership and Collective Bargaining Agreement within fifteen (15) days after the CORE PLUS 
mediation process and a "Notice of Results and Options" form is completed.  
 
2. Initial contact with a Conflict Resolution Specialist does not require supervisory approval. A 
reasonable amount of official time will be allowed without charge to leave or loss of pay in 
accordance with pertinent regulations.  
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3. The CORE PLUS mediation sessions will be held, if possible, on 001 premises and during the 
regular administrative work hours. If in a duty status, the parties to the complaint, Union 
Representative, or any employee called to participate in a CORE PLUS meeting will be excused 
from duty as necessary by her supervisor. Designated Union representatives and/or witnesses 
will not suffer loss of payor charge to leave.  
 
4. In accordance with 370 OM 770, the CORE PLUS process will normally not exceed 15 days 
with two possible extensions in 15 day increments, unless otherwise agreed to by both parties. If 
the mediation process is used, an "Agreement to Mediate" form will be completed by the CORE 
PLUS Specialist and signed by both parties and their representatives, if any.  Copies of the final 
signed agreement will be provided to all parties and the original document maintained by the 
designated Bureau Dispute Resolution Specialist (or CORE PLUS Dispute Resolution Manager).  
 
5. Issues discussed during CORE PLUS sessions are considered to be confidential to the 
maximum extent possible and will only be disclosed to those with a need-to-know (as defined 
under 370 OM 770).  
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